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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an attempt to explicate the concept 
of the death of God as it arises within Thomas Altizer's 
theological writings and the fiction of A.S. Byatt, 
paying special attention to the idea of the negation of 
eternal return. The negation of eternal return not only 
informs Altizer's theology, but also provides a metaphor 
wi th which to cri tique not only the tradi tional 
theological idea of God, but also the self-sufficiency of 
the theological tradition. As Altizer's theology is 
informed by a literary tradition outside the circle of 
traditional theological reflection, so this thesis 
suggests that theology comes about necessarily through 
self-emptying fictions, and not through the closedness of 
scholasticism; therefore the fiction of Byatt becomes a 
point of entry into theological reflection. The negation 
of eternal return also provides a useful metaphor for the 
metaphysics of the Proper, and economies of the Same. 
An intertextual consideration of Altizer's 
influences and theological development 
works of Byatt (specifically Possession, 
alongside the 
The Virgin in 
the Garden and still Life) , the thesis is informed also 
by thinkers such as Mark C. Taylor, Jacques Derrida, and 
Julia Kristeva, disciplines such as modern physics and 
nineteenth century biology, and literary works such as 
"The Dream of the Rood," and Iris Murdoch's The Time of 
the Angels. In the negation of eternal return, the 
kenosis of the God of Christendom, it is suggested, there 
arises a writing and reading which is, in Altizer's 
words, "a historically evolving faith," a decentering of 
the economy of the Proper, and an unending interpretation 
which is the apocalypse of the God who is other-than-God, 
and a theology which is other-than-theology. 
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PREFACE: 
Calling it a Draw 
Perhaps it was a book that only a genius could 
wri te, and he was not a genius. It might be 
that all he wanted to say about love and about 
humanity was true but simply could not be 
expressed as a theory. Well, he would think 
about all that later on. What he needed now was 
relaxation, perhaps a holiday. (Murdoch, Time 
of the Angels 221) 
Herewi th my thesis I which both presents and marks 
the end of my research (according to my submission forms, 
this theis should embody my research). Having submitted 
this writing to the institutional authority (an event 
which now, for me, lies in the future, a future forever 
captured in these marks: but for you, my reader I that 
future may very well be eternally past) the research from 
which it has originated is negated by its presence. Its 
presence, however, not· only marks the absence of that 
research, but its total presence in that negation. 
Nowhere else is that research to be found but here, and 
here only in its absence. 
In many ways the writing of a thesis is the drawing 
of a representation, an image, for lack of a better word, 
of one's research. "This is what my research looks like," 
I might say. Here then, is my picture, childish though it 
may be (for I remain a child in the eyes of the 
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institution, having not yet undergone the rite of passage 
to which this writing points). 
Flannery O'Connor once said that a child tries to 
draw "exactly what he (sic) sees" (Fadiman 607), but in a 
world following Piaget and Levi-Strauss, we have come to 
accept that a child draws not what he or she sees, but 
symbols representing what he or she sees, whether in 
reality or in the mind's eye. Any parent who has almost 
praised what looked like a very nice helicopter only to 
find that it is in the eyes of its artist a portrait of 
Mommy will understand this concept. To draw what one sees 
is a skill which must be taught, if it can ever be 
accomplished at all; it is certainly not accomplished by 
the unskilled child, and certainly not by this unskilled 
child. The unskilled child must provide an explanation in 
order to enlighten the uninitiated viewer of the identity 
of his or her inscribed symbol. Herewith my scribbled 
symbols, and my explanation--well, that's yet to come. 
This thesis was conceived of and written over the 
course of two years at the Centre for the Study of 
Li terature and Theology, at the Uni versi ty of Glasgow, 
Scotland. It is the product of original research and no 
part of it been used in any other thesis. A previous 
version of chapter three has been published in Literature 
and Theology 8:2 (1994). 
I have followed the MLA style in the presentation of 
this thesis, using parenthetical citation and, in cases 
of frequent citation or the use of multiple works by a 
single author, abbreviations for the titles of the works 
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have been used. A list of frequently used abbreviations 
precedes the text. I have, for the sake of clarity, 
deviated from MLA norms and single-spaced my end-notes. 
NOw, there are numerous people without whom I would 
not have been able to complete this project, and here I 
have a chance to formally acknowledge their 
contributions. 
I must begin by thanking Susan Cumings, who left 
several parts of her thesis, including her 
acknowledgement page, on a computer disc of which I am in 
possession. For the form of this page, I thank you, 
Susan. 
Thanks are also due to Dr. Robert Detweiler, who 
first of all sparked my- interest with a paper on 
Possession at the last conference in Glasgow, and also 
because of whose initial advice I wound up in Glasgow in 
the first place, and also to David Jasper, because of 
whose continued advice, support, and motivation, I have 
endured, SADS notwithstanding. Dr. Jasper has provided 
opportunities for personal development far beyond the 
requirements of a graduate supervisor. I am also grateful 
for the hospitality shown to Robin and myself by Alison 
Jasper, who has, along with David, made us feel much more 
at home before and after the recent birth of our 
daughter, Caroline. Robin's mother, Gerri Castle, also 
made it possible for me to spend a lot less time washing 
dishes and changing diapers, and a little more time 
typing, for which I thank her. I also greatly appreciate 
the friendship of the people in the Centre, particularly 
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that of Catherine Raine, my fellow sufferer at Edgehill 
Road. 
I am also very thankful to A.S. Byatt, who has taken 
far more time and effort to read and respond to my work 
than I would have ever expected, and whose congeniality 
has given me confidence I would not otherwise have known. 
To Dr. Altizer, as well, for responding to my inquiries, 
and for providing additional sources, I am grateful. 
Finally, I am eternally grateful for the love and 
support of my parents and family: sine qua non. I also 
thank Caroline for waiting as long as she did. There are 
many others, both here and in the states, whom I wish to 
thank as well, and I will do so--but not here. Most 
crucially, my deepest love and gratitude, which I cannot 
express, remains always for you, Robin. 
J. stephen Fountain 
Glasgow, September 1994 
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PROLOGUE: 
Facing the Death of God 
"We can speak about God only if we, can fully 
and actually speak, even if such speech should 
be indirect, paradoxical or veiled. (Thomas 
Altizer The Self-Embodiment of God 1) 
"Our sense of interdisciplinary acti vi ty now 
needs to be replaced with a much more generous 
and braver sense of multidisciplinary 
theoretical reflection which avoids the 
theological dilettantism saturating so much 
work in the field of 'literature and religion,' 
fostered all too often by a largely 
unreflective sense of literary criticism • 
• may there indeed be a way back--to 
literature, and through literature even now to 
theology?" (Jasper, "Introduction: Religious 
Thought and contemporary critical Theory" 2,5). 
This thesis has a double grounding: on the one hand, 
its methodological ground consists ,of an explication of 
the development of the idea of the death of God wi thin 
Thomas Altizer's theological writings and within the 
fiction of A.S. Byatt, paying special attention to the 
concept of the negation of eternal return (as developed, 
for instance, by Mircea Eliade, and not to be confused 
with Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence"). The negation of 
eternal return not only informs Altizer's entire 
theological network, as well as providing the fundamental 
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viewpoint from which to critique traditional scholastic 
theology, but is also a key motif arising from Byatt's 
fictional realms. Not only does Altizer propose that the 
negation of a cycle of eternal return in the death of God 
provides an image of God which is contrary to that of 
traditional theology, but methodologically the self-
sUfficiency of theological scholasticism is negated by 
Al tizer in favor of a more literarily-informed approach 
to theology. As Altizer's "theology" demonstrates a 
fundamental relationship between theology and literature, 
so this thesis attempts a theological discussion in a 
Ii terary mode I not a scholarly one (a dangerous 
proposition for a "thesis"), suggesting that theology 
comes about necessarily through fictions, which are self-
emptying, not through a scholasticism which seeks its own 
closure. Finally, the negation of eternal return provides 
a useful metaphor for the "phallogocentric economy of the 
Same" (as Irigaray demonstrates in her considerations of 
Nietzsche [Oppel 93]): it is the critique of that system, 
the metaphysics of the "proper, II to which this work is 
dedicated. For Altizer, theology arises outside the 
family circle of traditional Christianity, and fiction 
provides an entry into the theological realm, an entry 
which is gained through his attention to theology's 
"abject," fiction. Thus Altizer's is a decentering 
presence within the circle of traditional theology. Such 
an entry may also be gained through the fiction of A.S. 
Byatt. 
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Efforts by twentieth century theologians such as 
Thomas Altizer to grant any sort of sacred status or 
religiousness to texts outside the Christian theological 
tradition, or indeed, outside the canon (or to read 
canonical texts as textual products), have often been met 
wi th a firm Barthian "Nein!" or with the sentiments of 
those who, like Theodore Runyon, reflecting upon 
Altizer's understanding of Pauline kenosis, sees 
theological reflection ocurring outwith the tradition as 
the "secularization" of the gospel, "the basic sin of Man 
(sic)" (Cobb 45-57). "To become itself," however, Altizer 
has said, "theology must negate itself," even to the 
point of "abandoning its own tradition" ("Word and 
History" 122). 
The question whether or not there can actually 
remain anything like theology (talking about God, God-
talk, the exercises of theo-Iogic) following the death of 
God is a question which has been answered by a select few 
highly productive new theologians in the past thirty 
years1, although it is still a subject of debate whether 
or not their disparate efforts have actually been 
"theology," or, in fact, whether or not they should be 
(as are the questions, "What is the death of God?" and 
"When exactly did that death occur?"). What remains for 
theology in/at the wake of the death of God? Those of us 
who consider ourselves within, if at the margins of, 
disciplines affected by recent critiques of (the) 
Author/ity, find ourselves in a critical situation not 
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unlike that of A.S. Byatt's character, Ellen Ash, wife of 
renowned victorian poet, R.H. Ash. 
I sit among his possessions--now mine or 
no one's--and think that his life, his 
presence, departs more slowly from these 
inanimate than from him, who was once animate 
and is now, I cannot write it, I should not 
have started writing. My dear, I sit here and 
wri te, to whom but thee? I feel better here 
amongst thy things--the pen is reluctant to 
form "thee," "thy," there is no one there, and 
yet here is still a presence. (E 442) 
In this scene from Possession, Ellen Ash writes in 
her journal, just after her husband Randolph's death. The 
relationship between Ellen and Randolph has been celibate 
since Ellen's inability to consummate the marriage. This 
"inability" has been accepted by Randolph, and Ellen has 
lived her life in slavish attempts to compensate for the 
lack of bodily evidence of the relationship between them. 
Randolph, however tender and accepting of Ellen's love, 
and however reciprocal that pure and innocent love may 
have been, found passion in the arms of Christabel 
LaMotte, his fellow poet who, it turns out, mothers his 
child. Through a procession of confessions and textual 
evidence, Ellen learns of her husband's involvements, 
though the fact and the implications of the affair are 
repressed. She writes here, following Randolph's death, 
in remembrance of Him, anamnestically (until He comes?), 
though she knows "He'll come no more" (E 381). The truth 
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of the matter is, of course, that he never has at all; 
not with her, at least. What would it mean for theology 
to admit the same--that its efforts to maintain an 
exclusive relationship have precluded the very idea of 
relationship, and perhaps also that its efforts to 
contain that non-existent relationship within a sterile 
site (the marriage, the canon, the institution) have 
blinded it to improper, illegitimate and scandalous 
re(ve)lations occuring elsewhere? Perhaps the very idea 
of re(ve)lation consistently displaces our efforts to 
theologize and canonize. 
In his "analogical-theological" reading of the 
relationship between Ellen Ash and her husband, Robert 
Detweiler observes that "Randolph is his wife's god," 
accepting her unconditionally ("FF" 8). While Randolph 
has accepted Ellen's worshipping him in Spirit and in 
Truth, and in that way exclusively, Randolph has not 
returned her love with the same exclusivity, although he 
has provided her with "letters of care that are her 
sacred texts" (Detweiler, "FF" 8). Ellen sets herself up 
to experience a double-death, with her discovery of her 
husband's infidelity and child on the one hand, and his 
actual physical death on the other. As Detweiler 
observes, the discovery of his infidelity reveals him as 
"an ordinary, suffering human being" (8). Confronted by 
the death of her god, not merely a cessation of his 
existence, but a revelation of his carnality and the fact 
that her "innocent" and exclusive relationship never 
existed either, Ellen responds appropriately. She begins 
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to write. Does she write in order to preserve his 
presence, in order to re-present a presence which, as she 
understood it, was never there in the first place? An 
im/possibility: "There is no one there, and yet here is 
still a presence," the presence of the death of God. An 
im/possible presence, perhaps. The presence of abpence. 
Ellen finds herself, as so many writers do, writing in 
the between-time of presence and absence. Suspended 
between the texts of her own pacifying love letters from 
Randolph and the revelation of his humanity, Ellen faces 
an ultimate crisis when, acting in the stead of all 
humanity, her "sense of belonging to a comforting 
tradition" is superceded by her "drive to know" 
(Detweiler, "FF" 9) and she cries her own "Eloi, Eloi, 
lema sabachthani," wailing "What shall I be without you?" 
(E 459). It is a profound loss of identity which 
accompanies the death of God, and certainly the 
structures of theology need to be reminded that God is 
not what we thought (He) was-- (He) is other, and is no 
longer accessible to the execution of theology as it has 
been effected previously. Expressed through writing such 
as Byatt's, the death of God deconstructs theology, 
transforming its literalism into literarity, its analysis 
into poiesis. Only in writing, rather than in the 
written, can theology survive in this "no-time" of the 
between. 
Writing in his erudite Erring, Mark C. Taylor 
observes that the responses to the demise of the "divine 
Author and the corresponding demise of religious 
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authori ty" vary, from outright indifference concerning 
matters of reflection, to obstinate fundamentalism, to a 
celebratory attitude of trans formative liberation, or to 
the situation of those "marginal people" running the 
borders of belief and unbelief (4-5). Such marginal 
people recognize not only the manifestation of the death 
of God in the present age, but also its profound 
implications for the whole of western thought. As the 
transcendent God goes, so goes the transcendental ego, 
the Self, Reason, History, Purpose. Should we say, 
in short, Christendom? As early as 1963, Thomas Altizer 
was posing the iconoclastic question 
Shall we come to understand that everything we 
"know" as Christian is finally Christendom? Or, 
negatively stated, what can be the residuum of 
a faith which accepts the death of God? will 
faith contain any definable or cognitive 
meanings? Indeed, will it contain any symbolic 
meaning? When no "up" or "down" is left, when 
"beginning" and "end" and all historic symbols 
have disappeared, what will be the meaning of 
such primary dogmas as the Incarnation and the 
Creation? ("AFT" 13) 
Of course, the humanistic atheist attitude of this early 
Altizer sought the dissolution of' the transcendent for 
the sake of the autonomous individual, so that the 
Christendom which was negated could not have included 
that transcendental ego which Taylor deconstructs along 
with the transcendent God. still, the strength of 
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Altizer's questioning lies in the fact that whatever 
one's position, the death of God as it has been so 
irreversibly embodied in the history of the twentieth 
century is an unavoidable theme for the contemporary 
reader. 
Implicitly and explicitly, in style and content, 
Altizer has followed the trace of the death of God 
throughout the texts of the entire corpus of western 
history, epic apocalyptic texts marked by great 
evocations of absolute endings. Within Altizer's grand 
narrati ve, however, absolute ending is inseparable from 
absolute beginning, and while ours is a time' well 
acquainted with apocalypse as catastrophic conclusion, it 
is also, as Altizer points out, a time reluctant to know 
apocalypse as revelation. Nowhere is that reluctance more 
obvious, according to Altizer, than in the near-original 
wanderings of postmodernist thought. Though it is a term 
being constantly redefined, postmodernism, as Altizer 
sees it, runs the inevitable risk of final reversion into 
a cycle of eternal return. Postmodernists, among whom I 
have counted myself and perhaps still do, may find 
themselves now some decades into the "postmodern" world, 
as Sam Keen observes, "witnout an organizing center. • • 
wandering in a wilderness of confusing plurality" (111). 
Postmodernism finds itself always in between, always not 
yet, occupying a non-site which is at once (and neither) 
ending and (nor) beginning. Perhaps the time is at hand, 
however, for that which has dwelt near its origin, albeit 
reluctantly, to depart, for while ours is a time of great 
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erring, it is also a time of great thinking2. That 
thinking, as Thomas Altizer observes in The Genesis of 
God, has been most reluctant to think about God, although 
it has also been deeply, though negatively, theological. 
Such theology has been most hesitant to speak of both God 
and beginning, and certainly of the beginning of God, 
while the death of God, at least in name, is recurrently 
evoked within postmodernist discourse (GG 1-10). The 
death of God as event, however, is inseparable from the 
genesis of God in the Fall and incarnation. Theology 
which embraces the drama of the death of God fully is 
necessarilly a fallen theology, but a theology which may 
now in the time of its ending know an actual beginning as 
a literary exercise, a liturgy, a poiesis. Such a 
theology can know the incarnation as the embodiment of 
the death of God, and therefore as the genesis of the 
self-emptying God, and as its thinking will be an active 
embodiment of the death of God, it will therefore be a 
fallen theology which "sins boldly" in proclaiming the 
death of God and the immanence of the apocalyptic Kingdom 
of God. That very proclamation is itself an embodiment of 
the revelation of the incarnate God. No term has yet 
appeared with which to refer to such an exercise, 
although it may very well be, as Carl Raschke has pointed 
out, that at the end of theology, "theological thinking" 
now stands at the door, a thinking (Denken) which, in 
Heideggerian terms, is also thanking (Danken) (Raschke 
viii). However, the transformed theological thinking 
following the death of God may also be known as kenotic 
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theology, a/theology, theo-poiesis, and perhaps even as 
"reading religiously," and "thanatopoiesis." 
A self-sacrificial understanding of theology, and an 
understanding of theological thinking/thanking as a 
literary, liturgical and doxo10gica1 activity, provides a 
forum for christological reflection freed from the 
domination of dogmatic. tradition, while encouraging 
reflection upon that very tradition as fallen, and 
therefore errant, even sinful, yet liturgical and, as 
worship, precluding validation from authority-structures. 
Validation, or criticism, arises in the question of the 
doxological self-understanding of a discourse, that is, 
in its own participation in the self-embodiment of the 
kenotic God, sacrificially emptying itself for the sake 
of the other. Further, a kenotic understanding of God 
which knows history as the body of the self-emptying God 
no longer finds itself bound to patriarchal and 
pha110centric images of Christ, for it is in their very 
fallenness that those images proclaim the gospel of the 
death of God. In such a manner, theological thinking may 
just as fully reflect upon Christo10gy in relation to the 
man Jesus of Nazareth, 
Ruether suggests, a 
but may also know, as Rosemary 
christology liberated from 
patriarchy, in which Christ is encountered in the other 
and experienced in the midst of our community. The 
acti vi ty of a kenotic theological community would, it 
seems to me, bear a marked similarity to what Robert 
Detweiler refers to as "reading religiously." Rather than 
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offer a method with which one might "read religiously," 
Detweiler engages in such an activity, and suggests that 
groups committed to an intensive play with 
literature, engaging each other in search--and 
sometimes in the creation--of texts that, 
wherever they originate, take them against the 
grain of conventional reading, may discover 
themselves as communitas, powerless against the 
Ii terary establishment and indeed uninterested 
in challenging it. (BF 61) 
Such groups will be marked, says Detweiler, not by their 
endeavors toward the evangelization of an original 
"doctrine of religious reading" but by communal "reading 
for the mystery, marking the traces of liminality even in 
secular and fugitive texts--and celebrating those 
discoveries" thereby "constantly learning anew what 
religious reading is" (61). Continuing, or at least re-
enacting, the activity of the ancient "storytelling 
culture," such communities will, according to Detweiler, 
inevi tably attempt to establish such events and their 
celebration II in language and gesture adapted from 
liturgy" (61). Returning to the activities of story-
telling cultures means for theological thinking a turn 
from the literal to the literary, from the use of the 
story as a tool of exclusion to the use of the story as 
an activity of community. 
Further, in his essay, "Thanatopoiesis: Imagining 
Death," Detweiler speaks specifically of a "theology of 
kenosis, a self-emptying for the sake of others," which 
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is also defined as a faith the substance of which lies in 
"the call to live transforming lives in this present 
existence" (8). Considering the place of the pervasive 
myth of an afterlife in a contemporary Christian context, 
Detweiler suggests that "a religious faith that does not 
depend on a belief in life beyond death II might be more 
consistent with the faith of the early church than the 
institutionalized faith which has evolved over the past 
two thousand years, and might also provide a healthier 
and more ethical view of the place of the believer in 
history, living 
death. Such a 
toward community, and 
faith may originate not 
living toward 
only from the 
critique of the traditional afterlife myth, but also from 
the critique of the larger context of the superposition 
of the transcendent. outside theological circles, such as 
wi thin the narratives of modern physics and cosmology, 
the finitude of the universe and the constantly shifting 
theories of space-time represent a paradigm shift 
tantamount to a death of God, as do the critiques of 
meaning, presence, authority and the self within critical 
theory. The fall of the transcendent meaning-provider, be 
it an afterlife, God, Reason, the infinity of the 
universe, the stability of the self, or the authority of 
the text, and so on, represents a loss within the history 
of ideas which must be mourned as surely as the death of 
a member of one's community. Theological thinking is just 
now undergoing its Einsteinian revolution, a revolution 
which was endured by science with recourse to relativity, 
and within literature because of its poetics. What has 
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been needed in order for theology to face the death of 
God is its own relativity theory, its own quantum 
poetics. 
The reactions to the notion of the finitude of 
existence (in fact, to finitude in general), and the 
notion of the meaning of that existence have tended 
toward one of two options, obsession and denial or 
acceptance and remembrance. These two options find 
expression both wi thin academic disciplines and wi thin 
the popular culture which evolves under the influence of 
those disciplines, drawing from an understanding of 
history which is either, on the obsessive side, a purely 
cyclical understanding of an eternal return, or on the 
side of acceptance, a kenotic understanding of the linear 
irreversibility of time. The dialectical tension between 
these two opposing ideas has arisen within a wide range 
of disciplines, and informs a developing soteriological 
cuI tural mythology wi thin the present age, a mythology 
which provides the very understanding of "meaning" with 
new meaning. I have tried to follow the traces of that 
tension throughout various texts and disciplines: not 
with a sense of destination, however, but with a desire 
to contribute to the ever-expanding story that is the 
active embodiment of the death of God. 
A kenotic critical understanding stands in 
distinction from the Western metaphysical tradition's 
understanding of the unitary ego, the transcendent God, 
the priority of presence and the tendency towards 
domination and statici ty. On the other hand, a kenotic 
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understanding stands also in contradiction to the 
excessive emphasis on ineffable Otherness often found 
within postmodern theory (especially postmodern 
theology). Both understandings, which are here grossly 
generalized, risk the sterile transcendency of the 
eternal return. A truly kenotic model for theological and 
critical thinking acknowledges the total presence of the 
transcendent in the immanent, not as the re-presentation 
of an originary presence, but as the embodiment of the 
self-kenotic God, an embodiment which is only present in 
its passing away. In contrast to a "postmodern" 
theological understanding, a kenotic theological thinking 
allows for an anamnestic understanding of a once-and-for-
all-event which is always new, a eucharistic conception 
of total presence as a continual displacement. Such a 
thinking necessarily finds itself directed toward the 
future, not toward an eschatological glory or telos, but 
toward the future for the sake of which the present is 
itself emptied. 
What is presented in the quest for the sake of the 
future is neither the re-presentation of an originary 
presence, nor the impossible presentation of an ineffable 
absence, but a self-emptying apocalyptic presence, 
present in its passing. The quest that is undertaken here 
then, traverses necessarily intertextual crossroads, not 
simply nostalgically nor teleologically, but doxolog-
ically and eucharistically, marking a celebratory 
anamnesis, an embodiment of the Death of God. What the 
reader will find in the following work is both an attempt 
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to discuss the event of the death of God wi thin and 
alongside several related texts, and also an attempt to 
participate in the embodiment of that event, in a 
religious writing/reading which gives itself over to the 
community of readers so that the text is itself embodied 
in the reading, and only there in its passing away, in a 
textual apocalyptic "total presence" ("total presence," 
it will be shown directly, is not the metaphysical 
preservation and re-presentation of presence it might 
seem) • 
Beginning with a discussion of the death of God 
itself, and exploring textual sites embodying that event, 
the quest to be undertaken here will have been an 
interdisciplinary and intertextual dialogue, the recent 
novels of A.S. Byatt providing both a reference point and 
the means of transport. Aside from her status as a major 
force in contemporary British literature, and her growing 
popularity outside the UK, A.S. Byatt is one of those few 
authors whose work places its reader between enjoyment 
and religious experience, between absorption into the 
narrative and awe at the precision which which the text 
has been woven. Most forcefully in her award-winning 
Possession, but also in her other novels, Byatt blends 
poetry, historical fiction, mystery, criticism, 
scientific text and romance into an intertextual entity 
which defies generic definition. Within the bricolage of 
narrative and textual fragments, author/ity is sacrificed 
for the overflow of interpreti ve acti vi ty effected by 
the interplay of relationships within the textual nexus, 
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inside and outside the work itself, in fact, displacing 
any notion of staticity, whether of the text, the 
author, or of the reader. Byatt's work offers both a site 
and the elements with which the enactment of the death of 
God may take place; in the reading, in the writing, 
there, always, the call to worship. 
This thesis is arranged in five chapters. In chapter 
one the philosophical and theological significance of 
Altizer's understanding of the "death of God" is 
elucidated, with special attention to the influence of 
Mircea Eliade, Hegel and Nietzsche. The centrality of the 
concept of the negation of eternal return for these three 
thinkers and for Altizer is demonstrated as a radical 
negation of transcendence, which informs Altizer's 
understanding of the death of the eternal God as the 
genesis of the total presence of the apocalypse of the 
self-emptying God in the incarnate movement of Creation 
and Fall. 
Chapter two examines the development of Altizer's 
death of God theology from its literary influences. 
specifically, the writings of Milton, Blake and Joyce 
contribute to an epic tradition in which Al tizer 
chronicles the textual negation of transcendence into its 
total presence in the universal eucharistic language of 
Joyce. Altizer's theological method is here shown to rely 
fundamentally upon an act of interpretation which is 
embodied in a eucharistic re-writing and which sacrifices 
Authority in a radical dynamic. That interpretation 
relies essentially upon the negation of an eternal 
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transcendence, known by Altizer in a deepening historical 
consciousness of the eternal God as a satanic presence, a 
transcendence known in the movement of Fall and 
Incarnation. Such a movement may be known as a radical 
cri tique of Authority, enacted by a reading which is a 
universal eucharist which negates the metaphysics of the 
proper. 
In chapter three, an intertextual critique of the 
work of Kristeva, Byatt, and Altizer, alongside a 
treatment of the Anglo-Saxon poem, "The Dream of the 
Rood," continues the development of the implications of 
the themes of the death of God, relating Kristeva's 
jouissance and the subject in process to Altizer's notion 
of "total presence." The objections of Mark C. Taylor to 
Altizer's idea of total presence are addressed, and 
themes of the negation of realms of exclusivity through 
the irruption of difference (the fragmentary, the abject, 
the improper) are shown to link Kristeva's notion of the 
tension between the semiotic and the symbolic, Altizer's 
understanding of the kenotic God, the destruction of 
"circles of sameness" within Byatt's Possession, and the 
textual and historical situation of "The Dream of the 
Rood" and the monument upon which it appears. 
Chapter four adresses notions of temporal linearity 
and cyclicity, themes which have provided an undercurrent 
to the preceding three chapters. The apparent opposition 
between the linearity of evolutionary history and cyclic 
eternal return is here investigated through associated 
notions such as newness, absolute beginning, recurrence, 
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and dichotomy. The irreversibili ty of history, a 
prominent theme in Altizer's understanding of history, is 
examined, and the dialectic of the dichotomy of linearity 
and cyclicity, and the function of dichotomy in general, 
is explore~ through Derrida's writing in Of Grammatology, 
the a/theology of Mark C. Taylor, recent developments in 
physics and cosmology, including the "new physics," and 
the literary-scientific work of Stephen J. Gould. Gould's 
assessment of the development of the nineteenth century 
geological theories of Charles Lyell, whose work marks 
the tension between linearity and cyclicity, as he 
responds to the ever-more-popular ideas of evolution 
while holding to his "steady-state" theory of the earth 
leads into the use of geological theory in Possession. 
Using the work of Charles Lyell, A.S. Byatt draws on the 
tension between a "steady-state" view of the earth and 
the dynamic of evolution, and the shifting paradigms of 
nineteenth century science provide a vehicle through 
which the false economy of the exclusive ahistorical 
realm is revealed and decentered. 
Chapter five, a conclusion which isn't, draws 
together the themes which have been developed in chapters 
one through four, looking specifically at Altizer's ideas 
regarding the negation and transformation of 
Christianity, which must acknowledge its status as, he 
says, a "historically evolving faith." A historically 
evolving faith cannot uphold an idea of an eternal, 
static, transcendent divinity, nor the stasis of its own 
institutionalism, but must embody the total presence of 
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the Kingdom of God, the apocalypse of the self-negating 
God. The theme of "masking" provides an entry into 
Altizer's critique of traditional Christianity, and is 
followed through the a/theological work of Mark C. Taylor 
and the fiction of Iris Murdoch, whose The Time of the 
Angels might provide an anticipatory glimpse into the 
content of Byatt's forthcoming sequel to still Life and 
The Virgin in the Garden, both of which are discussed 
here. Through these works are developed the connections 
between "circles of sameness," the metaphysics of the 
proper (as developed by Kristeva and Derrida), and the 
functions of metaphor and incarnation in unmasking the 
eternal return therein. In the negation of the God of 
Christendom, in the reversal of eternal return, in the 
decentering of the economy of the proper, there arises a 
writing and reading which is a "historically evolving 
faith," an unending interpretation which is the 
apocalypse of the God who is other-than-God, and a 
theology which is other-than theology. 
Thus God is the name of exile, the name of the 
ground of exile, th~ name of the source of that 
exile which realizes itself by becoming exiled 
from itself. Simply by naming God we make that 
exile manifest. • (Altizer, The Self-
Embodiment of God 29) 
But the fountain sprang up and the bird sang 
down 
Redeem the time, redeem the dream 
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The token of the word unheard, unspoken 
Till the wind shake a thousand whispers from 
the yew 
And after this our exile (Eliot, "Ash 
Wednesday" IV:25-29) 
NOTES 
1 The "Death of God Movement" in theology began in 
the 1960' s and focused primarilly upon the writings of 
Thomas Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul Van Buren. 
Since that time, however, postmodern theologians, or 
a/theologians, have published works as diverse as the 
deconstructive writings of Mark C. Taylor, the pragmatic 
works of Don cupitt and the systematic efforts of Robert 
Scharlemann. Other important writers include Charles 
Winquist, Carl Raschke, and Ray L. Hart. 
2 I have in mind Heidegger, of course, and also his 
use of H5lderlin. See Poetry, Language, Thought. trans. 
Albert Hofstadter. (New York: Harper and ROW, 1988). 9, 
78. 
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Chapter One 
The Point of No Return: 
A Brief History of the Death of God 
o grosse Not! 
Gott selbst liegt tot, 
Am Kreuz er gestorben, 
Hat dadurch das Himmelreich 
Uns aus Lieb erworben. 
Johann Rist, "0 Traurigkeit, 0 
Herzeleid, " second stanza (Von der Luft 263; 
Scharlemann, "Introduction" 5) 
A form of faith or belief that adheres to 
an unmoving and immobile Godhead must deny the 
possibility of a forward movement "from 
Eternity to Eternity," just as it must submit 
to the absolute sovereignty of the primordial 
God. When faith is understood in this sense, 
there can be no question of a transformation of 
faith in response to the movement of the 
Godhead. But an apocalyptic and radical form of 
the Christian faith celebrates a cosmic and 
historical movement of the Godhead that 
cUlminates in the death of God himself (sic). 
(Altizer, "William Blake and the Role of Myth" 
189) 
If no other contemporary thinker so invites yet 
evades classification, surely no other theologian has 
been met with such disparate opinion as Thomas Altizer, 
and nothing so clearly demonstrates both the breadth and 
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diversity of Altizer's work nor testifies to the 
uniqueness of Altizer's style and direction. In light of 
his pervasive faith in the uniqueness of Christianity, 
his fidelity to the message of Jesus, and his devotion to 
Biblical revelation, Altizer is a traditional, even 
evangelical, theologian. In light of his assaults upon 
orthodoxy and fundamental doctrine and his attributing of 
canonical significance to non-canonical works of poetry, 
fiction and philosophy, Altizer is fervently radical, 
even heretical, and plays the role of theological 
literary critic. His continuity with Hegel places him 
within the modernist tradition, yet his critical stance 
toward the history of metaphysics finds him alongside 
postmodernist theorists (a title which he eschews and 
finds anachronistic with regard to theologyl). Altizer's 
work interacts with Christian theological history, and 
yet this is a history whose basic conceptions of God and 
Christo logy Altizer firmly rejects2 , a rejection. which 
finds affinity between Altizer's marginality and the 
efforts of feminist thought and liberation theology. Such 
a dialectic characterization threatens to continue 
indefinitely, yet the impressions Altizer has made upon 
others exhibit this same diversity. 
"When the history of twentieth-century American 
theology is written," says postmodern a/theologian Mark 
C. Taylor, "one of its major chapters will be devoted to 
the work of Thomas J.J. Altizer" (JAAR 569). R.C. Sproul, 
in a retrospective look at the Death of God Movement 
(with which Altizer is so intimately connected) which 
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was subtitled "Looking Back at a controversy that Was 
Destined to Die," refers to the movement as a "media 
event" and speaks of the development of "a newfound 
adherence in and insistence on the traditional tenets of 
faith" within the two decades following the appearance of 
the "TIME" article in 1966 (18). Sproul credits Altizer, 
however, with "staccato bursts of insight," arising from 
thoughts "expressed in almost poetic fashion" (19). This 
faint praise is contrasted by the comments of John Cobb, 
who refers to Al tizer as "the leading radical 
(theologian) ," "the most influential theologian" of the 
late Sixties, "the first major theologian since World War 
I to think theologically from the perspective of the 
study of the history of religions conceived on a world 
scale," and most impressively, lithe boldest evangelical 
theologian of our time" (13-16). Unlike the "media event" 
description given by Sproul, Cobb states that "the furor 
over the Death of God movement has al tered the 
theological climate in America irreversibly" (13). To the 
contrary, Robert McAfee Brown says of the most recogniz-
able of all the Death of God texts, Altizer's The Gospel 
of Christian Atheism, that "It is not a gospel. • • ; it 
is not Christian. ; and it is not Atheism. 
In an attempt to celebrate 'the death of God,' this book 
succeeds only in demonstrating the death of the 'death-
of-God-theology'" (a comment which appears on the cover 
of the work). Regarding death of God theology with 
typical disdain, Mary Daly has referred to Altizer as one 
of "the more colorful manifestations of the phenomenon," 
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and simplistically, and mistakenly, observes that for 
Altizer "God is dead but Jesus is alive," an assertion 
which, in her Beyond God the Father, exemplifies the 
Christian idolatry which, even in its most radical forms, 
requires that incarnation involve the "superior" sex 
(70). Finally, and perhaps most amusingly, Scott Cowdell, 
while appreciating the efforts of "postmodern 
theologians" such as Altizer and Mark C. Taylor, suggests 
that "the Christian vision of Altizer and Taylor" might 
be informed by "a touch of nostalgia for 1960's 
hippiedom. • or else an anticipation of days spent in 
the ease of retirement" (Cowdell 66). 
In his own words, Altizer has referred to himself as 
"an ersatz theologian, a self-taught theologian," but one 
who "intends to be a Biblical theologian" seeking "a 
theological meaning of the Bible apart from Church and 
Christendom;" Altizer's "real hope and intention," he 
says, has been "to do pure theology, a theology thinking 
about God alone, and thinking in such a manner and mode 
as to make possible a theological realization of 
revelation" ("AOA" 1, 6)3. That intention has given rise 
to a textual corpus the contents of which elicit 
criticisms from its own author ranging from "badly 
written, pretentious and irresponsible in its claims, 
and wholly lacking in historical sophistication and 
mastery of its sources," said of oriental Mysticism and 
Biblical Eschatology ("AOA" 1), to "two non-books which 
are only loosely and inadequately conjoined," said of 
Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred ("AOA 2). 
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That same body of work earns praise from others as 
containing "the first Buddhist Christian theology," said 
by Herbert Richardson of The Descent Into Hell ("AOA" 5) 
and one work, The Self-Embodiment of God, which is 
accepted by Jacob Neusner as "belonging to the sacred 
circle of the Torah" ("AOA" 6). Although Altizer's work 
is seen by its author as an "expression of a theological 
voyage. • conducted in solitude and darkness" ("AOA" 
9), the same may be said of the entire body of that work 
that is said by Altizer of his The Self-Embodiment of 
God, that as a demonstration of "the dissolution of a 
theological author," the work "only becomes real when the 
reader is the author of the text" ("AOA" 7). The emptying 
of author into reader directly reflects the one pervasive 
theme which, despite discrepancies and shifts in critical 
estimations, continually manifests itself throughout the 
vast majority of Altizer's work: the embodiment of the 
uniquely Christian death of God. 
It is as a "Death of God" theologian that Thomas 
Altizer continues to be most commonly recognized, due in 
large part to the media attention surrounding "death of 
God" theology in the 1960's, of which the following is a 
memorable sample: 
ATLANTA, Ga., Nov. 9, 1965--God, 
Creator of the Universe, principal 
deity of the world's Jews, Ultimate 
reali ty of Christians, and most 
eminent of all di vini ties, died late 
yesterday during major surgery 
undertaken to correct a massive 
diminishing influence. 
Reaction from the world's great 
and from the man in the street was 
uniformly incredulous. From 
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Independence, Mo., former President 
Harry S. Truman, who received the 
news in his Kansas city barbershop, 
said "I'm always sorry to hear 
somebody is dead. It's a damn shame." 
(TIME 82) 
When the above satirical excerpt from the Methodist 
student magazine "Motive" appeared in the April 8, 1966 
issue of "TIME," the world was just beginning to hear 
about the claims being made at Emory University, claims 
which were generally attributed to Altizer, then 
Associate Professor of Bible and Religion. Altizer, 
however, was not a lone figure in the much-publicized 
development; he was usually mentioned alongside William 
Hamilton and Paul Van Buren. However, insomuch as Altizer 
was by far the most vocal, and arguably the most 
articulate, it is his name which has become inseparably 
identified with the Death of God movement. Although the 
"movement" may have lost attention, Altizer has continued 
to develop the theological and philosophical implications 
of the death of God for now more than three decades. 
The death of God, according to Altizer, was not due 
to surgical complications but was self-inflicted. Altizer 
points out not a "massive diminishing influence," but an 
intentional, radical, massively increasing influence, 
that is, a radical inflowing of God into history, into 
actuality, into presence, into flesh. It is this same 
death of God which Altizer knows in his most recent work 
as the genesis of God. The death of God may be understood 
as both a one time event and a continual process, as John 
Cobb points out, (210) but just as recent cosmological 
theory can speak of the history of space-time as a single 
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event, the idea of event and process need not refer to 
two things or even two characteristics, but two 
interpretations, two descriptions. The event of the death 
of God constitutes the process of the events of history. 
This is not to imply that the death of God is simply a 
"cultural phenomenon,lI although this is so, and it is not 
to be understood that the cultural aspect of the death of 
God reflects an event or process simultaneously occurring 
in some metaphysical realm, for the cultural phenomena 
and the metaphysical reality are one and the same; this 
Hegelian "identity of history and metaphysics" is 
foundational to the philosophical development of 
Altizer's thought (Cobb 19). 
His dialogue with Hegel is indeed the most crucial 
catalyst in Altizer's theoretical evolution4 , but 
significant directional force must also be assigned to 
Nietzsche and Mircea Eliade. Altizer's developing 
appropriations and transformations of Eliade, Hegel and 
Nietzsche have marked the origins and milestones of his 
philosophical/theological "voyages," voyages which began 
prior to "the death of God" and have continued beyond 
"the genesis of God." 
The eminent historian of religions, Mircea Eliade, 
makes a considerable appearance early in the history of 
Altizer's writing, as the subject of his second book, 
Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, in which 
Altizer puts forward the thesis that "Eliade has given us 
our only Christian and truly dialectical understanding of 
Christianity" ("ADA" 2). A truly Christian understanding 
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for Altizer draws from Eliade a notion of the uniqueness 
of the Christian understanding of both the fall and the 
dialectic of the sacred and the profane, and a 
distinction between pagan (religious) humanity and modern 
(nonreligious) humanity, a distinction which depends 
primarily upon the negation of a nostalgic cycle of 
eternal return. 
Eliade asserts, in The Myth of the Eternal Return, 
that "Christianity is the 'religion' of modern humanity 
and historical humanity, of the one who simultaneously 
discovered personal freedom and continuous time (in place 
of cycl ical time)" ( 161 ). Further, El iade notes that the 
idea of God has become all the more pressing for modern 
humani ty, whose existence is "historical" rather than 
cyclic or repeti ti ve, and for. whom the idea of God 
provides the last refuge in the face of "the terror of 
history" (162) • Only the presupposition of God, says 
Eliade, provides modern humanity "freedom (which grants 
one autonomy in a universe governed by laws or, in other 
words, the 'inauguration' of a mode of being that is new 
and unique in the uni verse) " and a theodical certitude 
that "historical tragedies" possess "transhistorical 
meaning" (162). Any alternative position, Eliade 
maintains, ends in despair occasioned by the fact of 
one's existence in a hostile universe. As that religion 
which asserts the fallenness of humanity, Christiani ty 
directly addresses the position of modern humanity, 
"irremediably identified with history and progress", for 
whom "history and progress are a fall, both implying the 
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final abandonment of the paradise of archetypes and 
repetition" (162). In The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade 
carries his observation further, noting that modern 
nonreligious humanity has "lost the capacity to live 
religion consciously, and hence to understand and assume 
it," while retaining, in the depths of the unconscious, a 
memory of the religious sense (SAP 213). In contrast to 
religious humanity, who lived in the realm of the cyclic 
eternal return and kept themselves "close to the gods" 
through imitation of divine conduct and by "reactualizing 
sacred history," nonreligious humanity "refuses 
transcendence" and creates itself through a 
desacralization of self and world; modern nonreligious 
humanity, according to Eliade, believes it "will not be 
free until it has killed the last god" (202-03). This is, 
according to Eliade, a futile task, as nonreligious 
humani ty is always the inheritor of religiosity, and so 
retains "degenerated rituals" such as New Year's 
festi vi ties, celebrations of new homes, childbirth, and 
marriage, and "camouflaged myths" in plays, cinema, and 
perhaps 
Eliade, 
most significantly, in reading. According to 
reading includes a mythological function, not 
only because it replaces the recitation of 
myths in archaic societies and in the oral 
literature that still lives in the rural 
communities of Europe, but particularly 
because, through reading, the modern human 
succeeds in obtaining an "escape from time" 
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comparable to the "emergence from time" 
effected by myths. • • (R)eading projects one 
out of one's personal duration, makes one live 
in another "history." (SAP 205) 
The function of such religiousness, says Eliade, is to 
'awaken one to the universe,' but as long as nonreligious 
humanity remains unaware of the religiousness locked away 
in its unconsciousness, this awakening cannot occur. This 
forgetting of religiousness is called by Eliade a "second 
fall" into a desacralized and profane world (213). 
NOW, Altizer points out what he calls Eliade's "non-
dialectical contradiction, II a result of "an only 
partially dialectical understanding of Christianity. 
firmly rooted in the non-dialectical ground of the 
dominant historical expressions of Christianity," and it 
is this contradiction which he attempts to resolve in his 
Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred ("ADA" 2). 
Here Altizer declares, contrary to Eliade, that "it is 
precisely the most radical expressions of the 'profane' 
(in Eliade's sense) in the modern consciousness that can 
dialectically be identified with the purest expressions 
of the 'sacred' (again in Eliade's sense)" ("ADA" 2). 
Three years later, in his article "The Sacred and the 
Profane: A Dialectic Understanding of Christiani ty , II 
Altizer considers the religious quest for the sacred 
through a negation of the profane a backwards movement, a 
search for a primordial totality which "reverses the 
evolution of history" (Altizer and Hamilton 143). This 
backward movement is not confined to traditional 
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Christiani ty, but occurs in Eastern religions as well, 
even those in which the "opposition between sacred and 
profane" is apparently "transcended;" there, too, "a 
total epiphany of the sacred occurs only by means of the 
abolition of the profane" (143). In his attempt to embody 
a truly apocalyptic faith and a true understanding of the 
Incarnation, Altizer, like Eliade, proclaims the 
uniqueness of Christianity, but that uniqueness here lies 
in a non-Eliadean understanding of the Christian emphasis 
on the Fall. "Only an acceptance of the fallen reality of 
the profane," says Altizer, "can make possible a faith 
that encounters the concrete actuality of the world, and 
moves forward through alienation and estrangement to an 
Eschatological End that transcends a primordial 
Beginning" (Altizer and Hamilton 148). Thus, as Cobb 
points out, Altizer replaces a pagan, traditional 
Christian, or Buddhist No-Saying with a Dionysian Yes-
saying; "now, the dialectical affirmation of being in 
the immediate moment is an epiphany of the sacred" (Cobb 
30). This affirmation of "being in the immediate moment," 
of the sacrali ty of the profane, must be a dialectical 
affirmation, insomuch as "only an acceptance of the 
reality of a negative or fallen reality can make possible 
a coincidentia oppositorum that is a coming together of 
the dual reality of the sacred and the profane" (Altizer 
and Hamil ton 149). Altizer agrees with Eliade that "a 
nondialectical affirmation of the profane ends in despair 
and Godlessness, for the profane has no sacral or 
redemptive power," but points out that on the other hand, 
Fountain 39 
a faith which simply "knows an eternal and unmoving 
sacred. can never know the reali ty of the 
Incarnation" (Cobb 31; Altizer and Hamilton 149). What is 
called for, then, is an understanding of Fall as genuine 
Fall, that is, as a negation of an eternal transcendent, 
and of Incarnation as a fully kenotic event, as the death 
of God. For Altizer, the uniqueness of Christianity 
entails a recognition of "a kenotic Christ" which "cannot 
be known as an exalted Lord or cosmic Logos (Altizer and 
Hamilton 152). "When the Incarnation is understood as a 
descent into the concrete, or as a movement from a 
primordial and unfallen sacred to an actually fallen 
profane," Altizer specifies, "then it cannot be conceived 
as not affecting a supposedly eternal Godhead, or as 
being a static or unchanging extension of the God who is 
the transcendence of Being" (Altizer and Hamilton 152). 
For Altizer, tradi tional New Testament Christology 
remains bound to a backwards-moving process; a genuine 
Incarnation must be truly kenotic, "a continual process 
of spirit becoming flesh, of Eternity becoming time, or 
of the sacred becoming profane" (152). In Altizer's 
kenotic Christology, not only does spirit become flesh, 
the sacred become profane, but in so doing the fallen 
identity of flesh, profane existence, is transformed. 
This forward movement of Spirit results in the "abolition 
of its original ground;" the unchanging eternal God, "the 
primordial God of the Beginning" negates itself in order 
to effect a union of Spirit with flesh" (Altizer and 
Hamilton 154). 
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It is the death of the primordial which marks the 
genesis of the kenotic God, and which, as original fall, 
negates an original totality or ground and reverses the 
cycle of return. This theme, which has its origin in 
Altizer's early treatment of Eliade, runs throughout his 
work. The ending of the cycle of return and the genesis 
of God have remained crucial themes through to recent 
works. By the time of Genesis And Apocalypse (1990), for 
example, Altizer has begun to fully elucidate the 
cosmological ramifications of the fall, the death of God. 
There the fall, known now as the beginning of history, 
the self-naming of the I AM, and the act of creation and 
revelation, breaks the primordial silence and negates the 
cycle of eternal return, releasing the actual events of 
history which are actual (read "profane" in Eliade's 
sense) in their perishing (finitude). Thus the events of 
history embody the self-naming of the I AM and yet embody 
the "actual absence and unspeakability of I AM, II 
therefore embodying the self-emptying of God which is an 
"actual and final fall" from an originary transcendence 
or plenitude, and an "irreversible beginning of a full 
and final actualization" (32-33). 
still drawing from an original Eliadean influence, 
Altizer asserts that nothing could be more opposite to 
this fall than "an eternal cycle of return," and that 
this is the primary difference between the pagan, or as 
Altizer would put it, archaic or primordial, 
understanding of history and the understanding of the 
Judaeo-Christian "historical world" (33). Although 
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creation is understood as "fall" in primordial 
mythologies, says Altizer, it is there a fall that is 
destined for regeneration in a cycle of eternal return, 
and so is a fall which does not end the primordially 
transcendent, and therefore is neither a new act nor can 
it be actually present (37). 
The Christian understanding of fall as felix culpa, 
says Altizer, understands creation as the totally new act 
which ends and reverses a primordial eternity, and as the 
"embodiment of the glory of God" such as could never be 
known in a cycle of eternal return (37). Thus the 
uniqueness of the Christian death of God remains, having 
developed in Altizer's latest works from its early 
proclamation in The Gospel of Christian Atheism. There 
Altizer combines an Eliadean influence with a Hegelian 
philosophical structure: 
"God is dead" are words which may only 
truly be spoken by the Christian, and not by 
the religious Christian who is bound to an 
eternal and unmoving Word, but by the radical 
Christian who speaks in response to an 
Incarnate Word that empties itself as spirit so 
as to appear and exist as flesh. A kenotic Word 
acts or moves by reversing the forms of flesh 
and spirit. Moreover, a dialectical reversal in 
this sense cannot lead to an identification of 
the sacred with the profane or of the Spirit 
with flesh; Spirit must negate itself as Spirit 
before it can become manifest as flesh • • • • 
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Spirit empties itself of spirit so as to become 
flesh, and flesh negates itself as flesh so as 
to become Spirit. (Altizer and Hamilton 154-
55) 
Clearly, as exhibited by the above passage, the death of 
God as Altizer understands it draws effectively from 
Hegel's philosophical system, especially the development 
of Spirit as it is presented in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit5 • In The Genesis of God, Altizer credits Hegel 
with the historical realization of the incarnation of 
God, a realization which could only occur in the modern 
world, in "a self-consciousness that realizes itself by 
interiorly and individually realizing that God Himself is 
dead (Phenomenology of Spirit 785)" (31)6. This credit 
however, had been given to Hegel as early as the above-
quoted Gospel of Christian Atheism, in which Hegel is 
named as "the thinker who created a conceptual portrait 
of the incarnate or kenotic movement of God" (Gospel 63). 
"It is only in Hegel," says Altizer, "that we may 
discover an idea of God or Being or Spirit which embodies 
an understanding of the theological meaning of the 
Incarnation" (Gospel 63). For Hegel, Spirit exists in a 
dialectical movement in which it "must become 
historical;" that is, "Spirit exists 'for-itself' when it 
exists as its own opposite or other," and "only when 
spirit knows itself in its own otherness will it fulfill 
its destiny as Spirit" (Gospel 65). The kenotic movement 
of Spirit, the self-annihilation of God, the "self-
sacrifice" of spirit "first enters consciousness when 
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Spirit first appears in its kenotic form as the man, 
Jesus of Nazareth," says Altizer (Gospel 66)7. In the 
death of Jesus we find the fullest expression of the 
self-negation of Spirit, of the death of God, and so "the 
radical Christian refuses to speak of God's existence," 
Altizer says, "because he knows that God has negated and 
transcended himself in the Incarnation, and thereby he 
has fully and finally ceased to exist in his original or 
primordial form" (Gospel 67)8. Further, this dialectical 
process, with its Hegelian orientation, "aims at an end: 
God as all in all" (Cobb 35), the "total presence" of the 
divine in history. 
Because of the depth of Altizer's understanding of 
the incarnation (and crucifixion) as the movement of the 
kenotic God into "all-in-all " , or "total presence," 
Robert Scharlemann sees it as "perhaps the most daring of 
the Hegelian readings of the present" (91). Further, the 
idea of total presence offers a theological passage 
through both the barriers of modernist nihilism and 
postmodern cynicism. That is, as Scharlemann points out, 
the contemporary identification of God with finitude, 
which echoes a theological reading of incarnation and 
crucifixion as the "'place' where God is," transposes not 
only the modern nihilistic "impossibility of finding any 
existing thing that is godly" but "even the absence of a 
sense of absence (even the loss of a feeling that God is 
dead)" into a "testimony of the total presence of God" 
(90). The loss of "tension between God and the real" 
testifies to the revelation that "God is totally in 
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things as they are, present also in the absence of a 
sense of his absence at all" (Scharlemann 90). 
In the wake of the postmodern and post-structuralist 
critiques of western metaphysics, any appeal to Hegel is 
suspect, especially one which so clearly draws from what 
has been critiqued as an eschatological circle in which 
Spirit merely returns to itself, and one in which 
Spirit's negation does not seem an authentic negation. 
Mark c. Taylor argues that "wi thin Hegel's panoptical 
system, difference always returns to identity," and 
"profitless expenditure, senseless prodigality, and 
excessive loss cannot be tolerated and must therefore be 
excluded or repressed" (A 23, 32). Therefore "Hegelian 
philosophy,". says Taylor, "can be understood as a 
systematic attempt to secure the identity of identity and 
nonidentity and the union of union and nonunion" (A 
xxiii)9. In other words, the postmodern problem with the 
Hegelian dialectic lies in its interpretation, first of 
all, as a System of totalization in which all reality is 
rationally subsumed under one grand narrative of the life 
of Spirit, and secondly, as a system in which the 
negativity of the movement of Spirit is not kenosis but 
simple contradiction. Mark C. Taylor claims, then, that 
"within Altizer's Hegelian dialectic, there is no place 
for the postmodern" (TEARS 242)10. Altizer, however, 
recognizes in postmodernism the same nostalgia and 
exclusivity which postmodernism critiques within the 
metaphysical tradition and its CUlmination in modernism. 
While it is a basic tenet of most postmodernist critiques 
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that they are not separate from but parasitic (in both 
senses) upon (and to) modernism, Altizer recognizes 
postmodernism as a reaction to modernism, but modernism 
for Altizer entails a negation of the movement of eternal 
return and therefore postmodernism is seen as a 
reappearance of a nostalgic eternal return, an eternal 
return which is basically equivalent to the "Hegelian 
circle" critiqued by postmodernism. Altizer would argue, 
alongside Rowan Williams for example, that while "Hegel 
believes there to be only one story to tell of the life 
of the mind," that story is "emphatically not a story of 
return to the same" (75). Referring to Deborah Chaffin's 
work on Derrida's interpretation of Hegel, Williams 
asserts that "the structure of Hegel's dialectic is meant 
to challenge the all-sufficiency of the polarity of 
simple identity and simple difference" (78 emphasis 
mine). In Altizer's terms, the question is whether or not 
Hegel should be considered a pagan (in his Eliadean 
sense) or a truly modern thinker (that is, one whose 
system is ultimately a negation of an eternal return). 
It is in his "Hegel and the Christian God," (which 
appears in a fuller form in The Genesis of God) that 
Altizer addresses the problem of the understanding of the 
Hegelian movement as an eternal return. The question to 
be answered, says Altizer, is whether or not "the 
Hegelian absolute can actually die" (81). 
Hegelian negation a negation which 
"Is a purely 
is equally 
affirmation," Altizer asks, "so that finally there is no 
real distinction between negation and affirmation?" 
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("HCG" 81). If this is so, then the Hegelian movement of 
Spirit, the informing paradigm of Hegel's entire 
philosophy (Walker 214), is simply an eternal return, but 
such an understanding overlooks the centrality of Trieb 
or kenosis in the Hegelian system (GOG 37). "Trieb or 
kenosis," says Altizer, is the "most distinctively 
Christian ground of Hegel's system," and is also "the 
ultimate source and ground of a purely Hegelian negation" 
(GOG 37). Although there is an identity of opposites in 
the Hegelian system, this identity is due to a real 
opposition, as opposites are themselves "realizations of 
their own inherent otherness" (GOG 37). Such opposition 
is manifest in the absolute, Spirit, in Hegel's system, 
and without this opposition, Altizer points out, "Spirit 
would be lifeless and alone" (GOG 37). If such an 
absolute is to be understood in the Hegelian system as 
the ground of actuality, Altizer explains, that ground 
cannot itself be inactual or lifeless. While Hegel shares 
with Spinoza the view that actuality is that one 
indivisible substance, Altizer points out that Hegel knew 
that substance as a self-negating subject, and only with 
the centrality of Trieb or kenosis can the absolute be 
known as "subject," a subject which is self-negating or 
self-alienating (GOG 38). Altizer further points out that 
while spinoza's God could not be related with evil, 
Hegel's God experiences a "purely negative movement," a 
withdrawing into itself and becoming "self-centered n , 
realizing "that God who is 'being in itself'" and 
actualizing the death of God and the actuality of 
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absolute Spirit; this is the death of "the purely 
abstract God" (GOG 38). without this death, which Hegel 
identified with the crucifixion, Hegel's system, says 
Altizer, would be a "truly empty system," a system of the 
affirmation of that "purely abstract" absolute which was 
known by Hegel as evil; with it, however, Hegel can know 
absolute spirit as the embodiment of kenosis, as the 
crucified God, and can know the God of Christendom as 
"the bad infinite," that eternal and absolute isolation 
which is "alienated from the Godhead, " an alienation 
which is requisite to the self-negation of the kenotic 
God, and an "alienation which finally negates itself" 
(GOG 40). It was this absolute evil which Nietzsche, in 
The Antichrist would know as the God who is the 
"deification of nothingness" (GOG 40). The death of God 
is necessary for the negation of such an absolute evil, 
for "only the death of God," Altizer maintains, "is the 
full realization or actualization of absolute spirit," an 
actualization required by a self-negating absolute spirit 
which "realizes itself as its own 'other'" (GOG 38). This 
otherness , Altizer reiterates, is absolutely unique to 
the Christian understanding of the crucified God (lliill 
38). It is in knowing this death of God that Hegel most 
obviously knows the uniquely Christian God, and in his 
knowledge of that otherness which is an embodiment of 
that death!!, the uniquely Christian God is, according to 
Altizer, "more decisively present in Hegel than in any 
other thinker except Nietzsche" (GOG 38). Hegel and 
Nietzsche, says Altizer, are "those thinkers who most 
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purely know the death of God," and as such also "most 
decisively know the Christian God" (GOG 38). 
Nietzsche, whom Hans Kung has identified in Does God 
Exist? as "the atheist, whose challenge Christians must 
face" (Mark 273), has long been a force in Altizer's 
thinking, but his influence was early noted as a negative 
one. In his 1958 essay, "Religion and Reality" Altizer 
viewed Nietzsche's characterization of Christianity as 
world-denying as the negative truth of an antithetical 
pagan. In complete opposition to his later development, 
Altizer's early radical stance saw world-denial as a 
necessity: 
Contemporary Christians of all sorts also 
resist the eschatological teachings of Jesus. 
But, in so doing, they transform the historical 
Jesus and make impossible the radical demands 
of the Sermon on the Mount. Only a world-
denying faith can make possible an absolute 
obedience to God. For the other-worldly 
eschatology of Jesus is the ethical equivalent 
of the philosophical nihilism of Buddhism. A 
fai th which clings to being, which clings to 
the world, can never pass into the faith which 
Jesus demanded. As Nietzsche saw, both 
Christianity and Buddhism are nihilistic 
religions. Both embody a hatred of reality. But 
it is just this hatred which makes love 
possible. (260) 
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Here Al tizer credi ts Nietzsche wi th the accurate 
definition of the God of Christianity as the "deification 
of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy:" 
this observation, which Altizer then saw as arising from 
"the depths of (Nietzsche's) pagan defiance of Christ," 
would soon become fundamental in Altizer's theology, 
which then only took note of the similarity that both 
Buddhism and Christianity "teach that religious 
fulfillment lies only in a loss of the self. (a) nd 
both look forward to a dissolution of being that will 
make possible the authentic realization of faith and 
love" ("Religion and Reality" 261). However, at this 
stage in his development, Altizer uses Nietzsche to call 
for the "rejection of reality" in order that the reality 
of God be manifest. In his treatment of the 
eschatological traditions of the Old Testament, "The 
Religious Foundations of Biblical Eschatology," Altizer 
utilizes Nietzsche's inquiry "into man's employment of 
God as an instrument of his own self-torture," 
concluding, strangely enough, in light of Altizer's 
subsequent development, that "the rejection of the 
'reality' of the world makes possible the realization of 
the 'real i ty' of God, " and further, that " (w) hen the 
world becomes a nothing, Yahweh 'becomes' the wholly 
Other, the one final Reali ty" (270). The God of this 
early stage of Altizer's thought is not the God who has 
died, but the God who "has begun to act:" if there is to 
be any death, it is to be that of the world, of reality, 
of history, of being: 
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The good news of prophetic-eschatological faith 
is that even now God has begun to act. And the 
initiation of his action can result only in the 
advent of the End; for the higher expressions 
of biblical religion can submit to no "reality" 
that is not the "reality" of God. Hence the 
coming of the Kingdom of God must mark the 
advent of a New Creation--which must 
necessarily effect a total reversal of the 
"reality" of the world and which alone can make 
possible the triumph of God. ("Religion and 
Reality" 272) 
Also in his 1963 essay, "Nirvana and the Kingdom of God," 
Altizer continued to affirm the necessity of transcending 
and annihilating "all desire to be a being in the world" 
(Cobb 29). However, Altizer engaged in some negation of 
his own thought by suggesting a realized eschatology in 
which "the Kingdom of God 'will never dawn in us if we 
refuse our existence in the here and now'" (Cobb 29). In 
this understanding, "being" is not annihilated as Altizer 
had previously advocated, but it is "transfigured:" 
It is this very reality in its sheer actuality 
and immediateness which is being transfigured 
by the dawning of the Kingdom; God appears here 
and not in a beyond. Therefore, the Christian 
must live this life, sharing all its fullness 
and emptiness, its joy and its horror, knowing 
that his destiny is to live here and now, 
allowing his life to be the metal which God's 
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fire will transform into his Kingdom. And if we 
are to live now, we cannot escape the anguish 
of the human condition: if we are to live here, 
we cannot flee this condition by a leap of 
faith. (Cobb 29) 
It is at this point that the faith which for Altizer had 
been "world-denying" becomes "world-affirming." It is at 
this point, too, that a Nietzsche who had previously 
served as an opposite becomes a positive influence, as 
Altizer's understanding of dialectic develops and the 
"profane" existence of this world becomes the kenotic 
body of the self-negating God. Once a distinction is made 
between the God of Christendom (the God of Eternal 
Return, Hegel's Bad Infinite, and Nietzsche's "will to 
Nothingness Pronounced Holy") and the kenotic, crucified 
God of authentic Christianity, the cry of Nietzsche's 
madman, that God is dead, becomes the truest Christian 
testimony. As Altizer proclaims in "The Sacred and the 
Profane," the radical Christian remains "bound to an 
eternal and unmoving word," but the "radical Christian," 
who proclaims the death of God, responds to the truly 
incarnate Word, the negated spirit which appears in flesh 
(Altizer and Hamilton 154-55). This same emptying of 
Spirit into flesh is the totality of which Altizer speaks 
in his recent Genesis of God, when he writes, "to be open 
to totality itself as the apocalyptic Body of the Godhead 
is to be open to an absolutely new totality," and it is 
still only the Christian vision which may understand that 
totali ty as the "dissolution of a purely transcendent 
Fountain 52 
God" :in the "transformation of a pure and total 
transcendence into a pure and total immanence" (114). It 
is this immanence, says Altizer, which is not only 
manifest in Hegel's Science of Logic, but which is also 
"enacted in Nietzsche's vision of Eternal Recurrence" 
(GOG 114). Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence," however, 
must be distinguished from and considered in relation to 
the concept of "eternal return" and understood in its 
association to the Will to Power. 12 
Nietzsche's vision of eternal recurrence, says 
Altizer, "is not to be confused with the archaic vision 
of eternal return; " in fact, Al ti zer adds, "it is its 
very reversal" (GA 128). The "vision of eternal return" 
of which Altizer speaks is, of course, drawn from the 
influence of Mircea Eliade's thought, in which an 
original transcendence passes into immanence and back 
again into transcendence, or in which there is no real 
distinction between immanence and transcendence, or in 
which the function of immanence is as a mode of 
transcendence; in short, eternal return represents any 
metaphysical/temporal structure in which no real 
beginning is possible. In consideration of the finality 
of Nietzsche's view of history, Altizer notes that the 
primary difference between the pagan, or as Eliade might 
put it, archaic or primordial, understanding of history 
and the understanding of the Judaeo-Christian "historical 
world" is the refutation and reversal by the latter of 
any vestige of eternal return (~ 33). Further, Altizer 
would agree with Bernard Zelechow that while Nietzsche 
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utilizes the language of "pagan philosophy," his idea of 
eternal recurrence is "distinctly albeit implicitly 
biblical" (138). It is a grave error, says Zelechow, to 
view eternal recurrence as a flight from "the bond of 
Western culture" or subservience to history's biblical 
temporality into the safety of "the pagan cyclical view 
of time" (138). According to Zelechow, the view of 
history shared by the biblical texts and Nietzsche is an 
account of the redemptive call to personal responsibility 
and paradoxical freedom (129-130). "The biblical view," 
says Zelechow, is grounded by an "eternal now that binds 
the infinite past to the infinite future," and in which 
"time and eternity are linked by a given unity of world 
and Presence," so that history is the experience of the 
"God whose essence is doing in the world rather than 
merely the God of the cosmos who is" (129). The emphasis 
of biblical texts upon the personal encounter with God 
and the responsibility of the person's doing "God's work 
in the world" rather than upon the imparting of 
theoretical knowledge asks the question "to what extent 
can God's commands be embodied?": a question which, 
according to Zelechow, is also asked by Nietzsche's 
"secularised version of the biblical view of eternal 
presence (history)" (130). In Nietzsche's conception, the 
responsibility leveled upon the individual confronted 
with the responsibility of eternal recurrence becomes the 
vehicle through which the past is redeemed by the "Thus I 
willed it" of the will to Power, so that the pagan idea 
of the unalterability and inaccessibility (and cyclical 
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repetition) of the past is transcended, while the 
historici ty and actuality of the present are affirmed: 
the "eternal now" of eternal recurrence requires "the 
active recognition of human freedom" and responsibility, 
rather than the "fatalism and despair" of the pagan cycle 
(Zelechow 138-39). This point bears special weight in 
light of Altizer's consideration of creation and the 
revelation (and death/genesis) of God as "novum," that 
is, in a view of the events of history as "historical," 
or unique. It is just this vision of which Altizer speaks 
in his consideration of the uniquely Christian 
proclamation of the death of God and the redemption of 
history. 13 
The death of God, which for Altizer marks a 
beginning which is the irreversible ending of a 
primordial silence and therefore a total novum, can never 
"simply pass into ending," as is the case in "a cycle or 
circle of eternal return," in which there is finally no 
distinction between beginning and end, alpha and omega 
(GA 33). In order that events be understood as "final and 
unique," Al tizer asserts that the beginning which 
releases those events must be understood as beginning 
alone, "a unique beginning which is the origin and ground 
of irreversible and unique events" (GA 33). However, 
insofar as these events are unique only in their 
finali ty, in their perishing, an understanding of 
beginning which is absolute, that is, which can only be 
understood apart from a cycle of eternal return, must 
also be an understanding in which "ending becomes 
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manifest and real as an irrevocable perishing, a death 
that is fully and only itself, and therefore a death that 
can never pass into life" (~ 34). 
Now such an 
Nietzsche as well, 
finality in which 
understanding, for Altizer and for 
grants "a new finality" to life, a 
life, and history itself, as the 
passing away of events which are unique in their 
perishing and are released by the absolute beginning, is 
inconceivable apart from the ultimacy of death (34). It 
is this very understanding of the ultimacy of death which 
becomes the harbinger of new life, a life in which 
"nothing is more forbidden than a longing for death," and 
a life in which a chaos can be understood which is 
absolutely other, and which can never be reconciled in a 
cycle of eternal return: 
Once such life has become manifest and real, 
nothing is more forbidden than a longing for 
death, a death that now and for the first time 
appears and is real through the new portal of 
the full and actual darkness of chaos. Now only 
does chaos appear as a chaos that is only 
itself, an ultimate abyss which can never be 
sanctified or reversed in a cycle of eternal 
return, and a final abyss which is eternally 
closed to the presence of light. Yet the 
manifestation and realization of that chaos is 
a decisive sign of the presence of a 
truly new life, a life liberated from the 
encompassing power of a primordial abyss that 
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can be the giver of life, as the realization of 
the final and total darkness of chaos shatters 
the enticing and beckoning power of every 
primordial or original source and ground. Now 
death is otherness itself, a death that is 
wholly other than life; and with the 
realization of that life the life-giving power 
of the call of eternal return is ended. (34) 
It is only with the "self-naming of I AM," then, that the 
"call of eternal return" is ended. Altizer maintains that 
this ending is a "radical iconoclasm," which destroys 
every vestige of "an original or primordial ground or 
light" (34) • This iconoclasm grants to speech a new 
identity, dissociating speech from myth and rite, and 
freeing it from the cycle of eternal return. The speech 
of I AM, says Altizer, can not be associated with a cycle 
of eternal return, because the words which end the cycle 
of return can be heard "only as themselves, " thereby 
bringing about the reversal of the pagan view of cyclical 
history and the "beginning of the impact of irreversible 
events upon consciousness, an impact which ever more 
gradually and more fully called forth the release of 
individual and unique identities" (35).14 
Whether "the self-naming of I AM II refers to an 
ultimate cosmological beginning or an individual salvific 
event in an individual lifetime15 , the contrast between 
the cycle of eternal return which is reversed and the 
eternal recurrence which is embraced in the "thus I 
willed it" is of great import. The "thus I willed it" of 
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the "will to power" and eternal recurrence are finally 
intrinsically connected, as Altizer proclaims: 
(Eternal recurrence) is (eternal return's) very 
reversal, and is its reversal by apprehending 
eternal recurrence as the absolute ending of 
eternal return, or the absolute ending of the 
very possibility of transcendence, of the 
ending of every moment which is not an 
immediate and total now. If "Being begins in 
every Now (Zarathustra III, "The 
Convalescent"), that beginning is the ending of 
transcendence or the death of God, a death 
which occurs in every full and actual moment, 
and therefore a death releasing a total 
immanence, a pure immanence which is an 
absolute reversal of every moment which is open 
to transcendence, and therefore a reversal of 
an eternal return which is a return of a 
primordial and eternal moment of time. But 
Nietzsche's vision of Eternal Recurrence is 
finally identical with his vision of the will 
to Power, for here eternal recurrence is actual 
and real only in a moment of absolute will 
. . • ." (GA 128) 
Thus Altizer parallels the actuality of the individual 
moment with the ultimate cosmological beginning of the 
death/genesis of God and with the absolute will of the 
Will to Power. As the absolute willing of all that 
occurs, the willing of eternal recurrence and the 
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Christian doctrine of predestination are inseparable for 
Altizer. It is this understanding which allows Altizer to 
refer to Nietzsche as an Augustinian thinker. "Even as 
Augustine can only know full freedom by willing the will 
of God," says Altizer, "Nietzsche can only know full 
freedom by willing the will to Power, a willing which is 
the willing of everything which occurs, just as a willing 
of the will of God is a willing of everything which 
occurs" (GOG 122). Both predestination and the will to 
Power are a simultaneous willing of good and evil, and as 
such, grant total freedom for Augustine and can be known 
for Nietzsche as a will which is "beyond good and evil." 
A willing of absolute evil such as Nietzsche's will to 
Power is a negative will which according to Altizer 
imparts to God an ever more negative identity. This 
negative identity of God is the understanding which 
separates Hegel's concept of God from Spinoza' s in its 
knowledge of the absolute evil inherent in the absolute. 
Such a knowledge of God remains largely esoteric in the 
thought of Hegel, but, Altizer claims, it "bursts forth 
with an irresistible power" in the thought of Nietzsche. 
It is his understanding of the negativity and evil in the 
idea of God which warrants Nietzsche's place as that 
thinker who, in Altizer's words, "has more deeply 
understood the uniquely Christian God than any other 
thinker since Hegel" (GOG 127). That understanding relies 
upon an affirmation of the self-negating God and of the 
will as a "self-embodied" will which accepts 
responsibility for the whole of history in the willing of 
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eternal recurrence, and therefore wills predestination 
even as the Christian God wills the fall and 
predestination in the kenotic movement of death and 
genesis, thereby ending and negating the eternal return. 
Altizer's treatment of Nietzsche emphasizes the 
distinctions and similarities between the cosmological 
and existential implications of the death of God. That 
is, on a simple level, the death of God serves as a 
paradigm for both universal creation and self creation, 
which, in Altizer, become one and the same act, 
simultaneous with apocalypse, an ending which is an 
"apocalyptic genesis." It is that ending which is 
proclaimed by the "'good news' of Jesus," the good news 
of the "final ending of evil," an ending which Altizer 
proclaims as occurring even now, with the Kingdom of God. 
(GOG 8). The movement of total fall, of the genesis which 
is the death of God, is a movement which has never been 
understood theologically as an apocalyptic genesis, says 
Al tizer, and in true apocalyptic mode, he proclaims in 
his most recent work that "the time is at hand" for such 
an understanding (GOG 9). 
In a transfigured Eliadean mode, Altizer declares 
that such an understanding, an understanding of "a new 
eterni ty," a Nietzschean/Hegelian eternity "that is not 
only new, but whose novum is all in all" will remain 
beyond our consciousness so long as we in the modern 
world continue to cling to any sort of concept of a 
totality which remains Ita pure or unending eternity," in 
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the sense of a closed system or of a transcendence which 
is ultimately a pure transcendence or presence16 (~ 28). 
Eliade, Hegel and Nietzsche provide only the most 
rudimentary theological and philosophical elements in an 
exposition of Altizer's understanding of the 
death/genesis of God. That is an understanding which is 
equally provided by writers such as Milton, Blake and 
Joyce, among others. However, the philosophical structure 
provided by Altizer's appropriation of Eliade, Hegel and 
Nietzsche provides a sui table framework wi thin which to 
approach those writers, as well as a starting point from 
which to begin to move toward an exploration of the 
mul tifaceted realms wi thin which considerations of the 
death of God, the dialectics of eternal recurrence and 
eternal return, the relationship' between linear and 
cyclical time, and the interplay of fiction and theology 
interact and take on new shades of meaning. 
Theology was born out of faith's will to enter 
history; now theology must die at the hands of 
a faith that is strong enough to shatter 
history. If theology is to transcend itself it 
must negate itself, for theology can be reborn 
only through the death of Christendom, which 
finally means the death of the Christian God, 
the God who is the transcendence of Being •••• 
Perhaps we are at last prepared to understand 
the uniqueness of the Christian gospel. 
(Altizer, "Theology and the Death of God" 110) 
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NOTES 
1Altizer remarks in the preface to his The Genesis 
of God, that "the simple truth is that a fully modern 
theology has not yet been written or conceived, so that 
there cannot yet be a postmodern theology, but only a 
renewed medieval, or patristic, or pagan theology. " 
(2) • 
2 As Charles Sabatino points out, Altizer is not 
simply a critic of religion who asserts that "theology 
must become anthropology or that concern with God must 
gi ve way to concern strictly with humanity, " but is 
altogether more radical, claiming that "the religious 
tradition itself calls for this shift away from concern 
with the transcendent God" (289) 
3~his conviction is but one of many instances of the 
profound influence of Hegel upon Altizer's thought. 
Altizer's obsession with the idea of God bears similarity 
to Hegel, as Robert Scharlemann notes, 
One of Hegel's basic motifs puts him at odds 
with all thoughtless theology; it is the motif 
that in the meaning of 'God' there is a content 
that we can think, or conceptually grasp, and, 
by grasping it, take part in its own reality. 
(Inscriptions and Reflections 81) 
but whereas Hegel's model here is "thinking" and the 
"concept," Altizer, though not explicitly, implicitly 
places centrali ty upon wri ting as the fundamental 
paradigm of theology. 
4 It is Hegel's voice which is most recognizable in 
Altizer's writings, despite an acknowledged debt to 
Kierkegaard. In Altizer's estimation, Kierkegaard's 
critique of Hegel's system does not overturn it, but 
deepens it in a dialectical inversion. "Modern theology," 
says Altizer, "was founded by Soren Kierkegaard" 
("Theology and the Death of God" 95), and while both 
Kierkegaard and theology following his lead have named 
Hegel's system and its God "the pure anti thesis of the 
Christian God," Altizer asserts in his The Genesis of 
God, speaking specifically of Hegel's Science of Logic, 
that because of the ambiguous and dichotomous character 
of Hegel's God, Kierkegaard's "judgement is precarious" 
because that God· which is antithetical to the Christian 
God is the Godhead which is in Hegel negated in the 
negation of eternal return (11-12). The Hegelian God is 
"absolute· Idea," Altizer explains, but is as such "a 
'personality' which is not exclusive identity but rather 
universality itself" (GOG 12). Further, Altizer maintains 
that "Kierkegaard's dialectical understanding of 
Christiani ty is a reverse Hegelian thinking" which is 
"deeply Hegelian in apprehending the profound historical 
transformation of Christianity," in which contemporary 
Christianity has become the very opposite of New 
Testament faith, and that Kierkegaard's understanding of 
Fountain 62 
the "offense" of fai th arises from a Hegelian 
understanding of the paradox of the incarnation (GOG 44-
45). 
5 Jean Hyppolite has examined the idea that the 
Ehenomenology is fashioned as a pedagogical 
Bildungsroman, an epic tale of the heroic consciousness. 
"Hegel's Phenomenology," says Hyppolite," .is the 
novel of philosophic formation: it follows the 
development of consciousness, II from the renunciation of 
first beliefs to absolute knowledge (12). Hegel, however, 
according to Hyppolite, understood his work not as novel 
but as science, presenting within it that absolute 
knowledge. Altizer, however, has certainly read the 
Phenomenology as novel, not as presentation of scientific 
fact but as narrative open to interpretation, but as a 
novel the writing of which, like history itself, is the 
writing of the word of God, a writing which embodies the 
self-negation of God in history (and a writing which 
Al tizer himself continues). Hegel's Phenomenology marks 
the conscious historical realization of the incarnation 
of God, but is only one point in a continuing embodiment. 
For Altizer, Hegel's absolute knowledge is completely 
incomplete. certainly Altizer would agree with Derrida's 
assessment in positions that: 
We will never be finished with the reading of 
Hegel, and, in a certain way, I do nothing 
other than explain myself on this point. In 
effect I believe that Hegel's text is 
necessarily fissured: that it is something more 
and other than the circular closure of its 
representation. (Taylor, nQ 1) 
Perhaps it should be added that we will never be finished 
with the writing of Hegel as well. 
6 Eric von Der Luft observes that the phrase "God is 
dead," so often associated with Nietzsche, occurs three 
times in Hegel, and is often incorrectly attributed to 
Luther (by Baillie, Miller, and Findlay, for instance) 
(263). The phrase is in fact derived from the Lutheran 
pastor, Johann Rist, whose Good Friday hymn, "0 
Traurigkeit, 0 Herzeleid," concretizes the Lutheran theme 
of divine kenosis in what Scharlemann denotes as a 
religious expression of the disciples' momentous "loss of 
a world and a God" in the crucifixion (Theology at the 
End of the century 5) • Hegel, says Scharlemann, 
transformed the religious intensity of that sentiment 
into "a moment of world history as the point at which 
spirit is most estranged from itself" (5). 
7 For Hegel, the Christ-event is the historical 
actuality of Spirit's self-negation and actualization. In 
the concrete figure of Jesus of Nazareth, Spirit "yields 
to passion and to death and rises majestically from its 
ashes" (Hyppolite 352). This "to die and become" of the 
divine is re-enacted in the life of the consciousness of 
the subject, which "having posed itself in its absolute 
Fountain 63 
self-certainty, discovers its own finitude and is lost in 
the finite" (Hyppolite 352). 
8 As Fackenheim points out, Hegel's understanding of 
incarnation grows out of an understanding of the 
necessity of redemption, 'preserving and reconciling the 
extremes of divinity and humanity' (139). Therefore the 
redemptive act entails a divine entrance into the human 
world, without destroying the humanity which it would 
redeem, but also without simply forfeiting its own 
divinity; as Fackenheim stresses, "a god who simply died 
in the human world would be but an additional member in 
the Roman pantheon of dead gods" (140). Rather, the 
Christian redemptive action, centered in the crucifixion, 
entails a radical dialectical coincidence of the 
opposites of God and humanity, divinity and death, which 
inevitably "explodes into paradox" (Fackenheim 140). 
9 It could be argued, from a point of view such as 
is offered by David Manser in his article "On Becoming," 
that this is a misunderstanding of the radicality of 
"becoming" within Hegel, as well as a de-emphasizing of 
the notion that wi thin Hegel's dialectic "even everyday 
concepts are, when properly understood, similar, in that 
they do not denote static and timeless entities" (68). 
Hegel's use of "becoming" as the reconciliation of being 
and nothing does not reduce nothing (or nonidenti ty) to 
being (or identity), but serves to express the fact that 
neither being nor becoming (nor identity and nonidentity, 
union and nonunion) are static and changeless in the face 
of the insufficiency of language to express such a 
notion. 
10 Taylor's argument is based of course on Derrida's 
reading of Hegel, which criticizes the notion of 
"closure" in the Hegelian system. However, Howard Kainz 
asserts that while Derrida "has in mind the 'syntheses' 
of bivalent logic prevalent in nondialectical systems," 
the Hegelian system includes, a "collapse of the ordinary 
distinctions between thought and being," which leads to a 
"collapse of the binary distinction between closure and 
unassimilable otherness (by focusing on that very limited 
sphere where there is a distinction which is no 
distinction, or a unity-in-distiction)" (88). Hegel's 
dialectic engenders, according to Kainz, a "closure of 
closure and al teri ty, II which is not mere synthesis, nor 
staticity, but paradox, entailing not simple dissolution 
of distinction, but also distinction's perpetuation and 
intensification of itself (89). 
11 The 
transcendent 
actualization 
embodiment of the otherness of 
God is, as Hyppolite explains, 
of the death of God in community: 
the 
the 
The death of Christ is not only the death 
of the God-man, but also the death of the 
abstract God whose transcendence radically 
separated human existence from his (sic) divine 
essence. • As spirit God has become the 
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universal self-consciousness of the community 
which, through the mediation of its history, 
raises its particularity to universality and 
makes this universality, within which the 
particular dies, concrete and moving. (568) 
The death of the particular here is to be understood as a 
kenotic openness to community, a kenosis which, like the 
death of God, is the apocalyptic genesis and the "total 
presence" of the particular; the particular is not simply 
eradicated in a static entity, but is understood as 
participating in a process of "othering," of consistent 
decentering. 
12According to Joan stambaugh, Nietzsche himself 
drew no real distinction between "return" (wiederkunft), 
and "recurrence" (Wiederkehr), using wiederkunft " in 
most of the 'crucial' passages," that is, in those 
passages in which Nietzsche most explicitly refers to the 
concept (Nl%R 29). Further, Stambaugh points out that 
Nietzsche opted against the "more familiar and less 
ambiguous" term Wiederholung (repetition), which would 
have, according to Stambaugh, connoted "the exact 
repetition of all things ••• in a determined series" 
(NTER 30). A clearer distinction exists between the 
English "recurrence" and "return" than the German 
"Wiederkehr" and "Wiederkunft, II so that, according to 
Stambaugh: 
• • • what recurs is an event, something which 
has previously occurred. What returns might be 
anything, including a person, which goes back 
to where it was. A recurrence is something 
which has run through its course and occurs 
again. A return implies a turning about and 
going back to an original place or state. (NTER 
30) 
Stambaugh, as she interprets Nietzsche to have done, 
draws no real distinction between the two terms except 
with respect to the subject of "recurrence" or "return," 
whether event or object, respectively, although that 
subject is always Das Gleiche (~ 45-59). Stressing the 
import of the individual's powerful willing of the 
sameness of every moment, stambaugh understands the Will 
to Power as "the world considered as '--and nothing 
else! 'II and eternal return as the consideration of the 
world as "my world, the ring of rings to which I pledge 
my own return II (~ 101). For stambaugh, eternal 
recurrence or return represents that totality, that 
predestined totality, which determines the existential 
situation of the individual, existing in either of "two 
possibilities of being," reminiscent of Heidegger's 
authentic or inauthentic existence: "the dissonance of 
self-contradiction, or the consonance of speaking to 
oneself again" (TPOTIN 198). 
Further, Zelechow notes that while Stambaugh 
"assert (s ) that Nietzsche works wi thin the context of 
Greek presuppositions II she does IIrecognize that 
Nietzsche's sense of time isn't pagan;" while asserting 
Nietzsche's Platonism, Stambaugh's "reading of recurrence 
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requires a biblical conception of time," according to 
Zelechow (142). Magnus, stewart and Mileur also point out 
the necessity of a linear concept of time in the notion 
of eternal recurrence,a notion which, they argue, is a 
"self-consuming concept," which "requires as a condition 
of its intelligibity the very contrast it wishes to set 
aside," thereby allowing us to "see the same thing, only 
differently" (25). 
13Winston L. King convincingly argues in 
the Death of God" (Cobb 207-224) that Zen 
rejection of 'Oriental Mysticism' and Altizer in 
rejection of Christian and Buddhist 
transcendentalism" arrive at much the same position. 
"Zen 
"in 
his 
and 
its 
While Altizer does indeed affirm the negation of an 
absolute ground (Sunyata) as common to both Christianity 
and Buddhism, and also often sanctions the dialectical 
negation of Madhyamika Buddhism, he adheres to his belief 
in the uniqueness of Christianity as he states in his 
response that "just as Zen knows nothing of what we have 
known as transcendence, so likewise it has no awareness 
of what we are corning to know as total immanence." 
14 Dr. Robert Carroll argues convincingly for a 
translation of I AM (in Exodus 3: 14) as "I will be what 
(ever) I will be," so as not to transform the ambiguity 
of the divine name, an absent presence which carries 
wi thin it the "charge of the future," into a static 
presence ("strange Fire" 55-57). That static presence 
might be said to be equivalent to the eternal return 
which is negated by the speech of I AM in Altizer, 
identifying the kenotic God not with the statici ty of 
eternal return but with the process of becoming in 
creation and incarnation. Carroll's emphasis upon 
futurity is not contradicted by Altizer's use of I AM, 
though perhaps Altizer's position might be strengthened 
by the use of Carroll's translation. Altizer's use of I 
AM, however, tends to link him not only with the biblical 
tradition, but also with the romantic tradition exhibited 
by Coleridge's understanding of the "primary 
imagination," which, as Carroll points out entails the 
"repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM" (Carroll 52). That is an 
association of which neither Carroll nor Altizer would 
entirely approve: Carroll finds Coleridge's grounding of 
the self in God, "I am because in God I am," far removed 
from its biblical origin and "bordering on the absurd", 
and, as stated above (Sabatino), Altizer's "self" finds 
its identification with God not in its grounding in 
eternity, but in history, futurity, emptiness and 
interrelationality. 
15 Sabatino links the cosmological and existential 
aspects of the self-negation of God by observing the 
import of Buddhist negation for Altizer, in that it 
provides a positive perspective upon the negation of God 
and self. Within Mahayana Buddhism, Sabatino notes, it is 
not "personal centeredness" which provides the "primary 
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meaning wi thin being," as in the Western view of the 
self, but the "essential belonging in interrelationality 
of all existent beings" (293). The symbol of the death of 
God for Altizer presents a kenotic understanding of both 
God and humanity: 
.as God is to be understood as having 
retained and claimed nothing, but to have 
abandoned all prerogatives of Godhead, so does 
authentic human dwelling consist in the similar 
shift of one's own individual being toward that 
more common possibility of meaning which each 
shares with all. The death of God is a symbol 
for the death experience which any person must 
undergo as we come to participate with others 
in what is found to be an essentially shared 
world possibility and future. • • .Not only 
does (Altizer) negate the distinct existence of 
God, but he further negates the ultimate 
significance of that centered and individual 
being whom each might claim to be. (294-95) 
For a full elucidation of Altizer's understanding of the 
relatedness of Buddhist and Christian notions of negation 
and emptiness, see his Genesis and Apocalypse, chapter 6, 
"Emptiness and Self-Emptiness," 93-106. 
16 Refuting the claim put forth by Eric Meyers that 
Altizer's understanding of creation as the totality of 
the eternal God is a "dialectical process-pantheism" 
("Thomas J.J. Altizer's Construction of Ultimate Reality 
and Meaning,rt Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1:4 [1978] 
272-73), Sabatino specifies that this totality is a 
negated totality which passes through two stages of 
coming-to-be. First, there is the "emergence of world and 
God as Other," but also a second movement of incarnation 
" (represented by the Jesus event) in which creation is 
finally complete with the total self-negation of God" 
(291-92). This completion, however, is a passing of the 
eternal God into the "eternal becoming which is the 
world;" thus Altizer's total negation of transcendence 
differs from the transcendence which, understood as 
"embodied" but not "negated," is retained by God in the 
pantheism of process theology (292). 
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Chapter Two 
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(Watterson 77) 
or "down" is left, when 
"beginning" and "end" and all historic symbols 
have disappeared, what will be the meaning of 
such primary dogmas as the Incarnation and the 
Creation? (Altizer "AFT" 13) 
There is no up and down; there are no 
hierarchies; nothing is more fundamental than 
anything else. (Capra et ale 133)1 
Alan Olson, in his review of Altizer's Genesis and 
Apocalypse, notes that the notion of historical 
apocalypse within Altizer's theology resembles the 
"ontological priority of the future" of which Heidegger 
and Bloch have written (124). This ontological priority 
of the future is a theme which is adopted by Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, for whose systematic theology the notion of 
futurity is crucial, as he understands God as the "power 
of the future," and can claim that since the future is 
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the realm of God's existence, it is legitimate to assert 
that God does not yet exist, but is coming to be. 
Certainly this might be said to be Altizer's 
understanding of the death and genesis of God 
systematized, and the debt that both Pannenberg and 
Al tizer owe to Hegel is obvious. However, Pannenberg's 
focus upon futurity also leads to his notion of the 
anticipatory nature of all theological statements, their 
meanings and meaningfulness contingent upon the meaning-
giving ultimate future (an event which is itself 
contingent, and only hope provides the foundation of 
"meaning" in light of that event which mayor may not 
happen). In Pannenberg's theology, this apocalyptic event 
lies always in the future, while for Altizer apocalypse 
is a present reality (but an apocalyptic present reality, 
a "presence" which is always not yet) • Al though 
Pannenberg's understanding of history adds little to a 
traditional eschatological notion, Pannenberg's theology 
does lend itself to a "hermeneutical priority of the 
future," a notion of interpretation which finds affinity 
with Derrida's meditations upon "differance" and the 
"trace." Similarly, Altizer's theological "priority of 
the future" finds him (his objections to the anachronism 
of postmodern theological concerns notwithstanding) 
paralleled with Derrida as we11 2 • 
Charles Winquist points out the similarities between 
the theological movement from transcendence to radical 
immanence in Thomas Altizer's thought and the play of 
differance in Derrida's philosophical deconstructions, 
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noting that in both, "the origin of identity is the 
sUbstitution of a signifier, a name, for the 
transcendental signifier and a displacement into a 
network of signifiers u (338). For Altizer, whose theology 
and interpretation of history are written under the 
"grand trope of the death of God" (Winquist 339), God is 
understood as the signified "God" whose name entails the 
death and radical kenosis of the transcendental 
signifier, "God." The history of theology becomes then 
for Altizer a history of historically evolving re-
interpretation of that signifier, are-interpretation 
which is for Altizer, the presence of the absence of the 
transcendental. Altizer's theological program, then, 
relies fundamentally upon his activity as reader, as re-
interpreter and re-writer of the Word of God which 
negates the transcendental, objective, inactual reality 
of the immobile God of Christendom. Altizer's re-reading 
of God himself draws not only upon a critique of the 
interpretive activities of the institutional Christian 
tradition, but also upon a re-interpretation of' those 
marginal "theologians" who were, rather than reinforcing 
the propriety of the eternal return of the God of 
Christendom, writing scripture themselves and effecting 
the historical evolution of the faith, an evolution that 
scholasticism has sought to avoid, and indeed, to 
reverse. Such re-interpretation is for Altizer a re-
enactment of an original Christianity, but the emphasis 
here is not on a return to an original authoritative 
text, but upon the apocalyptic manner in which that text 
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is presented, grounded in a historically evolving faith. 
For Altizer, as Winquist observes, "theology cannot take 
possession of an original text because in the beginning 
there is silence" (339): the "original text," for Altizer 
is a text which is always already effaced and written 
under erasure. The God of Altizer's theology is a God who 
has written Godself as other than God, and a God the 
theology of whom is written as other-than-theology, by 
such "theologians" as Milton, Blake and Joyce, who have 
acknowledged, as Altizer, the "textuality of the divine" 
(Raschke 138: Jasper, "From Theology to Theological 
Thinking" 15). Acknowledgement of the "textuali ty of the 
divine," implies a shift from the objective notion of the 
logocentric (or at least a shift within that system if 
logocentrism is a tradition from which we cannot escape), 
the hermeneutic and theo-Iogical, toward the poetic, a 
fall "from the book to writing and theological thinking" 
(Jasper 20). This is a fall which, like the fall which 
Altizer equates with the death and genesis of God, is a 
felix culpa, enacting the very embodiment of that 
movemen~ which is simultaneously death and resurrection, 
an embodiment which grants actuality to history and 
enacts wi thin that history a total grace. That movement 
is for Altizer the epic movement of Spirit which is the 
redemptive and sacrificial negation of God, a historical 
movement reflected in literary epic movements and in the 
epic of the individual and universal consciousness. This 
movement is most essentially a movement of the negation 
of eternal return. 
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In his essay, "The Beginning and Ending of 
Revelation," Altizer chronicles once again the ending of 
the cycle of eternal return by the self-naming of I AM, 
an ending which "is the beginning of the impact of 
irreversible events upon consciousness," a beginning in 
which "world itself become(s) the arena and the horizon 
of ultimate praxis, a praxis releasing the ultimacy of 
primordial and sacred acts into the actuality of life and 
world itself" (79). Now while the effect of the self-
revelation of I AM is for Altizer historically 
developing, the revelation of I AM irreversibly 
establishes its own beginning and the "beginning of the 
ending of eternal return" (79). History itself, says 
Altizer, is a "realization of that revelation," a 
realization which has evolved an ever more deeply 
negative consciousness of transcendence, developing 
through multiple movements and identities over the course 
of centuries (80). That consciousness has, however, in 
the twentieth century, reached a "global embodiment" 
(80), in a total presence of the absence of the 
transcendent, a total presence which is a universal 
grace, a result of the apocalyptic movement of a 
historically evolving faith, an apocalypticism which was 
marginalized by the Christian Church itself (88-9). That 
grace is known in the absolute silence of the self-
negating God, a silence which is the fulfillment of .the 
speech of the self-revelation of I AM, the consummation 
in which "'God said' has wholly and finally passed into 
silence;" "if grace is everywhere, and is everywhere here 
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and now, it is everywhere as death and nothingness, and 
finally as the death and nothingness of I AM" (108). The 
finally present totality of death and ending is for 
Altizer, the apocalyptic ending which is the apocalypse 
(ending and revelation) of God, an apocalypse in which 
"the death of the crucified God is now universally 
realized as a final and total event," an "actuality" 
which is the "total realization of the Crucified God" 
(108). Thus for Altizer God is God in God's self-
embodiment and negation in the world itself, so that the 
reality of God lies not in the transcendent to which the 
realization of God refers, but in the realization itself, 
an embodiment of the negation of the transcendental 
signified. This act of negation is most fully realized in 
the crucifixion, "the sacrifice of that God who is fully 
God in kenosis and self-emptying," and the negation of 
that God who is only the God of Glory, a negation which 
the final realization and actualization of that God of 
ultimate sacrifice (QA 78). The full realization and 
enactment of that negation is symbolized by Altizer by a 
universal liturgy and eucharistic anamnesis, a 
totalizing, now at the end of history of the sacrifice of 
God and negation of the God of glory which is "re-
presented or renewed in the liturgical action of the 
eucharist or mass," and the sacrifice which is 
"proclaimed in authentic Christian preaching" (~ 76-77). 
The negation of the God of Glory in the God of 
Sacrifice, especially as embodied in the liturgical 
movement of the eucharist, is a theological understanding 
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shared with Altizer by Robert Scharlemann, whose 
explications of the kenotic God tend toward the more 
systematic than do Altizer's. In Scharlemann's 
meditations upon the being of God in the Eucharist, to 
say that "God is in the Eucharist" is to say that lithe 
sacrament of the eucharist symbolizes or makes 
perceptible the one acti vi ty of being wi thin the many 
activities of the final agent, God" (Klemm 308). The 
event of the sacrament discloses the self-revelatory 
activity of God which is always happening everywhere 
(Klemm 308), and the eucharist functions as a "revelatory 
language event," in which language, "the process of 
speaking and hearing, is the self-embodying of God" 
(308). In language, God "embodies deity as other than 
himself:" "God is manifest as other than God in the event 
of language," and eucharist, as a re-enactment of the 
primary symbol of God's self-negation, reveals the depth 
of that manifestation (Klemm 308). The "presence" of God 
in Scharlemann's theology, as in Altizer's, requires a 
critique of traditional ontology in which the being of 
God is the presence of God's absence, or, in which the 
way that God "is" coincides with the way that God "is 
not," or is as God is "other than God," as Scharlemann 
explains in his intricately paradoxical essays, "The 
Being of God When God is Not Being God," and "Being 'As 
Not'" (IR 30-65) • The same theme of ontological 
theological critique is undertaken by Jean-Luc Marion, in 
his God Without Being (1991), which also turns toward the 
eucharist for its focus. 
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Marion's consideration of the possibilities of 
theology in the wake of the death of God draws quite 
directly from Heidegger and Barth, while critiquing both, 
and presents the case for an understanding of God without 
Being, that is, for a theology which is from the 
beginning conscious of its own tendency toward idolatry, 
even in assigning to God its highest designation, that of 
Being. A theology in which God is understood solely as 
bound to, or participating in, the realm of Being 
remains, according to Marion, anthropocentric and 
idolatrous in its attempt at mastery of God through 
reason. Reason is not completely eradicated by Marion, 
however, but it cannot be maintained as the basis for a 
knowledge or worship of God; rather, the basis for 
theology is faith in the revelation as "agape" given by 
God alone. Rather than making an idol of Reason, Marion 
discloses the possibility that, as David Tracy notes in 
his foreword to the work, "revelation, centered in forms 
of visibility, can become an icon for thought" (xi). 
Marion's preliminary distinction between the idol and the 
icon (briefly, in which the idol is understood as that 
which freezes one's gaze and the icon as that which 
"gives rise to an infinite gaze" [18]), reminiscent of 
Heidegger's treatments of art, provide the tenor for 
Marion's main discussion, that of the question of Being 
in the theological context. In the end, even Heidegger's 
critique of ontotheology is open to a Derrida-esque 
questioning, though Heidegger' s admission that the idea 
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of Being has no place in a theology provides a pervasive 
theme for Marion's work. 
In admitting no less of Gea (whose name is 
consistently crossed out in the work) than absolute 
otherness, Marion understands theology's task as one of 
worship and thanksgiving, metaphorically presented 
through the activity of the Eucharist. True theology, for 
Marion, founded upon the kerygmatic revelation of the 
historical death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
carries out the task of a "Eucharistic hermeneutic," 
contrasted by Marion with both "scientific exegesis" 
which attempts to master the text and "prohibit in it all 
utterance of the said," and the "prophetic" treatment of 
the text which renders· it "so radically nonfactual that 
no salvation can occur in it" (145). In a eucharistic 
mode, theology understands the revelation of Gea in the 
present in an otherwise-than-metaphysical understanding 
of time in which 
"the present of the Eucharistic gift is not at 
all temporalized starting from the here and now 
but as memorial (temporalization starting from 
the past), then as eschatological announcement 
(temporalization starting from the future), and 
finally, and only finally, as dailyness and 
viaticum (temporalization starting from the 
present). (172) 
In thi s case, 
the analysis 
says Marion, the present does not "order 
of temporality as a whole," but rather 
"results from it" (172). 
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Further, not only does the Eucharist signify the 
gift of "union with Christ" in the corporal ecclesial 
body, but as presence is understood as gift in a 
Eucharistic context, time itself may be understood as 
gift for the sake of partaking within it in the gift of 
the eucharistic present: 
The eucharistic presence comes to us, at 
each instant, as the gift of that very instant, 
and, in it, of the body of the Christ in whom 
one must be incorporated. The temporal present 
during the which the eucharistic present 
endures resembles it: as a glory haloes an 
iconic apparition, time is made a present gift 
to let us receive in it the eucharistically 
given present. (175) 
Thus in the mystery of the "properly Christian" 
understanding of temporality, the "ultimate paradigm of 
every present" according to Marion, is given the gift of 
the eucharistic present. 
While Marion's understanding of the "eucharistically 
given present" closely resembles Altizer's "total 
presence" (which is understood as a universal eucharist), 
Altizer's understanding of history and temporality is 
founded upon the idea of the embodiment of the death of 
God. For Marion the death of God does not serve as such a 
temporal metaphor; Marion views the philosophical concept 
of the death of God as the death of an idolatrous 
confining of God to human terms, specifically to the 
distinction between being and nothing, presence and 
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absence. Like Altizer, Marion places God beyond being and 
nothing (Scharlemann, "A Response" 116), but the death of 
God for Marion is the death of an idolatrous 
which stopped short, as all concepts do, 
understanding of the God who reveals Himself, 
concept 
of an 
but who 
remains absolutely other. The transcendence of God the 
Father is maintained, contra-Altizer, in the kenotic act 
of the incarnation. with Altizer, Marion maintains that 
the Lordship of Christ is gained through the absolute 
surrender of the cross, but this does not imply that the 
agapaic expenditure of Christ provided no promise of 
receiving that lordship again: 
This kenotic loss, going so far as death and, 
above all, the descent into hell, appears as 
the highest lordship--that, precisely, of love 
without reserve, universal and hence all 
powerful. But it does not suffice to say of 
this lordship that in losing it the humanity of 
Jesus had no assurance of finding it again, in 
a game of loser wins. It does not suffice, 
since his very divinity cried out in Psalm 22, 
attesting by that very fact, in one stroke, the 
kenosis and di vini ty as kenosis. When Jesus 
rises, he does not rise at all by himself but 
by the power and will of the Father. (193) 
Not only in his understanding of the transcendence of God 
does Marion differ from Altizer, but also in his 
eucharistic understanding of temporality. While Altizer 
proposes an immanental "total presence" made possible by 
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the kenotic death of God, Marion suggests that every 
present be understood as "gift" not only of past but also 
of future, in which "the present, always already anterior 
to and in anticipation of itself, is received to the 
extent that the past and the future, in the name of the 
Alpha and the Omega, give it" (176). The import of this, 
says Marion, lies in the fact that it reveals that which 
has been called "real presence" as "foundering in the 
metaphysical idolatry of here and now or else must be 
received in according to the" properly Christian 
temporality" (176). 
God as present in 
Whereas Altizer's account portrays 
the immanence of the present, an 
immanence which is the negation of transcendence and 
implies the dynamic apocalypse of presence itself, Marion 
preserves the otherness of God in distinction from the 
present which is offered as gift and also in distinction 
from the past and future in which the present is offered 
up and taken back again (176-77). 
Marion's understanding of the crossing of God, in 
Altizer's opinion, contains a contradiction in its 
granting of a Pseudo-Dionysian mystical transcendental 
absolute unity to God, an eternal return which negates 
the very self-negation of the Christian God, alongside a 
Hegelian notion of the kenotic "gift" of the Crucified 
God. Following mystical theology's "way of absolute 
return," "Marion calls for a liberation from Being," 
Altizer points out in his review of God without Being: or 
rather, Altizer adds, Marion calls for a liberation to be 
given to Being, that Being's own "play" might liberate 
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itself, "above all to liberate itself from that 
ontological difference between Being and beings which is 
the deepest ground of our dominant Western ontologies" 
("DTCN" 4). Such a freedom implies, Altizer criticizes, a 
reversal of "all radical thinking," "by way of a 
Christian neoplatonism," but this implication that might 
have been avoided in Marion's thought through the 
dialectical quality of the crossing itself of Being. 
"Surely Marion is radical in calling for the 'Crossing' 
of Being," says Altizer, who is quick to inquire whether 
the crossing might perhaps "abolish (Being) without 
deconstructing it, exceed it without overcoming it, and 
annul it without annihilating it," but while Marion 
employs the language of Hegelian Aufhebung to explicate 
the "giving" of the Crucified God, (employing "releve," 
Derrida's translation of the Hegelian term), he 
"immediately calls upon the Pseudo-Dionysius, that 
thinker who is most infinitely distant from Hegel. 
rejoicing in a deeply mystical call that we become 
messengers announcing the divine silence," messengers who 
have abandoned "everything whatsoever both in this 'world 
of nothingness' and in the 'world of being," because of 
the deep discontinuity between "the false light, of our 
world and the absolute darkness of the Godhead" (6). Yet, 
Altizer notes, Marion's emphasis upon the Crucified God 
is in complete opposition to the language of Pseudo-
Dionysius, language from which images of kenosis are 
lacking. Perhaps then, Marion's Dionysianism is a modern 
Catholic Dionysianism, Altizer suggests, a Dionysianism 
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which knows Godhead as absolute darkness, but which can 
know an openness to "non-being" which "is itself an arena 
of the gift of the crucified God" (11). Such a 
Catholicism can know the world itself as the gift of the 
Crucified God, "a God which appears only in its 
disappearance, and which "is" only in the sense that it 
has wholly and totally given itself;" God without being 
( 12). Such an understanding would present a fully and 
uniquely Catholic notion of world which "is nature and 
grace at once," a history, a world, an existence which is 
"a sacramental world," not in the Pseudo-Dionysian sense 
of a reflection of "Heavenly and Ecclesiastical 
Hierarchies," but as the gift and the giving of the 
kenotic God, a "universal eucharistic presence of the 
Lamb of God" (12). 
A universal eucharistic presence in which existence 
is itself understood as the body of the kenotic God is a 
restatement of Altizer's understanding of "total 
presence," a coincidence of the opposites of the divine 
and the corporeal which Altizer finds developing both 
wi thin modern Catholic scholarship and having developed 
within the Christian epic tradition, a tradition 
epitomized in the historical evolution of the Protestant 
and Catholic theological discourses of Milton, Blake and 
Joyce. 
It is within Catholicism that Altizer lately finds 
the most promise for the continued evolution of Christian 
theology. Catholicism has progressed radically in the 
past century, notes Altizer, "losing its feudalistic and 
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monarchical political ground" as well as "erasing its own 
condemnations of modern astronomy, evolutionary 
biological science, and modern biblical scholarship," so 
that now, in Altizer's opinion at least, critical 
scholarship is more progressive in Catholic groups than 
in Protestant, and "radical political theology" is far 
more associated with Catholicism than Protestantism 
("TCCRC" 188) • Further, the gap between religious 
institution and academia present in both Catholicism and 
Protestantism is a gap which is in Catholicism "both 
present and absent at once," for the Catholic Church is 
itself more open to contemporary thought, an openness not 
equalled, says Altizer, since the sixteenth century, and 
an openness which has evoked a historically forward 
dynamic unparalleled in the Protestant world (188-89). 
Simply, and drastically, put, Altizer suggests that if 
the Protestant era has now ended, "it is Catholicism 
alone in the Christian world which is open to a genuine 
future" (189). The unique promise which Altizer finds 
within Catholicism is of course prompted by, among other 
things, the impact of liberative theologies,. the literary 
works of poets such as Gerard Manley Hopkins, the 
creative theological works of writers such as Jean-Luc 
Marion and Alphonso Lingis and others, but Altizer's 
primary interest in the development of Catholic thought 
resides in the work of D.H. Leahy. 
Altizer finds Leahy's development of the "real 
presence of the eucharist" into a "total and apocalyptic 
presence" to be a Catholic reversal of the teleological 
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destination of Hegelianism, while, in a Hegelian movement 
of negation, Leahy can know, as Altizer does, the 
existence of all matter as the body of God ("RC" 190). In 
Leahy's apocalyptic coincidence of opposites, elucidated 
in his Novitas Mundi and Foundation: Matter the Body 
Itself, 
it becomes the destiny of the eucharist to be 
the substantial experience of the world at 
large. Now an essentially new consciousness is 
born, whereby and wherein the very matter of 
the universe becomes the apocalyptic and 
sacrificial body of God. ("RC" 190) 
The movement represented by the eucharist is understood 
as an anamnestic re-enactment of the movement of 
creation, crucifixion, and resurrection, the 
"nullification of God" which is the "being-there" of God 
in the eucharist and in history (190). 
The nullification of God, the kenotic movement of 
crucifixion and the total presence of the body of God are 
concepts the development of which Altizer chronicles 
through the theological focus of the epic tradition which 
runs through Mil ton, Blake and Joyce, a tradition which 
includes the birth of the "modern imagination" in Milton 
and its fruition in a total apocalyptic presence in 
Joyce. The epic tradition in which Altizer finds the 
development of the kenotic movement of the death of God 
is a tradition in which the movement of Fall is crucial, 
as through Fall the kenosis of the transcendent God is 
effected; for this reason, the dialectic of God and 
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Satan, a dialectic embodying a radical understanding of 
negativity, is a vital theme within that development. 
Milton's Paradise Lost, according to Altizer, enacts 
the epic birth of modernity through the revelation of a 
totally glorious Satan, in its premier historical 
presentation as the dialectically opposite element to 
Christ (GA 162; HAA 162). Wi thin Paradise Lost satan 
mirrors the activity and personality of the Messiah: 
Satan's Hellish majesty being "an inverted form of the 
monarchic majesty of the Son in Heaven, II and the self-
emptying voyage of the Son being paralleled by an 
equivalent satanic voyage through the nothingness between 
Hell and earth (HAA 158): 
even as the Son undergoes a kenotic voyage from 
Heaven to earth to offer himself in sacrifice 
for a totally guilty humanity, satan undergoes 
a kenotic voyage from Hell to Earth where he 
kenotically empties himself into a serpent so 
as to tempt and ensnare a totally innocent 
humanity, and if that destruction of humanity 
is realized by the enticement of a totally 
exalted and ecstatic consciousness which is a 
totally negative consciousness, the salvation 
of humanity is realized by a passion and a 
death that is an equally negative act and 
enactment. (GA 162). 
Paradise Lost enacts a conjunction of Christ and Satan, 
says Altizer, 
understanding of 
a conjunction 
the passion and 
resulting 
death of 
from 
Christ, 
an 
a 
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passion and death which occur wi thin the core of the 
Satanic realm (GA 162). Altizer interprets Milton's 
conjoining of Christ and Satan not only as the "dramatic 
center of Paradise Lost," but more importantly as the 
"grounding epic" and "symbolic center" of the modern 
world (QA 162: HAA 143). That new naming of Satan and 
Christ is exercised through a resistance on Milton's part 
to utilize the traditional name of Christ in his epic 
poetry, opting for the terms "Son of God, the Son, or 
Messiah," a result, according to Altizer, of Milton's 
knowledge of a truly new Christ who has actually died in 
the crucifixion, falling to the majestic power of Satan, 
and therefore a Christ inseparable from the reality of 
Satanic power (163, 167). The free acceptance by Christ 
of the death and humiliation of the crucifixion is 
contingent upon the triumph of Satan in the Fall, a fall 
wherein the Creator has surrendered creation to sin and 
death, a surrender which is consummated in the kenotic 
movement of the crucifixion (164). 
The kenotic movement of fall, according to Altizer, 
realizes the "merit" of both Son and Satan, and conjoins 
the kenotic act of God and the redemptive movement of 
Christ with the absolutely negative "power and actuality 
of Satan" (GA 165). 
The Son cannot act as the sacrificial and 
atoning Son apart from the sovereignty of Satan 
over a wholly fallen world of death, just as 
the Son's abandonment of the glory of Heaven is 
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a response to that very exaltation of Satan. 
(165) 
The "merit" of Christ is therefore possible only in light 
of the Fall and "kenotic voyage of Satan," a movement 
which dialectically conjoins the identities of Christ and 
Satan. 
Remarkably, Altizer reads Milton's portrayal of "the 
purely negative energy of Satan" as "the imaginative 
embodiment" of the revolutionary political power released 
in the English revolution, a power which was paralleled 
by Goethe's Faustian will, Nietzsche's will to power, and 
which was further the ground for the "all too modern 
discovery of the infinity of the universe," all of which 
know a negation of the traditional distinction between 
the transcendent and the immanent, whether a will 
estranged from soul, a finite earth estranged from the 
infinity of the universe, or a transcendent God estranged 
from the finitude of existence (165). That power, and 
that transformed distinction, represented, according to 
Altizer, an apocalyptic vision of the triumph and 
sovereignty of Satan and darkness, a sovereignty which 
for the first time in history allowed a full knowledge of 
the apocalyptic victory and redemption of the kenotic 
Christ. Altizer reads Paradise Lost as a defense and 
chronicle of the fall of Satan and its renewal and 
reversal in the acceptance and willing of crucifixion, a 
dialectic which, Altizer contends, has no precedent in 
the Christian tradition, a tradition which had never 
known a fully kenotic Christ, a Christ which can only be 
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known through the exaltation of satan (~ 166-67; HAA 
161) • 
Nothing like this is present in the Christian 
tradition, but that tradition as such had never 
known a Son of God who truly and fully dies, 
and if Milton was the first dogmatic theologian 
to know that death, Milton was inevitably the 
poet who exalted Satan, an exaltation that is a 
necessary response to a deep and comprehensive 
realization of the ultimacy of death. For only 
a fully sovereign satan could be the ground of 
that death; that sovereignty is a sovereignty 
over a wholly fallen world, a world whose very 
center is eternal death. Moreover, that death 
alone makes possible the kenotic or self-
emptying movement of the Son. Consequently, to 
know the full actualization of the self-
emptying of the Son is to know the sovereignty 
of Satan, a sovereignty which is first 
dramatically enacted and envisioned in paradise 
LQ§t, and a sovereignty apart from which there 
could be no apocalyptic victory of Christ. (GA 
167) • 
Whereas the Christian theological tradition, which 
Altizer sums up in the words of Aquinas, could simply 
assert that "Christ's passion did not concern or affect 
his Godhead," Milton's De Doctrina Christiana, which 
Altizer claims embodied "the purest Scriptural theology" 
that had yet been historically realized (HAA 145), at 
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once affirmed the traditional "eternally impassive God," 
but also separated that God from the Son, asserting that 
the two are essentially distinct, because of Christ's 
totally kenotic death, a kenosis which is precluded by 
the concept of an infinite and eternal God (GA 168). The 
understanding of kenosis is carried even further in 
Paradise Lost than in the Doctrina, in which the Father 
"retires in the act of creation," so that, rather than 
the Doctrina's version in which Creation is produced out 
of God alone, and the Son first of all, so that creation 
is not "by or with the Son" (HM 146), the creation in 
Paradise Lost is "by the Word or the temporally generated 
Son," so that the Son is "generated in time rather than 
in eternity" (~ 168; HM 154). That is an understanding 
which, Altizer asserts, was impossible for Milton the 
dogmatic theologian, but not for Mil ton the poet, who 
could know more fully than any prior theologian the 
actuality of death and the fall (~ 168)3. That knowledge 
of the totality of death made possible the presentation, 
Altizer points out, of a universe in which a harmonious 
unified order is known only as a prefallen reality, a 
"lost universe," vanished as a result of the fall. Thus 
Al tizer knows Paradise Lost as a "'wake' for a cosmic 
corpse," a remembrance and re-enactment of the loss and 
fall of a vanished universe (BAA 171; GOG 80). It is this 
loss and fall which provides the theme of Paradise Lost, 
a fall which effects a knowledge of a radically novel 
Christ, a "fully kenotic or self-emptying Christ" (~ 
168). While that Christ, so opposite to an eternal and 
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transcendent God was, Altizer says, previously known 
theologically to Luther, Luther's adherence to the 
authori ty of the ancient Church prevented its dogmatic 
explication, an explication which would only take place 
wi th the "radical Reformation" which found its voice in 
Milton, "the first systematic theologian to accept the 
full death of Christ" (~ 168: HAA 152). That voice, says 
Altizer, was completely actualized in the poetry of 
Blake, whose comprehension of the totality of fall 
extends to the transcendent realm of Godhead itself (GA 
168-69). 
Blake, whom Altizer names as "the epic poet of the 
French and American revolutions," revolutions which 
Altizer understands as historical embodiments of the 
imaginati ve death of God4 , proclaims the kenosis of the 
transcendent which was thereby politically enacted in his 
distinction between the kenotic movement of Christ and 
the eternal Creator, a Creator who exemplifies a purely 
Satanic negativity (GOG 44-45; ~ 169). Blake conjoins 
the self-emptying of Jesus with the death of the "purely 
alien and negative Creator," so that the Satan which is 
negated in the crucifixion is the Godhead whose pure 
negati vi ty is emptied in the crucif ixion5 : this is an 
understanding of evil as the divine Being's self-othering 
and "withdrawal into self-centeredness" which Hegel was 
developing simultaneously in his Phenomenology of Spirit 
(GA 169: GOG 81). Both Hegel and Bl ake thereby knew a 
revolutionary death of God, in which the total negativity 
of the eternal Godhead, which Hegel knew as "being-in-
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itself," which Blake knew as satan and Creator, negates 
itself (GA 170; GOG 51). According to Altizer, "Christ is 
the Christian name of that self-alienation or self-
emptying," and so Christ and satan are inseparable in 
name, and this is "dual-naming" is continued in Blake and 
Hegel as it had been begun in Milton's Paradise Lost, 
which had embodied "the totality of the fall ••• that can 
finally be known as the fall or death of God" (GA 170). 
In realizing an identity of God as Satan, and 
envisioning the self-kenotic death of that God in a 
historically-evolving apocalyptic history, Altizer finds 
Blake in full continuity with "the original apocalyptic 
ground of Christianity" and also with Milton's vision of 
the totality of the fall, but Blake's vision of fall 
"radicalizes and totalizes its Miltonic source" through 
its apprehension of fall as "all in all" (HAA 189)6. 
Blake's naming of God as Satan reveals him, as Milton 
before him, to be in Altizer's opinion "a God-obsessed 
man and seer;" this obsession, paired with his 
understanding of the satanic power of his revolutionary 
historical situation, results in the centrality wi thin 
his writings of the image of the end of the world, an 
apocalyptic ending which historically marked an 
apprehension of the death of God (BAA 189). 
The death of God, or the self-negation of the 
eternal Absolute Spirit in Hegelian terms, which is 
realized as an "abstract universality" and a totally 
negati ve reality, is understood by both Blake and Hegel 
as an apocalyptic event within the context of the 
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eschatological fulfillment of their contemporary worlds, 
a notion shared by Nietzsche as wel17 (HAA 192; GOG 80-
81; 168). Altizer shares this conviction that the era of 
the French revolution "is the historical point at which a 
universal consciousness first fully and finally becomes 
actual and real," a result not only of the birth of a new 
self-consciousness, born in the dialectic of "universal 
freedom and the individuality and freedom of actual self-
consciousness," but also of Blake's realization of the 
"total universality of Satan" within his apocalyptic 
mythology, within Jerusalem in particular, and Hegel's 
development of his apocalyptic philosophical system (BAA 
192). The apocalyptic reality which Blake knew as 
"Urizen, as Selfhood, as Spectre, and as Satan" was 
paralleled according to Altizer in Hegel by the 
conception of "abstract spirit or the 'Bad Infinite' or 
the God who alone is God" (HAA 192). Blake's Milton and 
Jerusalem present a Christ who reverses and negates the 
negative reality of the purely transcendent Creator, whom 
Blake knows as "Urizen" or Satan (Hegel's "Bad 
Infinite"), in a movement which is the "self-annihilation 
of Satan," a movement which is also an "apocalyptic 
redemption" in the reversal of the fall which was 
creation, but a reversal which is also that fall's 
"apocalyptic consummation" (GOG 81). 
Similarly, Altizer reads Blake's "Luvah" as another 
character wi thin his mythology which symbolizes such a 
Hegelian negative totality (HAA 199). The figure of 
Luvah, who appears in The Book of Thel but plays a major 
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dramatic and symbolic role in "The Four Zoas ,,8 , is 
understood by Altizer as "the center and ground of a 
universal and eternal process of fall," and a 
"coincidentia opposi torum" embodying a historically 
enacted fall which is simultaneously transgressive and 
redemptive (HAA 197). with the figure of Luvah, Altizer 
observes, Blake conjoins Milton's Son and Milton's satan 
in a dialectical characterization embodying Christ's 
self-emptying and also satan's negativity: within 
Jerusalem, for instance, 
(Luvah) symbolically embodies the sacrificial 
movement of energy or passion from its original 
fall to its ultimate self-sacrifice in Christ, 
and thence to the repetition of that sacrifice 
in the suffering of humanity; and. • • he also 
embodies the dark or evil forces of passion and 
must himself become Satan if he is actually to 
accomplish his work. (HAA 198) 
Luvah, moving through the opposites of Christ and Satan, 
is the movement of history toward apocalypse, at once 
historical horror and violence and the redemptive Lamb of 
God which realize the universal reality of "The Eternal 
Great Humanity Divine, n a movement which I according to 
Al tizer, reenacts Paradise Lost by presenting "a purely 
apocalyptic epic" aimed at the establishment and 
realization of "the final apocalyptic triumph of the New 
Jerusalem," a triumph made possible by the conjunction of 
Milton's Son and Satan (HAA 199). The conjunction of Son 
and Satan in the kenotic movement of the death of God is 
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a union of Jesus and the New Jerusalem, a complete 
conjunction of God and Man in the abolition of the 
eternal and transcendent God, an abolition in which the 
Satanic reality of the transcendent negativity of God is 
itself negated and thus realized historically as the 
actuality of history (RAb 204; GOG 97). Thus Blake knows 
the Creator as the Crucified God, the self-annihilating 
Satan who is "the actual source of the totality of 
experience" (GOG 105). 
It is in their knowledge of Satan, says Altizer, 
that the works of Milton and Blake find their continuity, 
the Satans that they present being Sa tans which are 
historical and actual embodiments of their respective 
worlds, the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (GA 
170). The twentieth century has witnessed a comprehensive 
nihilistic epiphany of Satan, says Altizer, factually in 
its unique historical horrors and also literarily in its 
"twin epics, .. Joyce's Ulysses and Finnegans Wake (GOG 
141). The historicization of the radical dichotomous 
character of the self-negating God is consummated in 
these twin epics, and that consummation realizes and 
embodies a historical negation of the "primordial 
movement of eternal return" in a universal apocalypse 
(GOG 116). 
Joyce's Ulysses, in Al ti zer' s reading, presents a 
continuation of the Miltonic and Blakean understanding of 
the self-kenotic negation of God, making manifest a 
"Christ who is Satan, a Christ who is 'God becomes man 
becomes fish,' and who is now a nameless or anonymous 
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Christ" identical with Lucifer, whose fall is a felix 
culpa (GA 170-71). Joyce, along with Nietzsche, 
supercedes Blake in the radicality of his negation of 
God, enacting a resurrection of "that original abyss or 
nothingness which was negated by the original act of the 
Creator," and therefore reversing that original act, and 
reversing the Creator as well (GOG 117). Celebrating a 
"God-Satan who is Christ," Joyce's Ulysses presents, 
Altizer points out, a renewed heretical Sabellian Son of 
God, "the Father who was Himself His Own Son, n a Father 
whose fatherhood disappears in a liturgically embodied 
mystery of incarnation and crucifixion, a Father known as 
a "Hangman God" and revealed as only a "noise or voice in 
the street" (HAA 219; GOG 106). This "noise or voice in 
the street," however, is the "all in all" of the self-
sacrificing Creator, 
which makes possible 
a kenotically revealed 
the apocalyptic prayer 
totality 
to "Our 
Father who art not in heaven," a prayer heralding the 
arrival not of Elijah, but of the Joycean New Jerusalem, 
the "New Bloomusalem, n and its Christlike figure, the 
extraordinarily ordinary Leopold Bloom ("STOCn 19; lIM 
219: GOG 106).9 
Al tizer offers the reading of Leopold Bloom as a 
reversal of the docetism that becomes apparent in all 
previous Christology, ushering into historical 
consciousness a Christ-figure who is an actual human 
being10 (HAA 225). That is an understanding which Altizer 
claims has developed through the epic tradition, from 
Dante's inability to portray Christ as in any way human, 
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to Milton's refusal to "enact or envision him as eternal 
and divine Word," and Blake's inability to cast Christ's 
fullness into a "singular or individual form" (HM 225). 
Al tizer parallels this new Christological understanding 
wi th a new understanding of the Eucharist, insomuch as 
the fully human Christ who is now revealed is priest and 
victim, present in a Eucharistic presence "in our time 
and flesh" (HAA 225). Herein a new epic language is 
present, for. wi thin Ulysses Altizer finds Bloom's epic 
heroism expressed in antiheroic "everyday words and 
acts," which are, and this is Bloom's priestly function, 
"indistinguishable from those of their audience or 
reader" (HM 226). Therefore Bloom is Christlike by 
virtue of his "reversal of every mythical identity of 
Christ," in a totally historical identity and worldll ; it 
is impossible to "imagine Bloom as Christ," says Altizer, 
but this is because Bloom's identity so reverses the 
traditional glorified image of Christ, but does so in 
such a way that Bloom's textual presence "affects us even 
as does a ritual enactment," making present the actuality 
of "life itself" in the reversal of the negativity of a 
purely majestic Christ (HAA 227). 
In Finnegans Wake, Altizer submits, Bloom is 
transformed into H.C. Earwicker, H.C.E. ("Hoc" est corpus 
meum: take read, this is body, broken for you," as Mark 
C. Taylor reads it [Tears 64].), Here Comes Everybody, a 
Blakean liThe Eternal Great Humanity Divine," who is 
consumed in the cosmic missa jubilea, enacted in Joyce's 
transformation of liturgical language into the language 
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of the everyday, "a wholly fallen language" (HAA 233, 
244). The language of Joyce, and most of all the language 
of Finnegans Wake, says Altizer, is a language embodying 
the fall, the "divine death" which is re-enacted 
throughout its (non)narrative, and a language which calls 
upon its reader to "enact that which is read, " in a 
Eucharistic re-enactment in which the body of Christ 
becomes the realization of death and chaos in history, a 
conjunction of Christ and Satan12 in which the 
transcendent Creator is known as satan and the "Satanic" 
reali ty of history, and realized in Joyce in a 
transformed liturgical language which is divine and human 
at once (GA 172; HAA 234-237). 
• • .the language of the Wake is not only human 
and divine at once, it is totally guilty and 
totally gracious at once, for our final epic 
language is a cosmic and historical Eucharist, 
a Eucharist centered in an apocalyptic and 
cosmic sacrifice of God. Now a primordial chaos 
and abyss is indistinguishable from Godhead, 
just as an original chaos has passed into the 
center of speech. But now this ultimate chaos 
is fully and finally present, and present in 
and as this apocalyptic and liturgical text. 
(!1M 234) 
Even as the language of the ~ embodies 
reconceptions of the figures of the Father, the Son, and 
Satan, the refiguration of these typically male images is 
accompanied by a new representation of the feminine .13 
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Altizer points out that Milton's Paradise Lost, while 
presenting a poetic presence of the Christian God, 
portrays the "silence of the Mother of God, a Mother who 
can only be absent in the presence of the Father," but 
fully present in the absence of the Father, the death of 
God, which is not yet epically understood until Blake 
(HAA 236). Joyce, however, continues the "renewal and 
resurrection" of "the archaic and primordial Goddess," 
which Blake had begun; Blake's goddesses, however, 
according to Altizer, generally embody "a destructive and 
demonic presence," unlike Joyce's Molly Bloom, who, in 
her transformation into Anna Livia Plurabelle, renews 
Dante's "vision of Beatrice as the source of all grace" 
(HAA 237). Anna Livia Plurabelle, however, is no mere 
repetition of a cyclical primordial system of return, but 
"an actual and living center of joy and grace," an actual 
human and ordinary presence, like Leopold Bloom, "neither 
mythical nor divine,,14(HAA 237). Further, Altizer points 
out that the central action of the Wake is a re-enactment 
of "primordial sacrifice," or fall: that is a sacrifice 
which is re-enacted through the "night language" which 
"embodies the brute and formless matter of the primordial 
'water, '" but unlike the sacrifice and silencing of that 
feminine presence in the primordial act of the Father's 
"I AM," it is the water itself which speaks in the 
language of the Wake, speaking, "with an immediacy. 
never sounded since the original act of creation ," a 
language which enacts the death of God ("STOC" 20: GOG 
107). "Accordingly," notes Altizer, "a resurrected Anna 
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can proclaim: 'Rise up now and aruse! Norvena's over' 
(619.28) ," the end of "norvena" or nirvana ushering in 
the apocalyptic nightfall, the language of which is the 
"night language". which is the language of the death of 
God, the language of the "fall, condemnation and 
crucifixion of H.C.E," who is not only the Father, but is 
also, Altizer observes, Yggdrasil15 , the "cosmic Tree, 
which in the Eddas symbolizes the universe, a universe 
which goes on trial as the ' Festy King'" in the Wake 
("STOC" 20; HAA 239; GOG 107). within the Eddas Yggdrasil 
is also derived from "Yggr," meaning "deep thinker," or 
God, and Ildrasil," meaning "horse or carrier;" therein 
Yggdrasil "becomes at times 'bearer of God'" connoting at 
once the cross and the Virgin, as well as the tree which 
was the source of original sin (Himler 55). Altizer links 
"original sin" and "original sun" within the center of 
the Joycean negative Godhead which negates itself in the 
very language of the Wake, a negation "consummated in the 
resurrection of Anna' Livia Plurabelle, a resurrection 
which absorbs the power of Godhead;" that resurrection 
cUlminates in a universal Eucharist which is cosmic 
crucifixion and resurrection, a final "Yes," which also 
evokes the imagery of the tree, in the "cosmic dispersal 
of (A.L.P)'s body or leaves" eGA 171; GOG 107, 131-32): 
So. Avelaval. My leaves have drifted from me. 
All. But one clings still. I'll bear it on me. 
To remind me of. Lff! So soft this morning, 
ours. Yes. (628.6-9) (GA 171) 
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In this apocalyptic morning A.L.P. is known by Altizer at 
once as Dante's Beatrice, who "is the resurrected Christ" 
in the "resurrection of all and everything, and thus the 
resurrection of Here Comes Everybody" ("STOC" 24). This 
is the Beatrice who in Dante is "the sole actual image 
and the only intimate presence of the incarnate Christ," 
the Christ "in whom and by whom time and eternity are 
one," as the "very embodiment of grace," and the figure 
whom Dante sees as he is gazing upon Christ as the "one 
Sun" in the Paradiso ("STOC" 23). In the Wake Beatrice is 
present in the form of A.L.P. as the resurrection and 
image of H.C.E., in the self-sacrifice of the eternal 
God, a self-sacrifice grounded in an act of original sin 
by which the Father knows, and is conjoined with, his 
creation, a self-sacrifice enacted by the Eucharistic 
language of the Wake, re-enacting the apocalyptic moments 
evoked by the images of the tree of knowledge, the God-
bearing trees of incarnation and crucifixion, and the 
apocalyptic tree located at the center of the universe, 
Yggdrasil ("STOC" 23-4). It should be remembered that the 
apocalyptic falling of Yggdrasil, which Altizer here 
identifies with the death of the eternal Father 
represented by H.C.E, entails the freedom of the two 
humans therein, the "founders of a new humanity" who will 
live "under a new sun, more brilliant that the former 
one," even perhaps symbolizing a Joycean re-enactment of 
the granting of full humanity by the Edenic tree, and 
also by the tree of incarnation and crucifixion (Eliade 
169). All of these would be understood by Altizer to be 
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re-enacted in the Eucharistic language of the Wake, a 
language which historically enacts a universal 
Eucharistic presence, not leastly in its epic quality, by 
which its reader enacts the language therein. 
The night language of the Wake, a language written 
in the absence of the Sun, "writing or scripture finally 
ends," making way , Altizer proclaims, for that "primal 
and immediate speech. • .which is on the infinitely other 
side of that writing which is Scripture or sacred text" 
(HAA 237). However, Altizer's understanding of Joyce and 
of scripture is all too dialectical to end there. 
"Scripture is more universally present in Finnegans Wake 
than it is in any other text," its sacrality passing into 
"ribaldry, banality and blasphemy I" releasing the grace 
of a transcendent Heaven into "what Scripture can only 
name as Satan and Hell" (HM 238). Thus the text of the 
wake is not commentary upon Scripture, but is, in a 
transformed embodiment, Scripture itself16 (a notion 
directly related to Altizer's Christology). The New 
Testament, says Altizer, appears in the Wake in an 
inverted form, in which the four evangelists are "false 
wi tnesses, " participating in a chaos which is the 
"apocalyptic epiphany of total grace" (lIM 238). wi thin 
the universally Eucharistic language of the Wake, 
Scripture is both present and absent in a writing which 
is the ending of the written, a presence which is the 
absence of the transcendental and the originary: the 
presence/absence of Scripture is a Eucharistic and 
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apocalyptic presence, a total presence which is present 
only in its passing away: 
Now writing itself becomes indistinguishable 
from the original act of creation, and therein 
it becomes far more violent and chaotic than it 
has ever been before, and so much so that even 
if Finnegans Wake is for the most part written 
in English, it is written' in an English that 
can be read only by learning to read anew. 
Every new epic calls for and demands a new art 
and act of reading. • Thereby ritual fully 
passes into writing, and so writing ends as a 
writing which is only writing, and a writing is 
born which is inseparable and indistinguishable 
from that chaos and abyss which appeared to 
come to an end with the advent of writing and 
art. (HAA 238-39)17 
Altizer's reading of Joyce is a radical critique of 
the traditional notion of Scripture, yet it is an 
interpretation which takes its departure from the 
connection between Scripture and Eucharist, writing and 
ri tual, which Carl Raschke presents succinctly in 
relation to deconstruction's critique of the metaphysics 
of presence. The "classical meaning of scriptura," says 
Raschke, "refers to the densification of word and text 
into a public de-scription, the metamorphosis of mere 
writing into the document" (Theological Thinking 134). 
The written "document" is understood as the site of the 
re-presentation of presence, standing separate from "the 
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act of writing which gave it body" (134). The written, as 
opposed to "writing, " is therefore "charged with the 
sense of the aliter," which accounts for the gilding and 
illumination of Scripture (134). Illuminating the 
understanding of the "book, " the end of which post-
structuralist thought has heralded, Raschke points out 
that "Scripture is the 'book,' and is not simply the 
material ensemble of inscriptions; it is a veritable 
theophany" (134). The theophany of the book takes place 
of course in the reading, a reading which therefore 
becomes a presence-evoking ritual; such an understanding 
is woven into the very fabric of the term: 
"Book" is etymologically connected to "beech," 
an "edible tree" (cf. the Greek root phago-). 
Thus the book is the tree, the symbol of life, 
that is ingested as a sacrament. Reading in the 
classical context is akin to the celebration of 
the "mass," the assimilation of meanings, the 
consumption of the god, the transfer of 
presence. (Raschke 134) 
Certainly Altizer's understanding of the Eucharistic 
function of language is derived from such a tradition, 
but rather than effecting a mere "transfer of presence" 
which is a representation of an originary presence (of an 
eternal God, the Father, a Platonic nous or "sun" which 
instills in profane matter its Spirit) Altizer's 
understanding of the Eucharistic activity is founded upon 
his understanding of a "total presence, " which is an 
apocalyptic presence, present in its passing away, a 
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presence of the absence of God. Altizer's dialectical 
enactment of the presence/absence of scripture, while 
certainly bearing similarities to the deconstructionist 
notion of lithe end of the book," which Raschke notes as 
being IIfounded upon the Hebraic passion for iconoclasm, 
for de-situating holiness and making it a temporal 
disclosure ll (134), moves beyond Derrida's notion of 
"ecriture," in an action Raschke foresees, toward a 
notion of scripture as "oeuvre" or "poiesis" (134). 
"Poiesis" entails, Raschke points out, a 
Heideggerian/Ricoeurian "coming to presence through 
language II rather than "the installation of presence in 
the book," a manifestation of "the 'fullness' within the 
flux of the historical ll (134). Raschke's notion of 
"poiesis" opens up the possibility of a notion of text 
which "parlays into a set of paradoxical references" 
which "establish the language of text as scripture," a 
notion compatible with Altizer's understanding of the 
dialectical historical development of the negati ve 
presence of the transcendental (135). In Altizer's terms 
that historical development entails the enacting of the 
Word or Kingdom of God in the negating of the eternal 
Author, the Father, and focuses on the "total presence" 
of the apocalyptic revelation, in which the death of God 
is equally understood as the genesis of God: Raschke, 
too, critiquing the tendencies of the a/theological 
deconstructive trend in theology, calls for an overcoming 
of the "sentimentality of absence ll present in an 
overemphasis upon the "vanished author of the text," 
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toward a "theological thinking" in which the "Kingdom of 
God ••• is present among the grief of absence" (138). 
Such a presence of the Kingdom of God, like 
Altizer's transformed Scripture and ritual, entails, as 
Raschke points out, an understanding of religion as a 
"pre-metaphysical return of the repressed" (137); not to 
be understood as an eternal return, the Kingdom of God in 
Altizer's way of thinking is a "calling forth of the 
apocalyptic identity of genesis" (GOG 183 emphasis mine): 
••• just an original genesis is a dissolution 
or reversal of an undifferentiated pleroma, a 
final apocalypse is a dissolution or reversal 
of that very origin, but a reversal in which 
apocalypse is all that genesis was. Only a 
realization of that identity could make 
possible a consummation of genesis itself, but 
that very realization calls forth the 
apocalyptic identity of genesis, a calling 
forth which is the epiphany of the absolute 
triumph of the Kingdom of God. (GOG 183) 
The "triumph of the Kingdom of God," and the original 
negation which is the death/genesis of God, finds 
expression in images of birth as well as death, for as 
Altizer has observed, it is the Mother of God whose 
presence is known in the absence of God; that presence 
coincides, of course, with the birth of a new writing18 , 
as Altizer points out in the language of Joyce: 
Thereby ritual fully passes into writing, and 
so writing ends as a writing which is only 
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writing, and a writing is born which is 
inseparable and indistinguishable from that 
chaos and abyss which appeared to come to an 
end with the advent of writing and art. (lIM 
238-39)19 
In the absence of the Father, the Author ( i ty), the 
reading of such writing enacts the presence of the 
(M}other; the improper relations embodied in the 
Ii turgical and profane "night language, II a "dream 
language,1I which follows in the Wake of the death of God 
may well have resulted in the birth of a new writing, and 
a new reading--between speech and writing, between the 
transcendent and the immanent, between heaven and earth, 
between the Sun and the Virgin soil. In that decentered 
center grows the tree which bears the revelation of lithe 
return of the repressed." 
"Our epic destiny, " says Altizer, "was first 
interiorly enacted in Eve's temptation and fall," a fall 
effected by the irresistible temptation of "that ecstatic 
delight induced by a purely negative and thus purely 
forbidden consciousness, a delight consummated in that 
ecstasy which she knew in tasting the forbidden fruit,,20 
(GOG 97); that is a fall which is re-enacted in the 
Eucharistic "presence" manifest in writing the death of 
God. The reader before the book (the "edible tree," as 
Raschke observes) re-enacts the situation of Eve before 
the tree of Life, a situation re-enacted by the Virgin 
before the cross; partaking of the fruit of that tree 
might signal the beginning of an apocalyptic dawn, a dawn 
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in which the world is filled with "the smell of death and 
destruction," and 
hopeful" (Byatt E 
yet "smells fresh and 
507). The Prayfulness, 
lively and 
the playful 
prayful-ness of the language of the Wake (601) marks the 
sacrifice of Authority for the sake of the reader, whose 
eucharistic enactment negates and preserves the 
opposition between the two, participating in the 
ceaseless interpretation, the eternal dissemination of 
the text, the body of the Author(ity). In Joyce, 
authorial authority is sacrificed in a language which 
consciously requires the interplay of the act of 
reading21 • 
Thus the authority of the reader is established, but 
that is an authority that is incessantly de-centered by 
the text itself, in a wrestling toward an apocalypse 
which is always not-yet. That same wrestling for 
authority is present in Blake's reading and re-writing of 
Milton, as David Reide observes: 
In order to establish his own poetic authority, 
Blake needed to subvert Milton's, to establish 
a difference between himself and Milton. He 
attempted to overcome Milton's dualism, to 
repudiate what Milton saw as the essential 
structure of differences that constituted his 
cosmos and his text, the differences between 
God and -man, (etc). .But Blake is the 
inheritor of Milton's language, the language of 
a western tradition bui 1 t on dual isms. 
Inevitably, Blake's poem does not end with a 
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seamless vision, but with a woven garment of 
language that prevents, or defers, revelation. 
Ul timately all Blake can do is establish his 
difference from Milton, and so generate another 
duality: Blake/Milton. (275) 
Blake's reading of 
"writerliness" of 
Milton relies 
the text, its 
upon the dec entered 
submission to the 
subversion of its authority (Reide 275). But at the same 
time, Blake's establishment of authority in his new text 
demonstrates that subversion, presenting to its reader 
(that reader who would read against the "proper" 
interpretation, subverting the repressive, sterile 
eternal return of authority to itself) the elements with 
which to "combat the author's authority" (Reide 275-6); 
thus the transcendent authority of the text negates 
itself in a kenotic movement into the communal activity 
of the reader, interpretation, the writing of the body 
which is the absence of the author. 
In Milton's rewriting of Scripture as well, as 
Sanford Budick suggests, "the intercession of the logos, 
His effort to 'interpret,' is part of a living faith in 
and of interpretation" (211). The understanding of faith 
as a dynamic process of interpretation is exhibited 
within Paradise Lost in Milton's "belief in the ability 
of the human imagination to emulate di vine rationality 
and Christian redemption in its own acts of 
reconciliation through separation," according to which 
"the sanctuary of mankind's (sic) engraved heart must 
wander and err--must interpret," in order to "achieve 
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unity or oneness with the divine interpreter" (211). That 
is a dynamic unity which would become fully immanent in 
Blake, and fully embodied wi thin the very language of 
Joyce. The dynamic unity of reader and writer is an 
incessantly oscillating relationship, exemplified by the 
fact that Altizer's granting authority to the texts of 
writers such as Milton, Blake and Joyce depends upon the 
subversion of that authority in the re-wri ting, in the 
interpretation of those texts. Our epic destiny, as 
Altizer calls it, is a destiny of interpretive activity, 
a destiny which is terminated by an interpretive paradigm 
such as has informed scholastic theology, which reasserts 
textual and transcendent authority. In Altizer's 
rewriting of theology, he not only distinguishes between 
scholarly writing and "fully theological writing," but 
also "seeks a postmodern style" of writing while 
asserting that "there cannot yet be a postmodern 
theology" (GOG 3; HAA 4: GOG 2). The implication is 
simple, a postmodern theology must follow in the wake of 
modern theology, a theology which has yet to be fully 
written, and will remain unfinished until the underlying 
paradigm of theology can accommodate the sacrifice of 
(the) Author(ity). Meanwhile, theological reflection 
remains at the margins, as perhaps it is destined to do, 
arising from the negation of the eternal return of the 
realms of the proper both within and outwith its own 
discipline and tradition (as demonstrated, for instance, 
by Altizer's considerations of the epic tradition). 
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The sacrifice of authority which negates the 
metaphysics of the proper, the sterile system of eternal 
return, is enacted by a reading/writing which is, in 
Altizer's terms, a universal eucharist, the total 
presence of apocalypse. To be sure, that is a reading 
which is the result of a conscious effort on the part of 
the reader, an openness to the voice of the repressed 
(which, as we have seen from Altizer's reading of Joyce, 
is recognized theologically as a feminine or maternal 
voice), but there are texts which engender such'readings 
more fully than others (Kristeva, for instance, credits 
"poetic and religious discourse" as preferred sites[Gross 
98]). There is writing which is itself interpretive 
activity, sacrificing its own authority for the sake of 
the reader, and for the sake of the interpretive 
activity. In such writing, author may become reader, 
wri ting may become liturgy in which priest ( author) and 
congregation (reader[s)) are united, not in re-
presentation, but in the deferral of meaning which is 
itself the "goal" of the interpretive activity, the 
"total presence" of meaning. Certainly Altizer's work is 
such a writing, and in the world of contemporary fiction 
the work of A.S. Byatt stands out. Unlike Joyce, the 
unreadabili ty of whose language marks a transferral of 
authority, Byatt's work blends poetry, science, fiction, 
literary criticism, and so on, in a narrative which is 
ul timately readable, in fact, incessantly so. As both 
professional writer and reader, Byatt is a writer whose 
work negates its own singularity: any single work of 
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Byatt's is a network, and a departure point, of 
intertextuality, pointing toward texts which are its 
origin and its negation. It is toward Byatt's work, and 
toward some of those other texts, that we now turn. 
NOTES 
1 This is the philosophical situation from which 
science and theology operate within the present 
contemporary paradigm, according to physicist Fritjof 
Capra and theologians David steindl-Rast and Thomas Matus 
(Belonging to the Universe, 1992). 
2 For an informative study of the relation of 
Derrida's thought to theology, see Kevin Hart's ~ 
Trespass of the Sign, especially 64-70, and Hart's 
discussion regarding Derrida and negative theology, in 
which he concludes "not that deconstruction is a form of 
negative theology but that negative theology is a form of 
deconstruction" (186). See also Derrida's "How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials." 
3In Ruin the Sacred Truths, Harold Bloom draws a 
similar, if more understated distinction between Satan 
and Christ, and theology and poetry in Milton. 
If Satan in Paradise Lost is aesthetically 
superior to God and Messiah, as I think we must 
acknowledge, it is because passion is grander 
in him than in them, and Milton overtly 
accepted the paradox that poetry was more 
simple, sensuous and passionate than theology 
and philosophy. But this hardly means that 
reason is lacking in Satan •••• (102) 
4Al tizer notes that "Blake was the first seer to 
grasp the unity of the American and French revolutions, a 
unity marking the advent of a truly new world, indeed an 
apocalyptic world," an advent which ushered in the "end 
of all previous history" (HAA 185). Blake's epic poetry 
conjoins that "historical and eschatological ending" with 
"a poetic and imaginative ending," says Altizer, in a 
"new genre of apocalyptic poetry" which ends "the 
integral and organic coherence of the western epic 
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tradition," even reversing that tradition in chaotic 
language of Fall (HAA 185). The historical political 
revolutions themselves, says Altizer, also mark a 
"profound transformation of language," giving rise to a 
"postaristocratic" speech of the masses (liM 183-84). 
5 Pollard too, observes that Blake thought Mil ton 
"of the devil' s party without knowing it," presenting 
Satan as the true hero of Paradise Lost and Paradise 
Regained; that Satan, Pollard asserts, was for Blake "the 
true Jesus" (64-68). Further, "for Blake," writes 
Pollard , "Milton's Satan was Messiah, the Saviour, and 
Milton's Jehovah was the Devil; Heaven was seen in Hell 
and Hell in Heaven" (68). Within this dialectical schema 
arose Blake's marriage of contraries, exemplified by the 
notion that "God becomes as we are that we may be as He 
is" ("There is No Natural Religion"), which Pollard 
equates with Nietzsche's emancipatory birth of Dionysian 
creativity, evoked in the dithyrambs of both Blake and 
Nietzsche (75) , marking the ecstatic mourning and 
celebration of the death of God. 
6 Milton's "attempt in his epic to give poetic form 
to a view of life enlivened by faith" finds favor with 
Blake, writes Bette Werner, but Blake finds Milton still 
"the slave of his own oppressive notion of a cruel deity 
of reason and law," and describes him in Mil ton as 
"Samson shorn by the churches" struggling to support a 
collapsing ancient God (Urizen) (52-3). This is 
exemplified by one of Blake's illustration from his 
Milton which depicts that very scene: 
Blake's illustration. • .shows Milton holding 
up the slumping figure of an ancient God, who 
rests upon the tottering, broken tablets of the 
law. The inscription identifies the image of 
the Urizenic God with Milton's satanic 'Self-
Hood of Deceit and False Forgiveness, " whose 
annihilation will mean the poets eventual 
salvation. (werner 52) 
7 A brief but useful account of the similarities 
between Blake and Nietzsche is provided by David 
Pollard's "Self-annihilation and Self-overcoming: Blake 
and Nietzsche" (in Krell and Wood's Exceedingly 
Nietzsche, 1988). Nietzsche and Blake are paralleled in 
their use of dithyrambic verse, their "belief in the 
superabundance of creative energy I" their iconoclastic 
reactions to their "destitute ages" and their 
conservative backgrounds, and their orientation toward 
creativity as the "annihilation or overcoming of 
Selfhood" (63). 
8 For an extremely informative I concise discussion 
of Blake's mythology and Christology, see Welch's 
article, the title of which rather gives the game away, 
"william Blake's 'Jesus': The Divine and Human Reali~y, 
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Incarnate in the Imaginative Acts of Self-annihilation, 
Forgiveness, and Brotherhood." Welch notes that Blake's 
"four zoas" represent humanity's fallen (and therefore in 
need of re-integration) "mental powers:" 'imagination, 
reason, instinct and passions,' known to Blake as 
"Urthona (or Los), Urizen, Tharmas, and Luvah (or Orc)" 
(103). Further, Welch observes within Blake's developing 
mythology the consistent "root metaphors" in which 
"Jesus=Imagination=Poetic Genius," which entail the 
identification of Christ with reality which is "both 
human and divine, encompassing space and time, infinity 
and eternity," so that a complete dismissal of the figure 
of the transcendent Father is unnecessary; the Father and 
Spirit are "subsumed in the Son" (103, 118). 
9 It is this ordinariness which Jung, in his 1932 
review of Ulysses, read as the vehicle for Joyce's 
cynically-disguised compassion: "we suffer because the 
world revolves around eternally identical days that 
repeat themselves over and over, pushing the human 
consciousness in its foolish dance through the hours, 
months, years" (Eco 35) 
10 Edward Cronin offers the fascinating reading of 
Leopold Bloom as "Eliade' s primi ti ve man who, lacking 
religious faith, relies upon myths and archetypes to 
overcome the 'terror of history,'" a man "out of his time 
by several millenia (435, 437). While "Leopold Bloom has 
religious faith to renounce," says cronin, this "complete 
'philosophical' materialist" whose "Jewishness rests as 
lightly upon him as his catholicism into which he was 
formally baptized so he could marry his Catholic wife" 
defends himself nonetheless with "an arsenal of 
protecti ve myths," the most important of which is his 
wife, Molly, followed closely by his home, which becomes 
the center of the world, Eliade's "archetypal Center," 
not by virtue of its location or structure, but because 
it contains Molly, "Bloom's very being" (435-39). Bloom's 
home represents his nostalgia for pure presence, and his 
preoccupation with it, in Cronin's opinion, represents 
his desire to reverse the irreversibility of time, to 
live in harmony with the rhythms of the universe; it is 
this "desperate" "artificial" and "sterile" mythologizing 
which sustains Bloom through June 16, 1904, and Cronin 
adds, which will "get him through June 17, 1904" 
(438,439, 446). 
11 Umberto Eco, while avoiding Altizer's 
Christological language, observes that the "refusal and 
destruction of the traditional world" within Ulysses is 
effected by a "radical conversion from 'meaning' as 
content of an expression to the form of the expression as 
meaning," so that experience "shows itself directly in 
the word," speaking "by itself," as does the form itself 
(37). When Joyce critiques the "paralysis of Irish life," 
for example, he does so not in the content of the text, 
but rather in the form of the text: for instance, by 
"record(ing) the vacuous and presumptuous newsmen without 
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pronouncing judgment" ( Eco 36). Thereby the language of 
the assertion gives way to the language of enactment. 
12 Commenting on the influence of linear and cyclic 
conceptions of temporality in Joyce (and opting for the 
metaphor of the spiral in which historical time may be 
understood as both linear and cyclical, and the religious 
movements of redemption or damnation may also be read as 
such, moving upward or downward contingent upon the 
observer) Paul Kuntz observes the necessity of Joyce's 
conjunction of Christ and satan. Drawing from Joseph 
Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson (A Skeleton Key to 
Finnegans Wake. NY: HBJ, 1944), Kuntz proposes that "if 
the final meaning of Finnegans Wake is a 'mighty allegory 
of the fall and resurrection of mankind (sic),'" then it 
is fitting that "Joyce's anti-hero should be both a devil 
and a saint," noting that the uni versali ty and range of 
interpretation "from a dead soul, or a Lucifer, one who 
has condemned himself to Hell by choosing evil, to a 
Christ-figure who has sacrificed himself for the 
salvation of mankind (sic)" coincides with the 
representation of the evolution (or not) of history as a 
downward or upward spiral, so that "st. Augustine would 
read it one way, defenders of the modern world the other 
way" (530-31). 
13 While A.L.P. is understood by Altizer as "neither 
mythical nor divine," the coincidence of actual humanity 
and "joy and grace" in an image which re-enacts the 
rupture of the propriety and sterility of an originary 
presence bears significant similarities with Julia 
Kristeva's "maternal and erotic" notion of "la m~re qui 
jouit" (Graybeal 19). This image, discussed by Kriteva in 
"About Chinese Women" and elsewhere, conjoins the two 
alternatives allowed women by the repressive traditional 
Christian system, symbolized by the corporality and 
sensuousness of Eve or the virginity of Mary (Graybeal 
19). Kristeva, rather than advocating an escape from the 
"Symbolic system" or an marginal masculine identity which 
is "allowed" by the system, discerns the possibility of 
decentering the system through identification with its 
repressed identity: 
When, striving for access to the word and 
time, she identifies with the father, she 
becomes a support for transcendence. But when 
she is inspired by that which the symbolic 
order represses, isn't a woman also the most 
radical atheist, the most committed anarchist? 
In the eyes of this society, such a posture 
casts her as a victim. But elsewhere? ("ACW" 
159) 
14 Julia Kristeva sees this as a prime motivation 
behind the language of the Wake. That is, insofar as she 
reads the Wake as "an example of the unconsciously 
motivated 'chora' which manages to evade that 
phallogocentric discourse of the Lacanian 'Symbolic 
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Order' which dominates our waking lives" (Butler 277), 
its "dream language" is an instance of the return of the 
repressed semiotic (dis)order. 
15 According to Eliade, Yggdrasil, in Northern 
European mythology, is the tree of life situated at the 
center of the universe, and which connects the cosmos to 
its origins yet announces its end, for before Ragnarok, 
the destruction of the cosmos and the return of Balder, 
Yggdrasil shall tremble, suffer and fall; then the 
apocalypse has come. Yggdrasil, according to Eliade, is 
the paradigm for the cyclical time of the mythical 
religion, for it "incarnates the exemplary and universal 
destiny of existence itself: every mode of existence--the 
world, the gods, life, men--is perishable and yet 
capable of rising again at the beginning of a new cosmic 
cycle." 
16 Similarly, Christopher Butler notes Samuel 
Beckett's observation that Joyce's writing "is not about 
something; it is that something itself" (275). 
17 Because of the birth of Joyce's "new writing," 
Al tizer notes that "there is no narrative structure as 
such in the Wake," that is, there is no narrative 
structure which is distinguishable from an "epic 
movement" which is also a "cuI tic and sacrificial 
violence, a violence wherein an whereby the breaking and 
dismemberment of the Host and Victim passes into the very 
words of the text" (HAA 239). This linguistic and graphic 
sparagmos liturgically extends the narrative to include 
the reader in the Eucharistic moment of epic enactment. A 
less vivid but more praxis-oriented image of the 
interaction between reader and text in Joyce is drawn by 
Brian Russell, who compares Joyce's fragmented momentary 
epiphanies with the manners of presentation in the 
contemporary visual arts and also in Mark's gospel: 
Joyce does not tell a story as a continuous 
narrative; he provides necessary preparation to 
appreciate a moment of significance which can 
lead to prospects for change in the individual 
and in society. His episodic way of building up 
fragments or illustrations or incidents is more 
like the way reality is conveyed in the modern 
visual arts, in film and in television. It may 
also be that the episodic structure of (say) 
Mark's Gospel, leading to the cross and 
resurrection as climax, can be understood as a 
chain of epiphanies which prepare us to receive 
the significance of the climax so that we can 
hold something of its meaning for our Christian 
discipleship. (40) 
18 As Eco poirits out as well, "Finnegans Wake 
signals the birth of a new type of human discourse," a 
discourse which does not make assertions regarding the 
world, but "becomes a mirror-like representation of the 
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world" (86). Words no longer support the "things" of 
which they speak, "'things' ••• are used to convey words, 
to support and evidence them" (87). Further, the novel 
semantic structure of the Wake makes its own limitations 
known: "the form of the relationships between signifiers 
expresses new possibilities of defining something," but 
"the form assumed by the signifieds remains as a mirror 
of an obsolete universe" (87). Thus the "evolutionary 
network of connections between signifiers" serves to 
inform us of that which we are already aware--"name1y, 
that everything is everything" (87). 
19 As Umberto Eco notes regarding the "aesthetics 
and metaphysics of chaosmos," the Wake "encloses chaos 
wi thin the framework of an apparent Order and thereby 
places us in the same situation as the apostate Stephen 
who uses the words of Thomas Aquinas to refuse family, 
country, and church" ( 8 7) • The Wake, through its 
iconoclastic and chaotic fallen language, ushers in a 
revolutionary fai th, the only fai th left in our 
apocalyptic situation: "the only faith that the 
aesthetics and metaphysics of the Chaosmos leaves us is 
the faith in Contradiction" (87). 
20 McCarthy points out that spelling and writing is 
connected to fall and creation throughout the ~: as 
Ada1ine Glasheen observes, Joyce presents writing as "an 
act equivalent to the eating of the tree of knowledge" 
(143). 
21Murphy and McClendon (211) submit that Altizer 
signals a shift beyond the paradigm of the modern age in 
his reading of Joyce. Altizer certainly maintains that 
that shift is enacted literarily, though perhaps not yet 
theologically. Al tizer does note a development in 
consciousness following the Wake, which distinguishes the 
contemporary age: "our wake is no longer Finnegans Wake," 
writes Altizer in Genesis and Apocalypse, 
for no resurrection lies readily at hand, and 
yet our death does lie in the wake of 
resurrection, and in the wake of an eternal 
life which is eternal life and eternal death at 
once; and if that wake is no longer an 
awakening of the dead, it may well be an 
apocalyptic transfiguration nonetheless, and an 
apocalyptic transfiguration which is a 
transfiguration of our abyss. (186) 
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Chapter Three 
Ashes to Ashes: Possession, Jouissance, 
Apocalypse, and "The Dream of the Rood" 
It was just one step, I say, to displace Man 
From the just centre of the sum of things--
But quite another step to strike at God. • • 
(Byatt, Possession 209)1 
Joy Comes in the Mo(u)rning: 
Kristeva's Jouissance 
In her discussion of Holbein's "Dead Christ" Julia 
Kristeva interprets the confrontation of "separation, 
emptiness and death" in the painting's presentation of 
the passion and death of Christ, understandably enough, 
as the "depressive moment," characterized by the 
sentiments, "everything is dying, God is dying, I am 
. 
dying" CBS 130). It is this moment, transformed by 
Christian tradition through its interpretation of 
crucifixion and resurrection, sacrifice and redemption, 
which becomes the vehicle with which the individual 
subject identifies with the "absolute Subject (Christ)" 
(132-34). However, the presentation of the crucified 
Christ in the manner utilized by Holbein, that is, as one 
"wi thout the promise of Resurrection" (110), marks a 
site, for both artist and viewer, of an absolute loss of 
meaning, an instance of the "deepest abyss" of Hegelian 
severance, a site of the death of God (136). This same 
moment of severance, emphasized in the Christian 
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concentration upon the rupture in the relationship 
between God the Father and the Son, constitutes a 
Hegelian "work of the negative" in the corning to 
consciousness of the individual which is chronicled in 
the crucifixion narrative's "mythical representation of 
the Subject" (132). 
It is as a result of her appropriation of the 
Hegelian work of the negative that Kristeva has developed 
the understanding of "le sujet en proces," the "subject 
in process/on trial," a subject suspended between the two 
extremes of, on the one hand, the symbolic "ego in 
control," and on the other, the semiotic "jubilatory fall 
into nature, into the full and pagan mother" (Graybeal 
14). This subject is of course a speaking subject, or at 
least a signifying sUbject: signification is not for 
Kristeva a question of the assertion of a transcendental 
ego, however (Gross 98). Signification is a question of 
the thetic rupture and repression of the semiotic chora 
in order that the subject participate in the symbolic 
realm of language. While the repression of the semiotic 
is prerequisite for symbolic signification, neither the 
semiotic nor the symbolic "exist" as such except in 
distinction from each other. An understanding of the 
subject in which the semiotic chora functions as the 
endless displacement 
opposition to the 
of the symbolic 
alternatives of the 
offers, in 
perpetual 
frustration of the symbolic drive toward mastery through 
the eradication of the semiotic or the desperation of an 
absolute loss of meaning, another mode of existence. 
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Fully related to the semiotic and the symbolic, between 
errancy and propriety, between drive and reason, between 
the irrecoverable freedom of the maternal origin and the 
unfulfillable law of the paternal rule, the subject in 
process is open to what Kristeva calls jouissance. 
Jouissance, as utilized by Kristeva and others, 
carries the simultaneous implications of sexuality, 
spirituality, physicality and conceptuality, signifying 
"total joy or ecstasy" (Graybeal 15). Jouissance, in all 
its dimensions, relates to the drive of desire, an 
impulse, as Jean Graybeal notes, "incapable of final 
satisfaction, since desire is always displaced and 
displacing" (17). Openness to jouissance and its excesses 
is exemplified in the postmodern critique of Platonic 
metaphysics' rejection of the improper and irrational 
which endeavors to construct or to return to "a timeless 
state of stasis," an endeavor which draws its efficacy 
from an exclusive model of the subject "as unified, self-
identical, capable of perfect self-understanding and 
mastery, and constituted solely in relation to ' law and 
reason' " (Graybeal 17). contrary to this understanding, 
the subject of jouissance is continually dissolved, 
displaced, and re-established in its displacement. 
Jouissance is driven by the play of negativity, by the 
loss of the unified, self-mastering subject in its 
encounter with its semiotic dimensions which have been 
marginalized and repressed in a system of patriarchal 
rationality; such a drive is clearly unending, based not 
on a progressive linear chronology, but on the suspension 
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and oscillation of the jouissant subject between the 
symbolic and the semiotic, between law and freedom, 
edification and loss. 
"A possible source of jouissance," according to 
Graybeal, "is the sense of abjection" (26). "Abjection" 
is characterized by Kristeva as " a vortex of summons and 
repulsions:" the "abject" is defined as "what is 
'radically excluded. .that which is violently and 
negatively chosen," and is further, "that which I most 
clearly want not to be" (Graybeal 26). "The expulsion of 
the abject" is a dimension of the symbolic splitting and 
repression of the semiotic chora (Gross 87). As the 
semiotic recurs and displaces the symbolic, so the abject 
is never completely exterminated, but lingers on the 
margins, "threatening apparent unities and stabilities 
with disruption and possible dissolution" (Gross 87). In 
the case of the proper, Platonic metaphysical system, the 
abject includes the semiotic recognition of the 
foundational function of abjection, that is, the 
recognition of the existence and recurrence of the Other 
which the symbolic extreme seeks to eradicate or deny. 
The repression of the abject results in its fragmentary 
recurrence within the symbolic discourse which seeks its 
eradication. 
While Graybeal cites abjection as "a possible 
source" of jouissance, Mark C. Taylor, in his remarkable 
work, Altarity, goes much further. Quoting Kristeva's 
Powers of Horror, Taylor indicates that "Jouissance alone 
makes the abject as such exist," specifying that "it is 
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simply a boundary, a repulsive gift that the Other. 
(sic) allows to fall so that the 'I' does not disappear 
but finds in it, in this sublime alienation, a fallen 
existence" (182). The boundary of abjection which is the 
site of jouissance gives rise to an apocalyptic notion of 
the subject, and also to a notion of literature that, "in 
the absence of God," replaces the sacred and is itself "a 
version of the apocalypse" (182). From Kristeva's point 
of view, Taylor observes, "all literature is probably a 
version of the apocalypse," rooted "in the fragile 
boundary ('borderline') where identities (subject/object, 
etc.) are not, or are hardly at all--double, blurred, 
heterogeneous, animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject" 
(182). 
Kristeva's apocalyptic understanding of the subject 
which is recurrently displaced and of meaning which is 
never established is obviously not, writes Taylor, "the 
realization of a Hegelian telos in which absolute 
knowledge becomes totally present;" rather, "this 
apocalypse is black with burnt up meaning," and is "not 
the parousia but its impossibility" (181). Perhaps, 
however, an apocalypse which will have always not yet 
arrived is also one which is always already at hand. 
History en proces: Altizer's Apocalypse 
Despite his perceptive reading of Kristeva, Mark c. 
Taylor, in another recent non-book, criticizes the work 
of Thomas Altizer by saying that, as we have noted, in 
Altizer's writing "there is no place for the postmodern," 
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and that Altizer does not understand the difference 
between Hegel and postmodern thinkers (Tears 242). Taylor 
suggests that Altizer, like Hegel, may not know to what 
extent he is right (as Derrida echoes Bataille in writing 
and Difference), but it should be added that Taylor does 
not allow Altizer to be right enough, or, more precisely, 
that he does not allow Altizer to err greatly enough. The 
difficulty is, I suspect, one of style, for while Taylor 
philosophizes with shears and needles, Altizer, like his 
predecessor, uses a hammer, and this inevitably results 
in rough edges and fragments. 
Taylor's problem with Altizer, it seems, is one of 
presentation. Altizer has not kept up with the trend and 
continues to make use of terms like "presence," a 
practice which places his writings pitifully out of 
fashion. Specifically, Taylor says that Altizer does not 
"think the death of God radically enough," and is 
unwilling to "confront the impossibility of presence and 
the inescapable absence of apocalypse" (69). What 
offends Taylor in the extreme is Altizer's use of the 
phrase "total presence," which Taylor interprets as the 
re-presentation of an originary presence, so that 
Altizer's kenotic death of God is merely a Hegelian 
dialectic in which presence returns to itself (67). Such 
an understanding of total presence interprets it as a 
desire for the present possession of presence, a return 
of the immediacy of speech (67-69). The "self-embodiment 
of God" of which Altizer writes is indeed present in an 
eternal now which is a total presence, but contrary to 
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Taylor's reading of Altizer's "presence," Altizer 
specifically points out that the present is only present 
in its perishing. The self-embodiment of God in the 
present is its perishing, and the presence is not a re-
presentation of an originary presence, but a reenactment 
of the absolute perishing of an original totality or 
eternity--the present, for Altizer, is present not in 
terms of its re-presentational presence, but in terms of 
its perishing, its recurrent absence. The originary 
presence for which Taylor says Altizer exhibits a 
nostalgia is a presence which for Altizer can only be 
thought as absence, as perishing (Altizer, ~ 43). 
Presence, for both Altizer and Taylor, is identified with 
speech, but Taylor's hesitancy to think long enough with 
Altizer results in his reduction of Altizer's thought to 
the triadic schema of speech-writing-speech, presence-
absence-presence, which represents "the fall that sets 
history in motion" (Taylor, Tears 60). In Taylor's 
version of Altizer, speech, or presence, falls into 
writing, or absence, and is recovered in the end. 
Something is· lost in Taylor's translation, however, for 
presence for Altizer is always and only present in its 
perishing: there is not, as Taylor claims, a "profit from 
every expenditure" in Altizer's thought (Tears 64); there 
is only expenditure, only sacrifice--prophetic perhaps, 
but not profitic. The fall, as the beginning of history 
(lithe fall that sets history in motion"), known to 
Altizer as the self-naming of the I AM, the act of 
creation and revelation, in breaking the primordial 
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silence, releases actual events which in their actuality 
in perishing embody the self-naming of the I AM and yet 
embody the "actual absence and unspeakabili ty of I AM," 
therefore embodying the self-emptying which is an "actual 
and final fall" from an originary transcendence or 
plenitude, and an "irreversible beginning of a full and 
final actualization" (~ 32-33). 
As noted in the preceding chapters, Altizer says 
nothing could be more opposite to this than an eternal 
cycle of return, and this is the primary difference 
between the pagan, or as Altizer would put it, archaic or 
primordial, understanding of history and the 
understanding of the Judaeo-Christian "historical world" 
(33). A beginning which is the irreversible ending of a 
primordial silence and therefore a total novum can never 
"simply pass into ending," as is the case in "a cycle or 
circle of eternal return," in which there is finally no 
distinction between beginning and end, alpha and omega 
(33). In order that events be understood as "final and 
unique," the beginning which releases those events must 
be understood as beginning alone, "a unique beginning 
which is the origin and ground of irreversible and unique 
events" (33). However, insofar as these events are unique 
only in their finali ty , in their perishing, an 
understanding of beginning which is absolute, that is, 
which can only be understood apart from a cycle of 
eternal return, must also be an understanding in which 
"ending becomes manifest and real as an irrevocable 
perishing, a death that is fully and only itself, and 
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therefore a death that can never pass into life" (34). 
The "self-naming of I AM, II ends the "call of eternal 
return," and Altizer maintains that this ending is a 
"radical iconoclasm," which destroys every vestige of "an 
original or primordial ground or light" (34). 
Eternal return is, as we have seen, strictly 
distinguished from "eternal recurrence" by Altizer. It is 
the willing of eternal recurrence which ends the cycle of 
eternal return, and it is his appropriation of 
Nietzsche's vision, rather than Hegel's, which most 
clearly demonstrates Altizer's critique of Hegelian 
teleological return: 
.Hegel understood the death of God as the 
resurrection of God, a resurrection which is 
the return of the Godhead of God, and the 
return of the Godhead of God as the center and 
ground of self-consciousness in history. That 
is precisely the return which is ended in 
Nietzsche's vision of eternal recurrence, and 
it is ended by a new proclamation of the death 
of God, a death that is now, and for the first 
time in our history, a full and final death, 
and thus it can only return as death and never 
as a resurrection of the Godhead. So it is that 
Nietzsche's vision of the eternal recurrence of 
the same is a vision of the recurrence of full 
and actual events, events which are finally 
actual events only as the consequence of the 
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death of God, for only that death releases 
events from a transcendent ground •••• (140) 
Indeed, Altizer's anti-cyclical (in the sense of an 
eternal return) yet not teleologically linear Christian 
vision sees genesis as apocalypse, beginning as ending, 
presence as expenditure or loss while maintaining the 
absolute distinction of the two terms. Both Altizer and 
Kristeva, while drawing from a Hegelian process of 
oscillation of binary opposites, critique the tendency of 
such a system to result in a re-presentation of an 
originary presence or to tend toward stasis. Altizer's 
"speech of the Father," the self-naming of the I AM, 
becomes a first moment only by ending a pure 
transcendence, that is, as the death of God. The order of 
speech and the symbolic becomes a kind of negative ground 
for the play of total presence, just as the symbolic 
order grants the possibility of the semiotic, providing a 
temporal structure by which the semiotic (the feminine) 
is repressed (abject-ed) and through which the process of 
upheaval, displacement, and errancy holds sway. For 
Kristeva, the symbolic order is a "temporal order," 
associated both with "the Father" and with speech: 
There is no time without speech. Therefore, 
there is no time without the father. That, 
incidentally, is what the Father is: sign and 
time. It is understandable, then, that what the 
father doesn't say about the unconscious, what 
sign and time repress in the drives, appears as 
their truth (if there is no "absolute," what is 
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truth, if not the unspoken of the spoken?) and 
that this truth can be imagined only as a 
woman. (Kristeva, "ACW" 153) 
Pointing toward a kind of non-teleological, utopian, 
apocalyptic challenge of much the same sort as Altizer's, 
Kristeva envisions 
A constant alternation 
"truth," identity and 
between time and 
its loss, history 
its 
and 
that which produces it: that which remains 
extra-phenomenal, outside the sign, beyond 
time. An impossible dialectic of two terms, a 
permanent alternation: never the one without 
the other. ("ACW" 156) 
"Never the one without the other:" and yet, in his 
critique of Altizer, Taylor, in a move which seems more 
simple metaphysical inversion than deconstructive 
critique, calls for the writing of "a writing that is not 
secondary to, or has not 'fallen' from speech" (Tears 
69). For Altizer, this is unthinkable, for that very fall 
is historical; it has happened. The denial of that fact 
is the basis of Altizer's objection to postmodern 
theology. Altizer's understanding of the present 
situation, however, is compatible with a postmodern 
standpoint; in fact it is postmodern. Taylor seems to 
have given Kristeva the benefit of the doubt which he 
does not allow Altizer. Perhaps Altizer should be read, 
using Taylor's phrasing, not as a "truthful philosopher," 
but as a "stylish writer" (Altarity 182). Perhaps one 
must confront not only Altizer's voice in the wilderness, 
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but also his writing in the sand; if "in the absence of 
God, literature remains (reste); (the) literary remains 
(to) 'take the place of the sacred'''(182), then perhaps 
Altizer's gospel should be read in terms of its literary 
destabilization as well as its theological structure. 
Perhaps it is inevitable that the reader, the subject, 
even history itself (insofar as it becomes a "subject" 
for Altizer) is recurrently suspended between the two, 
driven by desire and loss. 
The Suspended Subject: "The Dream of the Rood" 
As a religion with a cross at its center, loss 
should not be a difficult concept for Christianity to 
swallow; yet Christianity has always been preoccupied by 
the recovery of the original, the primal, the authentic 
(even Altizer's Genesis and. Apocalypse is subtitled "A 
Theological Voyage Toward Authentic Christi ani ty"--maybe 
there is something to Taylor's critique). It is commonly 
accepted that the rise of Christianity as an official 
religion was accompanied by a zealous search for relics, 
and of course one of the most sought after relics was, 
along with the grail, the true cross. Claims of the 
discovery of even a small fragment of what was alleged to 
have been the true cross gave rise to several literary 
works, most notably that work which, having no title, is 
known as "The Dream of the Rood." 
In its most primal available form, the "Dream of the 
Rood" exists, in part, in runic form upon the Ruthwell 
Cross in Dumfriesshire. The monument I which has been 
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dismembered, defaced, buried, exhumed. and re-assembled 
(as part of an act against idolatrous monuments), 
contains various Christian scenes as well, with the 
fragments of the poem consigned to the margins of the 
sculpture. The poem may also be found in its fullest form 
within the "Vercelli book," dated from the "second half 
of the tenth century," and separated from its earlier 
form by an enigmatic three centuries (Swanton 1). Also 
belonging to the tenth century is a silver reliquary, 
built to contain the largest known fragment of the "true 
cro?s," upon which a passage from the poem is inscribed 
(Alexander 103). The survival of the poem in these three 
forms is testimony to a remarkably widespread 
dissemination and popularity throughout its history. 
The poem is, at least in its fullest form (of which 
Michael Alexander grants only the first half 
"authentici ty"), written in the style of the Anglo-Saxon 
riddle, making use of its two most common forms, the "I 
saw" and the "I am" types (Alexander 104). Riddles, it is 
supposed by Alexander, were "traditionally reserved for 
party games," though in this case, the riddle is 
accompanied by the use of the "six-stress line," a form 
reserved for moments of solemn ceremony (Alexander 105). 
Riddles conceal or hold back their "answers," which are, 
when one plays the game, supplied by the reader. The 
question, of course, concerns the answer to the riddle in 
this case, when there seems to be no answer required. The 
tale here does not sound like a riddle; what is the 
mystery, what is the question to be answered, where is 
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the missing name to be supplied? Here, too, the reader is 
without recourse to the answer, as the reader's questions 
are met by the silence of the text. Of course this is 
also a dream, and humanity has been interpreting dreams 
for as long as we've been sleeping. When we interpret 
dreams we assume that things are not as they seem, that 
there is a need for what we as readers, or hearers, do. 
Riddles served as entertainment at parties, and were 
also a method of passing a wealth of acquired wisdom from 
one generation to the next. Wisdom is more easily 
recalled in the form of a riddle, or a proverb or 
parable. The impermanence of authors and the resistance 
of wisdom to straightforward presentation make necessary 
the technique. However, it may not be qui te correct to 
say that wisdom is "recalled," nor that what is passed on 
has been "acquired." As an intentionally misleading 
genre, whatever truth may be therein "contained" is 
veiled by falsehood; the riddle, as Aristotle writes, 
presents the possible in an impossible way (McCarthy 17). 
"Riddle and parable may be much the same," says Frank 
Kermode in his consideration of the obscuri ty of 
parabolic narrative (mashal or hidah) (~ 24). Both 
riddle and parable "require some interpretive action from 
the auditor; they call for completion; the parable-event 
isn't over until a satisfactory answer or explanation is 
giyen; the interpretation completes it" (24). The 
response completes, of course, only the parable event, 
and not the parable itself. Parables are not only like 
riddles: Kermode suggests "that the interpretation of 
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parable is like the interpretation of dreams" (24). "The 
dream-text," says Kermode, "when understood, disappears, 
is consumed by the interpretation, and ceases to have 
affective force (or would do so, if one were able to 
conceive of a completed dream analysis)" (24). 
Fortunately, or unfortunately, the riddle of the rood 
remains unanswered, and it is quite impossible to 
concei ve of a completed dream analysis, at least where 
this dream is concerned. Of course, as Heidegger points 
out in his epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art," 
"the task is to see the riddle," not to solve it) 2. 
Riddle, vision, and parable recall the challenging words 
of another prophet: 
You who are glad of riddles! Guess me this 
riddle that I saw then, interpret me the vision 
of the loneliest. For it was a vision and a 
foreseeing. What did I see then in a parable? 
And who is it who must yet come one day? 
(Nietzsche 271-72) 
The dreamer of the "Dream of the Rood" hears, deep 
in the night, the voice of a glorified tree, which, at 
the very moment the dreamer proclaims ita "signum of 
victory," is revealed to be "stained and marred," and one 
reads that "through the gold," the dreamer "might 
perceive what terrible sufferings were once sustained 
thereon. " After a while, the bleeding tree ( a loaded 
metaphor) breaks the silence. The tree's tale is, of 
course, of being arbitrarily chosen from the forest (but 
now blessed among trees for having borne the Son), taken 
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away to be mounted by the Almighty God, the warrior king, 
and then thrown into the earth to be forgotten for a 
time. Some time thereafter, "followers of the Lord, 
friends," resurrect the cross and adorn it, and find 
healing there. The function of the tree as feminine 
symbol, "mounted" by the Almighty God (this is no Christ 
with whom identification is allowed, this is a God who 
only sleeps, but does not die), discarded, rescued and 
adorned lends itself all too easily to identification 
with the semiotic drive utilized as the prop for the 
paternal system's abuse, yet remaining wi thin the 
narrati ve to offer healing to those who would hear her 
voice. In contrast to the purely glorious crucified God, 
the Christological element here is the cross, suspended 
between heaven and earth, sustaining the act of its own 
abjection and suffering its own horrors. It is not only 
the cross, however, which is held in suspension between 
its own extremes. 
The dreamer of the dream of the Rood, while 
apparently providing for the reader a means of access to 
a first-hand account of the passion narrative, even to 
the point of the immediacy of a spoken voice--the voice 
of the Rood--provides here no immediacy for the reader or 
for the one who stands before the cross. The cross 
itself, whether the written poem, the inscribed monument 
before which one might stand, or even the cross described 
in the poem itself, bearing the physical marks of the 
passion, bears the inscription of the passion narrative, 
but that is a narrative which is only readable in light 
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of the later development of the narrative in which the 
cross itself plays a part. The cross is remembered, and 
its text completed, its inscription made readable, by a 
later completion outside its own narrative. In the 
original cross, therefore, lies an incomplete and 
unreadable narrative which is appropriated by later 
reading and interpretation. wi thin the narrative of the 
poem, there takes place a retrospective movement toward 
the elusive and illusory origin, an origin the 
presentation of which is futile, except in its recurrent 
displacement. Even the voice that is given to the tree 
is, in the end, the voice of the dream of the dreamer. 
Between the voice of the tree and the inscription upon 
it, between speech and writing, there lies the cross. Any 
search for the true, originary cross is doomed to 
failure, insomuch as Kermode points out, "interpretation, 
which corrupts or transforms, begins so early in the 
development of narrative texts that the recovery of the 
real right original thing is an illusory quest" (125). 
The reading of the cross, then, can only be a 
reading of the reader, an attempted appropriation of a 
text on the boundary of the narrative of the passion. The 
cross, as a character, performs its function in the 
passion narrative and is then put aside, its own 
narrative diverging from the narrative of which it plays 
a part. The cross, as a text, bears the marks which 
provide the narrative and yet stand between the cross and 
the reader, preventing the reader's possession of the 
tale. On the contrary, as an element outwi th both the 
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"original" and traditional institutional narrative, the 
cross "unreads" the narrative, as "an unstill brightness" 
incessantly changing its garb from gold to blood and 
sweat (Lines 19-23). Even within the metaphysically 
glorious ending of the Vercelli book, in which the cross 
is seen as an escape from the sufferings of the world, 
healing is given to those who bear the mark of the cross, 
denoting possession not of the cross but by the cross. 
It is of no small import that the monumental cross 
which should bear the poetic, religious inscription 
should have been dismantled and, as it were, ostracized 
from its system, a system which has been again and again 
defined as exclusively patriarchal. It seems obvious why 
such a monument should be seen as dangerous, for it seems 
to' carry with it a call to those of whom Kristeva 
occasionally speaks, as Elizabeth Gross points out: 
Kristeva consistently maintains that only 
certain men--that is, those who are prepared to 
put their symbolic positions at risk by 
summoning up the archaic traces of their 
repressed semiotic and maternal (prehistory)--
are able to evoke, to name, to re-inscribe this 
maternal space-time and pleasure in the 
production and transgression of textuality. The 
feminine and the maternal are expressed and 
articulated most directly in two kinds of 
discourse: the poetic and religious discourses. 
(98-99) 
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"The poetic text, II says Gross, "materializes the 
pleasures, rhythms and drives of the semiotic," while 
"religious discourse is the site of a privileged symbolic 
representation of the semiotic, in which the symbolic is 
able to tolerate the expression of normally unspoken pre-
oedipal pleasures" (99). Of course, the symbolic is not 
always so tolerant, and the restraint and shame deemed 
"proper" to the body are ascribed to what could otherwise 
be interpreted as an instance of "jouissance," the 
identifying of the subject with the sign of the cross. 
The marking of the body with the sign of the cross takes 
place most notably on Ash Wednesday, when the leaves of 
the triumphal expectations of Palm Sunday give way to the 
ashes of Lenten mourning. The crossing of the self takes 
place with the bearing of the ash. Ash, however, "black 
wi th burnt up meaning" (Taylor, Al tarity 181), can make 
for very fertile soil. 
will the Circle be Unbroken?: 
Possession and Apocalypse 
Our Lady--bearing--Pain 
She bore what the Cross bears 
She bears and bears again--
As the Stone--bears--its scars 
The Hammer broke her out 
Of rough Rock's ancient--Sleep--
And chiselled her about 
with stars that weep--that weep--
The Pain inscribed in Rock--
The Pain he bears--she Bore 
She hears the Poor Frame Crack--
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And knows--He'll--come--no More-- (Byatt E 381) 
The poem, or fragment, reminiscent of "Stabat Mater," is 
one contained upon "a page of scraps of poems," written 
by Sabine de Kercoz, the cousin of Christabel LaMotte, 
Victorian poet, lesbian demigoddess to feminist academic 
groups and lover of Randolph Henry Ash, by whom she has 
borne a child. In order to keep her pregnancy concealed, 
Christabel spends the time before the birth in Brittany 
with cousin Sabine and her family. Brittany, we are told 
by Sabine, recalling the words of her father, is a place 
of both ( and neither) linear and (nor) cyclical times 
(364)3. 
All of this, and much, much more, takes place within 
A.S. Byatt's Possession, in which, to oversimplify in the 
extreme, a fortuitous discovery of a fragment of a draft 
of a letter to an unknown correspondent (who turns out to 
be Christabel LaMotte) of the illustrious nineteenth 
century poet, Randolph Henry Ash, sends Roland Michell, a 
twentieth century student of Ash and assistant to James 
Blackadder, noted Ash scholar, on a quest which is to 
transfigure not only modern Ash and LaMotte scholarship, 
but also the lives of those who, whether honestly or 
through more covert means, join in the search. 
Prior to this event Roland is, to say the least, 
disillusioned, seeing himself as having arrived a decade 
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or so too late on the academic scene, and despite his 
fulfillment of the obligatory educational status, 
consigned to research for Blackadder and carve a living 
out of tutoring and dishwashing. The discovery of the 
letter, however, which was not only unfinished and 
effaced, but also did not fit into the preconceived 
mythic character of Randolph Henry Ash (who, it was 
understood, enjoyed a quite traditional relationship with 
his wife, Ellen, despite the absence of children), 
provides Roland the opportunity to possess that which is 
absolutely unavailable to his peers and superiors, that 
which, in fact, calls into question all that they so 
ambitiously pursue. Roland soon realizes that he cannot 
accomplish his quest alone, and shares his secret with 
Maud Bailey, noted scholar of Christabel LaMotte and a 
descendant of Sophia Bailey, who had reared Maia Bailey, 
Maud's great-great-great-grandmother, and, unbeknownst to 
Maud, the daughter of Ash and LaMotte. Maud Bailey, too, 
has grown somewhat cynical of her pursuits, especially as 
she is herself pursued by both Fergus Wolff, a trendy 
young deconstructionist to whose wolfish wiles Maud has 
already succumbed, and Leonora stern, a lusty American 
sister in the LaMotte school. 
Roland and Maud come to share a common quest in 
their pursuit of the history of the Ash-LaMotte affair 
and the destiny of the child, but on the way they 
discover a common desire, a desire which is exhibited 
throughout the novel and shared by most of its 
characters: 
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"Sometimes I feel," said Roland carefully, 
"that the best state is to be without desire. 
When I really look at myself--" 
"If you have a self--" 
"At my life, at the way it is--what I 
really want is to--to have nothing. An empty 
clean bed. I have this image of a clean empty 
bed in a clean empty room, where nothing is 
asked or to be asked. Some of that is to do 
with--my personal circumstances. But some of 
it's general. I think." 
"I know what you mean. No, that's a feeble 
thing to say. It's a more powerful coincidence 
than that. That's what I think about, when I'm 
alone. How good it would be to have nothing. 
How good it would be to desire nothing. And the 
same image. An empty bed in an empty room. 
White." (267) 
The white and/or empty room is a recurring image in 
Byatt's work. The nostalgia thereby invoked, which Robert 
Detweiler calls a desire for an absence of desire 
("Faithful Fictions. "4), is in Possession 
symptomatic, in several characters and their respective 
societies, academic, social, or religious, of the 
tendency toward one or the other of the exclusive 
'extremes of dissolution and mastery exhibited by the 
individual subject or the institution as subject. 
Exclusive institutional systems tend toward an ambiguous 
but zealously affirmed symbolic origin, while the 
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disillusioned subject longs for nonexistence or complete 
"satisfaction;" either way, the result is a static 
nostalgia. This nostalgia for a pure presence, for an 
absence of actuality, for a negation of any Other, is 
exemplified in both realms of "real" tempora1i ty 
presented in the text of Possession. Each of the two 
primarily linear narratives (nineteenth and twentieth 
century) is informed by a mythical, and therefore 
primarily cyclical, narrative, implicitly animating the 
roles of the "real life" characters and their respective 
societies, and explicitly illuminating the text as a 
whole. 
On the one hand there is the actual past of the 19th 
century characters: the Ash-LaMotte narrative. Two 
exclusive systems come immediately to the fore: the 
households of Randolph and Ellen Ash and of Christabel 
LaMotte and Blanche Glover. Both households are, to 
borrow a phrase from Irigaray, economies of "the order of 
the same." The Ash marriage, due to Ellen Ash's se1f-
protection, which is at the same time her self-assertion, 
is never consummated. The order of the same maintains 
such a grip over Ellen that she cannot allow herself what 
little difference is "allowed" for the propagation of the 
system. Ellen prefers to worship her husband only in 
spirit and in truth. The illusory order of the Ash 
marriage, separated from carnality, is broken most 
critically by Ellen's discovery of her husband's affair 
and child. Writing, and loving, have always shattered 
spheres of indifference, and so it is, too, 
that the correspondence between 
revealed to Ellen, splits the 
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Ash and Christabel, 
illusory realm of 
spirituality upon which she bases her "marriage." This 
revelation is provided by Ellen's counterpart, Blanche 
Glover, Christabel's cohabitant who is driven to suicide 
by the failure of her own exclusive realm. Her ill-fated 
system was an attempt to live with Christabel "frugally, 
charitably, philosophically, artistically, and IN HARMONY 
with each other and Nature," isolatedly and "without 
recourse to help from the outside world, or men" (307). 
It comes as no terrible surprise to learn of the method 
of her demise: 
I intend to emulate the author of the 
Vindication of the Rights of Women, but, 
profiting by her example, I have sewn into the 
pockets of my mantle those large volcanic 
stones which MISS LAMOTTE had ranged upon her 
writing desk • ••• (308) 
Thereby another system of exclusion bites the dust at the 
hands of Ashes and Writing. 
On the other hand there is the contemporary 
narrative, the actions of the characters in the "now" of 
the twentieth century, in which Roland and Maud share 
their "whi te-room" visions and in which the same two 
preeminent systems, which have failed in the past, recur, 
taking on mythic proportions. The Ash and LaMotte 
"households" have developed into two academic centers, 
represented by Roland and Maud. Shaping the actions of 
these academic camps are the mythic figures of Ash and 
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LaMotte, around whose fictive personae scholastic and 
theoretical systems of exclusion have developed. Moreso 
than Ellen Ash ever dreamed, modern Ash scholars have 
exalted Randolph Ash to a godlike position as the paragon 
of nineteenth century virtue. Blanche Glover's dream, 
too, has become reality in the minds of LaMotte scholars 
who see the two (Christabel and Blanche) as victims, not 
of themselves, but of an outside world still hostile 
toward true, higher, beauty. 
Now, providing the underlying script for both the 
destruction of the nineteenth and twentieth century 
"circles of sameness" is the myth which informs the 
writings of Randolph and Christabel. The recurrent 
mythical narrative which pervades the poetry and 
correspondence of Ash and LaMotte and therefore the 
actions, thoughts and dialogue of their contemporary. 
counterparts is the northern European story of the myth 
of Ragnarok and its accompanying events, including the 
apocalyptic suffering and collapse of the world tree 
note , an event which is powerfully enacted with the 
disturbance of Ash's grave by the appropriately named 
American scholar, Mortimer Cropper (who harvests the past 
even to the point of pillaging cemeteries). It is this 
same myth --the tale of sUffering of the tree at the end 
of the world, announcing the return of the slain Balder--
which has been noted by many scholars in connection with 
"The Dream of the Rood".4 
Roland's own discovery of the fragment, the 
subsequent quest and further discoveries effect a 
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cri tique of the traditional Ash and LaMotte narratives 
and through the re-telling and connection of the mythic 
and "real" narrati ves reaffirm, though enacting anew, 
both origin and future. For example, Maud is not only 
given an origin--an ancestry--but she is also freed, from 
the constraints of possessive relationships with Fergus 
and Leonora, and from her own relationship to her subject 
matter as well. Further, Roland returns home to find that 
his previous work has, due to his discoveries, gained 
recogni tion, and realizes that "nothing in what he had 
wri tten had changed and everything had changed" (468). 
Roland and Maud, as the primary subjects of Possession, 
are suspended between extremes of exclusion (mastery) 
and dissolution, and driven by desire toward a creative 
which displaces their own subjective, conclusion 
genderal, academic and temporal boundaries in a 
coincidence of genesis and apocalypse. The cry of 
jouissance marks the site of recurrent displacement and 
re-establishment: 
And very slowly and with infinite gentle delays 
and delicate diversions and variations of 
indirect assault Roland finally, to use and 
outdated phrase, entered and took possession of 
all her white coolness that grew warm against 
him, so that there seemed to be no boundaries, 
and he heard, toward dawn, from a long way off, 
her clear. voice crying out, uninhibited, 
unashamed, in pleasure and triumph. 
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In the morning, the whole world had a 
strange new smell. It was the smell of the 
aftermath, a green smell, a smell of shredded 
leaves and oozing resin, of crushed wood and 
splashed sap, a tart smell, which bore some 
relation to the smell of bitten apples. It was 
the smell of death and destruction and it 
smelled fresh and lively and hopeful. (507) 
Far from concluding the narrative, the "resolution" 
of the mystery of the Ash-LaMotte affair opens up new 
futures, in the light of which history is re-wri tten. 
Further, in the post-script, the reader is supplied with 
a fragment of the tale, not unlike the letter "given" to 
Roland, a kind of "pharmakon"5 regarding the meeting of 
the father and Maia (Maia, incidentally, is the mother of 
Hermes), which throws the narrative, now apparently 
wrapped-up, into a new light, exhibiting and generating 
the endless possibility of potential worlds not only of 
the past, but of the future as well. The reader begins 
again, or one finds oneself at the beginning. 
Thomas Altizer, seemingly echoing the sentiments of 
Maud and Roland, notes that in our historical situation 
we have lost all sense of a true and actual beginning, 
except as an absolute mystery. The veiled mystery of that 
seemingly unknowable origin calls to us, according to 
Altizer, "calling us to a quest that otherwise would be 
absent" (27). This same calling, says Altizer, makes 
possible Ita new naming of beginning;" an answering of 
that call, a "new naming" even of the mystery, is, 
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according to Altizer, "an evocation, if not an 
embodiment, of the novum" (27). This "embodiment" of the 
absolutely new must come at the closure of a history, an 
ultimate ending. "The death of God in the modern world," 
says Altizer, "is just such an ending," and though it has 
not yet been understood theologically, it has 
authentically "realized a new naming of beginning," 
providing our history not only with the opportunity to 
know genesis "not only as an absolute origin or source," 
but as "that event which is absolutely new. • in its 
very embodiment of totality" as well (28). 
The total presence of history in the present is not 
the re-presentation of a past presence, but a negation of 
past and future as merely past and future (191); the end 
or completion of history of which Altizer writes is 
inseparable from the genesis of a present (and therefore 
a past and future) which is present and actual only in 
its perishing. So too the narratives of both "The Dream 
of the Rood" and Possession are never fully present, but 
continually rewrite themselves, or are rewritten, as 
textual history, neither (and both) linear nor (and) 
cyclical, carrying, like Maia, a message which is never 
delivered. "Now and then there are readings," says Byatt 
(is she critic, reader, or author here?), " ••• readings 
when the knowledge that we shall know the writing 
differently or better or satisfactorily, runs ahead of 
any capacity to say what we know, or how" ( 471). Such 
readings· fall away as soon as they are known. Or is it 
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that they are known, like dreams recalled upon waking, in 
their falling away, by their absence? 
In these readings, a sense that the text has 
appeared to be wholly new, never before seen, 
is followed, almost immediately, by the sense 
that it was always there, that we the readers, 
knew it was always there, and have always known 
it was as it was, though we have now for the 
first time recognised, become fully cognisant 
of, our knowledge. (472) 
Our historical situation finds us surveying the 
fragments of unfinished histories, interpreting a history 
the unity of which is shattered by individual elements, 
sifting through the ashes of a disaster brought on by, 
among other things, leaving our canons closed too long. 
The completion of the unfinished text of the cross, the 
resolution of the Ash-LaMotte affair, the reading of 
history--these call us on, for as Randolph Henry Ash 
observes, "we are driven by endings as by hunger. We must 
know how it comes out. "(476). It is in answering 
that call, in the reading, in the enactment, the re-
writing of the text, that we provide and are provided 
with an ending, an ending which is truly ending, actual 
only in its perishing. Reading from such a precarious 
position is necessarily writing, turning from the 
nostalgic impossibility of the blank page of the eternal 
same toward the ashes of apocalypse. Reading in the wake 
of the death of God, following deconstruction, calls for 
a kind of poetics6 of jouissance, a kenotic reading and 
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writing which accepts the end of endings and takes 
apocalypse seriously, as genesis. Perhaps then we may 
begin, following the fragmentary trace of the death of 
God, to read, and write, "It is finished".7 
Nothing leaves a trace ••• a trace that is 
almost nothing. • a trace that is as light (and 
as dark) as ash. (Taylor, Tears 163) 
NOTES 
1 The excerpt is from "swammerdam," the magnum opus 
of Byatt's fictional Browning-esque poet within 
Possession, R.H. Ash. 
2 See Martin Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Thought. 
trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and ROw, 1971. 
79. 
3 
"He said that the Druid religion as he 
understood it had a mysticism of the centre--
there was no linear time, no before and after--
but a still centre--and the Happy Land of Sid--
which their stone corridors imitated, pointed 
to. 
Whereas for Christianity this life was 
all, as the life, was our testing-ground, and 
then there were Heaven or Hell, absolute. 
But in Brittany a man could fall down a 
well and find himself in a summer land of 
apples. Or catch a fish-hook on the bell tower 
of a drowned church in another country. " 
(Byatt, ~ 364) 
Also, for an intriguing consideration of the 
function of linear and cyclical understandings of 
temporality within earth science, see stephen J. Gould, 
Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in 
the Discoyery of Geological Time (London: Penguin, 1987), 
discussed in chapter four. 
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4 See, for example, the works of Gabriel " Turville-
Petre, Myth and Religion of the North: The Religion of 
Ancient Scandinavia. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964. 
(119-20), Gale R. Owen, Rites and Religions of the Anglo-
Saxons. Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1981. (27) and 
J.A.W. Bennett, Poetry of the Passion. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1982. (14). 
5 See Derrida's Dissemination, "Plato's Pharmacy." 
6 In his consideration of Ricoeur's "mimesis," 
Detweiler suggests that "an imagining of what our own 
creative configurations might be, our own plots. 
might. • .lead us to poetry (Detweiler, "Faithful 
Fictions" 20) 
7 These words also end Altizer's The Self-Embodiment 
of God, and are contrasted by Taylor with his own ending 
of Erring: "It is (un)finished ••• Amen ••• Sobeit ••• 
(p.s.)". 
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Chapter Four 
Crossed Lines and Broken Circles: 
Paradigms, Dichotomies and Novelty 
We might mistake this 
tranced moving for joy 
but there is no joy in it (Atwood, "The Circle 
Game" 20-22) 
To assume that the evidence of the beginning or 
end of so vast a scheme lies within the reach 
of our philosophical inquiries, or even of our 
speculations, appears to be inconsistent with a 
just estimate. of the relations which subsist 
between the finite powers of man and the 
attributes of an Infinite and Eternal Being. 
(Lyell, Principles of Geology 799) 
It doesn't have to be like this. All we need to 
do is make sure we keep talking. (stephen 
Hawking's computer-assisted "voice" in Pink 
Floyd's recent single "Keep Talking") 
Blackadder said, "How strange for you, Maud, to 
turn out to be descended from both--how 
strangely appropriate to have been exploring 
all along the myth--no the truth--of your own 
origins." (Byatt E 503) 
Randolph Henry Ash's observation that "we are driven 
by endings as by hunger" (Byatt 476) is only half-true, 
for we are equally driven by origins. Thomas Altizer goes 
Fountain 147 
so far as to say that the "primacy and centrality" placed 
upon "the ultimate question of origin" by a uniquely 
"Christian and western thinking" provides its distinction 
from "all other thinking" (GOG 52). It follows then that 
Altizer views Hegel and Nietzsche, two thinkers 
exemplifying the cUlmination of Christian thinking, as 
"totally given to the question of origin," and sees the 
thought of the twentieth century, so influenced by their 
thinking, still generally obsessed by that question, from 
"our most openly revolutionary traditions" to "our most 
empirical science" (53). In Altizer's understanding, as 
we have seen, beginning is to be understood as a negation 
of eternal return, and therefore as beginning which is 
truly beginning, without the possibility of reversal in a 
cycle of eternal return. It is this understanding which 
separates the ancient consciousness from the modern 
consciousness, which as such knows an exclusively and 
irreversibly forward movement of time (53). The evidence 
of such a consciousness, grounded in an irreversibly 
forward temporal movement, is noted in contemporary 
scientific thinking by Altizer, who observes that even 
though the laws of contemporary physics may be "time 
symmetric," the actuality (for instance, the applications 
of physics and the evolutionary structure of biology) to 
which those laws apply is understood as irreversible, 
given to an exclusively forward movement of time (GOG 
53)1. 
. 
That irreversibility is linked of course to the 
notion of historicality, is the basis not only of 
Altizer's understanding of the self-negation of God, but 
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also his understanding of Christianity as a forward-
moving, historically evolving faith. Such an idea of the 
historical evolution of theology has often been 
negatively compared with the objectivity of science, and 
as Carl Raschke observes, theology is spoken of as 
"'imaginative,"fictive,' metaphorical,'" and so on, and 
given less "truth value" than "objective science" (19). 
However, in the wake of quantum theory, a revolution 
in the way objective science sees itself is now offering 
common ground upon which to examine the structures and 
development of both science and theology. As Stephen 
Toulmin has observed in Foresight and Understanding 
(1961), science has been coming to see the relativity of 
its own assertions, its inhabitance of a continually 
evolving intellectual world: 
We need. • .to see scientific thought and 
practice as a developing body of ideas and 
techniques. These ideas and methods, and even 
the controlling aims of science itself, are 
continually evolving, in a changing 
intellectual and social environment. (Raschke 
19) 
The "laws" of incompleteness and uncertainty which have 
been ushered into science by quantum theory have been met 
with disdain by mechanists and rationalists who, as 
Raschke observes, predict that quantum theory will lead 
to the destruction of the foundations of science (Raschke 
50). The relativism which is the cause of such fears has 
not remained constrained to the theoretical and abstract, 
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or even to the scientific, as more recently, George 
Lindbeck has written of the "textualizing of reality," 
apparent in thinkers such as Derrida and Thomas Kuhn: 
We find it natural, as previous generations did 
not, to speak of encoding data, following 
scripts in scientific investigations, and 
inscribing reality in texts. Trope and metaphor 
everywhere reign. (Lindbeck 363) 
Within the objective sciences, "discovering the truth" 
has been replaced with "modelling reality," and the 
theories of literary criticism "rival those of the hard 
sciences in technical complexi ty, " so that "the 
epistemological grounding of a physicist's quarks and of 
Homer's gods is exactly the same" (Lindbeck 363)2. 
This theoretical relativization would not seem at 
first to be present in Altizer's distinction between the 
irreversibility inherent in the human conception of time 
and the apparent reversibility or atemporality of 
universal principles. This distinction, however, as with 
all distinctions in Altizer's writings, is part of a 
dynamic dialectic relationship. The dialectics of 
reversibility and irreversibility, and of the theoretical 
and the material, are associated by Altizer with the 
development of the uniquely western autonomous 
consciousness. First, Altizer is careful to distinguish 
between the material and the theoretical in modern 
science, stating that the irreversibly forward movement 
of time and the category of absolute beginning are 
"inescapable," in "actual" (material) scientific 
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expressions, while not an absolute necessity in "formal 
or abstract" (theoretical) scientific expressions (GOG 
54). As the 'dominant and most comprehensive thinking of 
the twentieth century,' scientific thinking, at least in 
its "actual" manifestations, according to 
testifies to the impossibility of knowing "a 
Altizer, 
pure and 
actual backward movement of time, or a movement of time 
which is ultimately forward and backward at once" (54). 
Altizer's distinction between "actual" science which 
apprehends the irreversibility of time and 
"formal/abstract" science which may not, amounts, it 
seems, to a distinction between scientific "history" and 
"myth," a distinction between immanent, historical praxis 
and transcendent, ahistorical theory. This distinction 
arises out of Altizer's historical understanding, which, 
as noted previously, is not an either/or between 
transcendence and immanence, but an apocalyptic 
dialectic in which the transcendent is recurrently 
emptied/presented into immanence, without the possibility 
of a backward movement to the re-presentation of an 
originary presence, but opening the possibility of the 
total presence of an embodied transcendence, known in its 
absence, its passing away. The pure theoretical does not 
exist in actuality. In this same manner, says Altizer, is 
the origin-obsessed modern consciousness also "centered 
upon death," the death of an ancient transcendence which, 
in the science of the seventeenth century, simultaneously 
produced a radically new historical subject and an 
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understanding of "universal mathematical and physical 
laws": 
Even the discovery of the infinity of the 
uni verse which gave rise to modern science in 
the seventeenth century is the full realization 
of the death of a celestial sphere which is 
other than our terrestrial sphere, only that 
death made possible the comprehension of 
universal mathematical and physical laws •• 
The very mind that comprehends those radically 
new mathematical and physical laws is a mind 
that is a truly new subject or center, a center 
of consciousness now liberated from the 
encompassing presence of all primordial images, 
and only that liberation made possible a purely 
autonomous thinking. (GOG 61) 
Yet this purely autonomous subject was to be radically 
decentered by the time of the twentieth century, as 
Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence and will to Power ushered 
in what Altizer refers to as the "final disappearance of 
that unique 'I' which was born with the advent of the 
will": Eternal Recurrence is a re-enactment of 
Augustinian predestination in Altizer's understanding, 
which reveals the "bondage of the will which cannot will 
backwards" and enacts the transformation of all "it was" 
into "thus I willed it," shattering that "I" which finds 
itself "powerless against everything that has occurred 
and has been done" (55). The historical disappearance of 
that "I", however, has not been fully effected, according 
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to Altizer, "so long as the deep question of its ultimate 
origin is inescapable, an inescapabili ty which is 
inevi tably present in the actual presence of the symbol 
or category of absolute beginning" (54-55). The symbol or 
category of absolute beginning is, in Altizer's view, 
required for an understanding of an irreversibly forward 
movement of time (54-55). Al though we have effected the 
death of God ourselves, says Altizer, the full embodiment 
of the death of God will remain beyond us, "more distant 
from us than the most distant stars I" as it was for the 
hearers of Nietzsche's Madman, "so long as we can know, 
and only fully and truly know I a forward movement of 
time," for until then "we will not yet have escaped or 
transcended our origin in a forward movement of 
revelation, a forward movement that is the necessary and 
inevitable beginning of an absolute beginning or genesis" 
(53-54). As for the reality of the occurrence of the full 
embodiment of the death of God, that is a matter of 
interpretation, for the total presence of the apocalyptic 
absolute future which is the consummation of an absolute 
genesis occurs in every now and yet, present only in its 
perishing, is always not yet. 3 
It was in very much this same manner that Nietzsche, 
in Twilight of the Idols, contrasted the historian's 
backward belief in the search for origins with his own 
"formula for happiness": the straight line, the goa1 4 
(Kaufmann 470, 473). Nietzsche's "goal" was hardly the 
traditional teleological end of the story, but a negation 
of the cyclic return of the same. within the cycle of the 
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same, origin and telos are two sides of the same coin (a 
coin which may very well be fixed--perhaps a coin without 
inscription5 ), witness Heidegger's notion of beginning 
which "contains the end latent wi thin itself," in "The 
Origin of the Work of Art" (though I suspect that given 
the dichotomous quality of the Ur-Sprung, Heidegger could 
well be read otherwise) (76). Questions of the absence or 
presence of beginnings and endings bring to the fore the 
circularity or linearity of the perspective from which 
one reads the universe. For the Western world, that 
perspective has changed drastically since the time of 
Nietzsche, indeed, since Augustine, as we have tried to 
make sense of the coinciderice of the "Greco-Roman 
apprehension of the cycles of life and of seasons" and 
the "Hebraic conception of history from the creation to 
the last judgement" (Kuntz 517). Biblical absolute linear 
history gives rise to the necessity of absolute beginning 
and absolute ending, eternity turns to time and back 
again to eternity, a curiously circular arrangement, as 
the historical musings of Altizer exhibit. Linearity, 
however, is allegedly the paradigm which, according to 
Eliade, separates modern humanity from the primitive. 
Postmodernism critiques linearity over and against 
cyclicity, even spatiality over against temporality, and 
lines and circles remain nuclei around which views of 
history orbit, even after history itself has been 
supposed to have ended. 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida, while drawing a 
definite delineation of what he understands as a "linear" 
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paradigm, cautions that any thinking which supposes to 
"think the history of ( a) system, its meaning and value 
must, in an exorbi tant way, be somewhere exceeded" (OG 
85). Certainly this is true of Altizer's thinking; 
although he utilizes the distinction of linear 
"historical" thinking from "ahistorical" thinking, his 
affirmation of such a modernist view. serves to supercede 
and subvert its teleology, and proclaims the possibility 
of a "transformed" theology. Al tizer, though he does 
indeed eschew the title, is at least in this way a 
"postmodern" thinker. His use of "historical," "linear," 
and "epic" models enacts a simultaneous affirmation and 
critique of such systems, in a writing which recurrently 
subverts itself. Altizer's notion of history is not a 
simple linear teleology, but a thoroughgoing critique of 
the staticity of eternal return, a critique which 
requires an understanding which is beyond simple 
teleological linearity. Derrida's critique of linearity 
does not defend a static "simul tanei ty," but serves, as 
Altizer's notion of "total presence," to subvert an 
oppressi ve notion of history. Perhaps, as Derrida 
suggests in his assertion that the "pluri-dimensionality" 
of "non-linear writing" does not "paralyze history within 
simultaneity," but "corresponds to another level of 
historical experience," the term "history" is not so 
useful anymore (OG 85). Derrida finds that "history's" 
association with "a linear scheme of the unfolding of 
presence, where the line relates the final presence of 
the originary presence according to the straight line or 
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circle," and reckons that "simultaneity," a concept 
closely akin to Alti~er's criticized eternal return, 
"coordinates two points or instants of presence, and it 
remains a linearist concept" (OG 85). The relaxation of 
the oppressive domination of linearity might negate the 
sterility of the "technical and scientific economy," and 
"transform its nature profoundly," says Derrida, who 
notes that "beginning to write without the line," which 
is to allow "access to pluridimensionality and to a 
delinearized temporali ty, " reveals the "rationali ty 
subjected to the linear model appear as another form and 
another age of mythography" (illi 87). Such a 
transformation has been occurring within "philosophy, 
science and literature" within the last century, because 
thinking finds itself 'suspended between two ages of 
writing,' a suspension which has resulted in a situation 
in which "the problem of reading occupies the forefront 
of science" (87). The revolutions within 'philosophy, 
science, and literature,' says Derrida, "can be 
interpreted as shocks" which are enacting the gradual 
destruction of the linear, epic model (QG 87). The 
duplicity of such a standpoint is obvious; the very 
concept of "revolution" and the possibility of a "new 
writing," depend upon both a cyclic (which is the nature 
of "revolution," a term which bears great weight in 
Altizer's thinking) and a linear understanding (otherwise 
"newness" itself is precluded). Derrida is well aware of 
this tension, and states that the present inadequacy of 
writing according to a linear model "is not modern, but 
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it is exposed today better than ever before" COG 87). The 
"meta-rationality and meta-scientificity" of such 
thinking, abandon the traditional concepts of "man, 
science, and the line" COG 87), enacting the familiar 
Derridean occurrence, the end of the notions of "history" 
and of "the book." 
Heavily influenced by Derrida, Mark C. Taylor's 
discussion of the "End of History," in his Erring, 
invokes the following passage from Altizer's "History as 
Apocalypse": 
. . the end of history and the death of God 
are not only simultaneous but identical 
movements. The end of history is the self-
negation of self-consciousness, an ending which 
is fully and openly embodied in the twentieth 
century, and an ending which is eschatological 
in the sense that it is an absolute end of 
everything which is here manifest and real as 
history itself. So it is that the end of 
history has, indeed, occurred, and not simply 
the history of metaphysics, but the history of 
the West as a whole, for the "metaphysical" 
identification of being as presence is simply 
the philosophical voice of the Western 
consciousness itself. (~ 52) 
The . advent of the postmodern consciousness (an almost 
meaningless catch-phrase now, but in Taylor's Erring it 
is enough to identify it with the "radical implications 
of the death of God" [7]) which marks the "end of 
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history" simul taneously alters the whole of the network 
of concepts with which Taylor illustrates the classical 
Western onto-theo-logical Wel tanschauung. This network, 
which Taylor exemplifies with the use of the related 
concepts of God, self, history and book, rests, according 
to Taylor, upon a hierarchically oppressive and 
repressive system of unequal bipolar opposition, from 
which emancipation may be gained not simply by a reversal 
of the hierarchy, but through the effecting of a 
"dialectical inversion that does not leave contrasting 
opposites unmarked, but dissolves their original 
identities" (E 7-10). Of course, the question is, 
especially for Altizer, whether the "dissolution of their 
original identities" is an actual possibility, or whether 
such an aim is fundamentally a reactionary escapism. That 
is, dialectical inversion, when applied to bipolar 
opposites such as origin and telos, should result in a 
dynamic of affirmation and critique; however, 
"dissolution of original identities" would necessarily 
bring that dynamic to a halt, in an attempt to step 
outside the very system the subversion of may be effected 
only from wi thin. Taylor does indeed stress the 
"parasitic" character of such an inversion, exhibited by 
the preclusion of the deconstructive critique's 
separation from the system it subverts, so perhaps 
"dissolution of original identities" is just an 
unfortunate choice of words. At any rate, it must be 
affirmed that Taylor's critiques mark an irreversible 
alteration in the climate of the theological environment. 
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Taylor's a/theology represents a definite theological 
paradigm shift in which, under the influence of post-
structuralist thought, God becomes "writing," self 
becomes "trace," history becomes "erring," and book 
becomes "text" (13). The alteration of these terms marks 
a change in theological focus and method from an 
obsession with presence and domination toward a notion 
informed by subversion and kenosis, a change which 
epitomizes, for Taylor, the difference between modernism 
and postmodernism (13). 
While Taylor's portrayal of 
dichotomies of Western metaphysics 
the underlying 
allows for the 
equation of theology with modernism, Altizer, in the 
preface to his Genesis and Apocalypse, suggests that the 
possibility of recovering theology in a "postmodern" 
world is offered by the very fact that it was the 
theological enterprise as a "science" which was the first 
discipline to fall victim to modernity, or at least to 
have been forced into a kind of unnoticed dormancy, in 
which a kind of transformation may have been taking place 
(13). In order to effect a metamorphosis from within the 
all-engulfing postmodern silence, Altizer states that 
theology must be reborn into a "profoundly atheistic if 
not nihilistic world," a world which owes its very 
existence to the "uniquely modern realization of the 
death of God" (13). Regarding "postmodernism" as a 
nostalgic reaction against modernism, Altizer heralds the 
birth of a fully "modern" theology, a theology which 
remains to be written, but a theology which, like 
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Taylor's a/theology, is driven by a kenotic understanding 
of the dialectic of polar dichotomies (GOG 1-4). For 
Altizer, however, the notion of kenosis and the 
possibility of subversion are unavailable to a 
postmodernism which, seeking a dissolution of identities, 
cannot know beginning itself. The possibility of kenosis 
requires, in Altizer's estimation, a genesis which is an 
ending of an originary transcendence; in fact, that is 
its very definition. To seek a dissolution of dichotomous 
identi ties is to seek an ahistorical pure presence, a 
presence of which history itself, in Altizer's reckoning, 
requires the negation. 
It is for this reason that the question of genesis 
is so fundamental for Altizer, who recognizes that "at a 
time of ending, nothing is more overwhelming than the 
mystery of beginning" (27). Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the present century's fascination with the power 
of the natural sciences to present the terrifyingly 
ancient past (even as this is written, new pictures taken 
by the Hubble telescope have made the evening news, and 
Stephen Hawking's voice provides the recurring theme for 
the latest Pink Floyd single). However, though our 
cosmological concerns revolve around the question of 
"cosmic beginning," Altizer claims, as noted in the 
previous chapter, that "we have lost or are losing every 
sense of a true and actual human beginning, or of a human 
beginning that now could be actually new" (27). Even as 
the "first moment" of the cosmic expansion remains 
elusive to our scientific theories, so Altizer notes that 
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"ul timate beginning or n ovum " remains veiled before us 
(27). The veiled mystery of that seemingly unknowable 
origin calls to us, according to Altizer, "calling us to 
a quest that otherwise would be absent," a calling which 
makes possible "a new naming of beginning;" it is this 
call which has been answered in the writing of the 
present century, writing which is itself "an evocation, 
if not an embodiment, of the novum" (27). As stated 
previously, Altizer maintains that the embodiment of the 
absolutely new must come at the closure of a history, an 
ultimate ending; as he explains: 
If a new naming of beginning is truly a novum, 
it is realized only in that vacuum or emptiness 
which is effected by the erosion and erasure of 
an earlier naming of beginning; and that 
erasure is the inevitable consequence of the 
ending of an old world. (27) 
So long as we in the (post)modern world continue to cling 
to any sort of a concept of a totality which remains "a 
pure or unending eternity," in the sense of a closed 
system or a transcendence which is ultimately only a 
pure transcendence or presence, "we will remain closed," 
says Altizer, to an understanding of "a new eternity, 
• • • an eternity that is not only new, but whose novum 
is all in all" (28). The understanding of novum advocated 
by Altizer precludes the possibility of an understanding 
of God as "simply and only eternal, or whose primordial 
identi ty is simply identical wi th an apocalyptic 
identi ty , or whose identity and reality as God wholly 
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transcends the novum of an absolute or total beginning:" 
in other words, if one is to speak of a God pre-existent 
to an absolute origin who remains unchanged or who simply 
returns at the end of history to the pre-creative state 
in an all-encompassing process of reconciliation, then 
one does not speak of the absolutely new, or actual, for 
"absolute beginning cannot be a total event if it is not 
an all-comprehending event. • (or) if it exists in and 
as the shadow of a preceding eternity, for then its very 
existence as such would not be absolutely new" (29). 
It is newness with which Altizer is concerned in so 
much of his work, a radical novelty which distinguishes 
Christianity's kenotic understanding of God from a cycle 
of eternal return. As discussed briefly in chapter one, 
this is Altizer's concern regarding "postmodernism" and 
the apparent contradiction between its reliance upon 
bipolar opposition for its critique's impetus and the 
alleged (by Altizer at least) aim of its critique to 
dissolve the bipolar identities; just as no actuality at 
all is possible in a cycle of the same, or in a system 
which posits an eternal transcendence, no critique is 
possible in a quest for the dissolution of distinctions. 
A dialectic which hopes to dissolve distinctions is most 
fundamentally a cycle of the same, and if a postmodernist 
theological agenda draws from such a philosophical 
paradigm, then it is, according to Altizer, nothing new 
at all, but a reactionary "renewed medieval, or 
patristic, or pagan theology" (GOG 2). The generalization 
of individual theological or critical efforts under a 
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rubric such as "postmodern," however, runs a serious risk 
of misunderstanding those efforts. Further, the debate 
over whether or not "postmodernity" is, or can be, 
anything more than late moderni ty continues among 
thinkers such as Rorty, Dupre, Habermas and Lyotard 
(Dupre 277-95), and such paradigmatic historical 
dichotomization must remain dynamic and subversive, as 
both Altizer and "postmoderns" would agree, if it is to 
serve as a useful method of elucidation. 
The underlying questions here pertain, 
unsurprisingly, to the possibility of novelty and the 
function of dichotomy. It is "the new" which, in 
Altizer's view, ultimately separates an ahistorical 
"pagan" cyclic understanding from a "modern" linear view, 
two understandings which become, it must be recognized, 
yet another paradigmatic dichotomy, like "modern" and 
"postmodern." Recent discussion regarding the existence 
and relation of historical paradigms have both clarified 
and obscured the issue. Paradigm shifts, of course, rely 
upon a distinction between dichotomies, and a conviction 
that "something new" can indeed happen. Things tend to 
get rather confusing, however, when the opposing 
paradigms concern the existence or non-existence of 
paradigms and paradigm shifts themselves, or, in the case 
of the opposition of a "cyclic" or "linear" historical 
understanding, when opposing historical understandings 
pertain to historicality itself. There is no doubt that 
fundamental philosophical infrastructures have changed 
drastically within the past few centuries, but it is not 
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automatically given that anything "absolutely new," or, 
on the other hand, anything which might be regarded as a 
definite philosophical paradigm shift, has happened. 
Since Thomas Kuhn introduced the phrase in the 60's, 
"paradigm shifts" have been a topic of much discussion 
within virtually every academic field. A paradigm shift 
occurs, according to Kuhn, when a scientific revolution 
gives rise to a new way of thinking which is 
"incommensurable" with the previous way of thinking6. 
However, as Bohm and Peat point out, incommensurability 
may very well exist only in the eye of the beholder; that 
is, the incompatibility of two paradigms may be most real 
to those who exist in the time of revolution, and the 
"event" of a paradigm shift may be far too subtle and 
interconnected to result in a dichotomy of "old" and 
"new" (27). Bohm and Peat suggest that there is "a 
potential for a continuously creative approach" in which 
such a dichotomy does not surface; this however, like 
Taylor's deconstructive theological method, is at least 
similar to a paradigm shift with regard to the way we 
understand paradigms (which become polar dichotomies when 
a distinction between old and new is made) themselves 
(Bohm and Peat 27). 
Let us suppose that the phrase "paradigm shift" is 
at least suitable for discussion for the moment, and that 
one has indeed occurred, or is occurring. This is the 
posi tion taken by Fri tjof Capra, Thomas Matus and David 
Steindl-Rast in their conversations regarding science and 
theology. Fritjof Capra is perhaps the most recognizable 
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(along with Paul Davies) spokesperson for the "New 
Physics;" Capra's. works, of which The Tao of Physics is 
probably the most well-known, present, as Carl Raschke 
puts it, "a marriage of physics with religious thought in 
the subject area of quantum mechanics" (20). Raschke also 
points out that the authors of the new physics have 
"almost en bloc" convinced their readers that "quantum 
mechanics corroborates some form of Eastern theosophy" 
(21), and this is no less true of Capra's conversation 
with two Christian thinkers such as steindl-Rast and 
Matus. However well-intended, the simplistic discussions 
of the three thinkers serve to demonstrate the dangers of 
overemphasizing paradigm shifts and approaching cross-
disciplinary discussion informed by a magnanimous but 
subconsciously imperialistic pluralism. 
In Belonging to the Universe, Matus and steindl-Rast 
parallel in theology the paradigm shift which Capra 
observes within science. Capra contrasts the "old 
scientific paradigm" of Descartes, Newton and Bacon, with 
the "new paradigm," which is referred to (insufficiently, 
Capra points out) as "holistic, ecological, or systemic" 
(xi). On the theological side, Matus and steindl-Rast 
differentiate between the old "rationalistic, 
manualistic, or positive-Scholastic" paradigm and the new 
(again insufficiently so-called) "holistic, ecumenical, 
or transcendental-Thomistic" paradigm (xi). The two new 
paradigms are characterized by five criteria which 
distinguish the perspectives of new paradigm science and 
theology with regard to its subject matter, and to the 
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methodology by which it utilizes the contents of that 
subject matter. 
First, Capra recognizes in the new scientific 
paradigm a "shift from the part to the whole," 
characterized by a reversal of the old-paradigm belief 
that 'the dynamics of the whole of a complex system 
could be understood from the properties of the parts' 
(xi). This reversal results in the conviction that "the 
properties of the parts can be understood only from the 
dynamics of the whole," and that "ultimately there are no 
parts at all," because what is known as a part is "merely 
a pattern in an inseparable web of relationships" (xii). 
This shift is paralleled by the theological shift "from 
God as revealer of truth to reality as God's self-
revelation" (xii). Similar to the scientific point of 
view, Matus and steindl-Rast note that the old paradigm 
held that "the sum total of all dogmas. • added up to 
revealed truth," while the new paradigm "reverses the 
relationship between part and whole," so that "the 
meaning of dogmas can be understood only from the 
dynamics of revelations as a whole" (xii). In this view, 
"revelation as a process is ultimately of one piece," 
with particular dogmas reflecting the singular moment of 
"God's self-manifestation in nature, history, and human 
experience" (xii). 
Secondly, Capra observes a scientific "shift from 
structure to process," in the turn from the old 
paradigm's view "that there were fundamental structures, 
and then there were forces and mechanisms through which 
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these interacted, thus giving rise to processes," to the 
new paradigm's understanding of structure as "the 
manifestation of an underlying process," stressing the 
dynamic quality of the "web of relationships" that appear 
as a structure (xii). Theologically, the correlating 
shift is from "revelation as timeless truth to revelation 
as historical manifestation" (xii). The old paradigm view 
here, according to Matus and Steindl-Rast, is that "there 
Was a static set of supernatural truths which God 
intended to reveal to us;" however, "the historical 
process by which God revealed them was seen as contingent 
and therefore of little importance" (xii). The new 
theological paradigm, on the other hand, views "the 
dynamic process of salvation history" as the truth 
itself, "of God's self-manifestation;" revelation is 
therefore "intrinsically dynamic" (xii). 
Thirdly, Capra acknowledges a "shift from objective 
science to 'epistemic science'" (xiii). This entails a 
movement from the belief in the objectivity of scientific 
observations and their independence from the observer and 
the "processes of knowledge" to a belief that 
"epistemology. • is to be included explicitly in the 
description of hatural phenomena" (xiii). Theologically, 
the shift is from "theology as an objective science to 
theology as a process of knowing" (xiii). Like scientific 
descriptions, "theological statements" in the old 
paradigm were thought to be objective and independent of 
both the believer and the epistemological process (xiii). 
This belief, which might have been'more clearly referred 
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to as the theological/philosophical shift from ontology 
to epistemology, has, according to Matus and steindl-
Rast, gi ven way to the notion that "reflection on non-
conceptual ways of knowing--intuitive, affective, 
mystical--has to be included explicitly in theological 
discourse" (xiii). 
Fourthly, both a scientific and theological "shift 
from building to network as metaphor of knowledge" are 
mentioned by Capra, Matus and Steindl-Rast, stressing the 
turn from a conception of knowledge as an edifice made of 
"fundamental laws, fundamental principles, and basic 
building blocks" (a structure the foundations of which 
were said to be crumbling during paradigm shifts) toward 
the formation of a network of relationships formed by 
descriptions of "observed phenomena" or . theological 
statements (xiii). such networks will include, according 
to Capra, "neither hierarchies nor foundations," and 
according to Matus and steindl-Rast, singular 
perspecti ves wi thin that network "may yield unique and 
valid insights into truth" (xiii). The shift from 
building to network also entails the supersession of the 
idea of, on the one hand, physics, or on the other "a 
monoli thic system of theology" as an ideal for other 
sciences or as "the sole source for authentic doctrine" 
(xiii). 
Finally, the authors suggest that scientifically, a 
shift has 
descriptions," 
"theological 
occurred "from truth 
and theologically, from 
statements" to a focus 
to approximate 
a focus upon 
upon "divine 
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mysteries" (xiv) • Scientifically, this shift displaces 
the cartesian belief that science "could achieve absolute 
and final certainty," and acknowledges the contingency, 
incompleteness, and approximation of scientific 
assertions (xiv). Thus, the scientist is not concerned 
with correspondent truth, in the sense of agreement 
between assertion and reality (signifier and signified), 
but with the utilization of "limited and approximate 
descriptions of reality" (xv). Likewise the theologian, 
turning from the "manualistic paradigm" with its emphasis 
upon its own formation as a comprehensive " , summa' or 
compendium," toward "a greater emphasis on mystery" which 
"acknowledges the limited and approximate nature of every 
theological statement," finds truth in the reality given 
"a certain true, but limited expression" by the statement 
(xv) • 
NOw, while 
Steindl-Rast is 
scientific and 
the discussion 
valuable in 
theological 
by Capra, Matus and 
its critique of the 
tendencies toward 
totalization, providing a forum for a more open 
discussion regarding pluralism, ecological and liberative 
concerns, Capra's tendency to regard reality as 
absolutely transcendent, along with the authors' 
simplistic blending of Buddhist and Christian mysticism 
(in which "on the deepest level there is no difference" 
between the teachings of Jesus and the Buddha [60]) gives 
rise to a metaphysical dichotomy in which reality is as 
unavailable to the scientist as the absolutely 
transcendent God is to humanity. The ineffable 
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transcendence which thus arises, rather than providing a 
site for dialogue between science and religion, or 
Buddhism and Christianity, eliminates the discrepancies 
between disciplines and philosophies (paradigms) by 
discounting the very qualities which make them unique. 
Again, the issue is dichotomy and its dissolution. 
Interdisciplinary and interfaith discussion should indeed 
serve to dispense with unnecessary quarrels, but it 
should also intensify distinctions, and above all, avoid 
the thought that the goal of discussion is an end of the 
dialogue ("It doesn't have to be like this," as Hawking 
and Floyd say). Is it not a dangerous proposition to 
allow an alleged plurality of belief under the conviction 
that all religions ultimately (at the deepest level) say 
the same thing (since what all religions say is usually a 
version of my religion)? It is for this reason, it seems 
to me, that Thomas Altizer is so definite in his belief 
in "the uniqueness of Christianity," for only by 
affirming the uniqueness of Christianity can one affirm 
the uniqueness of Buddhism, or any other system of 
belief, any other paradigm--and uniqueness does not 
presuppose superiority. Such uniqueness might have been 
preserved had the authors' considered the possibility of 
a kenotic theology, rather than one in which God remains 
an ultimately ineffable and static identity, that is, had 
the idea that "the dynamic process of salvation history 
is itself the great truth of God's self-manifestation" 
been thought more radically, understanding history itself 
as God's self-manifestation and not the "truth" of it 
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(xii). Even though the authors do refer to "reality as 
God's self-revelation," that is a reality which can be 
known only as an absolute mystery behind the observation 
of it. This is not to say that the efforts of the three 
authors are fundamentally flawed; it is to say however, 
that there are serious contradictions and areas of 
critical neglect. In the end, the efforts of Capra, 
Steindl-Rast and Matus serve as a warning against the 
danger of aiming at the dissolution of opposition, 
effecting a critique which might otherwise be quite 
valuable, but because of the illusion of the sufficient 
totality of the new paradigm, reconstructing a hierarchal 
bipolar metaphysical system which remains all too 
heavenly. It would be, perhaps, timely to re-examine some 
sources of the new paradigm of which the authors speak. 
"New Paradigm" thinking has its roots in the post-
Nietzschean hermeneutics of suspicion, an iconoclastic 
critical stance toward the very nature of truth and 
absolute criteria. That very iconoclasm arose at least as 
early as the time that, driven by the Scientific Method, 
the post-Enlightenment movement from God to Reason as an 
absolute criteria intensified a process of philosophical 
relativization which would· soon, in Nietzsche and in 
later scientific exploration, question the need for 
absolute criteria altogether. That process of 
relativization was nonetheless marked by shifting 
replacements of transcendental systems. As Carl Raschke 
suggests, this was the case in evolutionary theory, which 
found a way to "sanctify time" with the notion of 
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progress (80). without recourse to traditional teleology, 
Raschke asserts, evolutionary theory reversed the 
providential notions of Christianity, though eventually 
fostering its own teleological underpinning in the 
process (80). Evolutionary theory, or more specifically, 
the discoveries generated by the geological discovery of 
"deep-time," (simply, that the earth is a lot older than 
Christendom wanted to think), provided thinkers of the 
time opportunity to reconstruct their basic ideas of 
history, just as cosmology in the post-Einstinian world 
has had opportunity to do the same. Reconstructing 
history provides its editors the freedom to proclaim that 
things are not as they seem, or at least not as they had 
seemed. As readers, the audiences of the prophets of 
science, we have always been and remain hungry for 
cosmological theory and paleontological discourse which 
might provide us with the answers to the ultimate 
metaphysical "why" (as Heidegger put it, "Why are there 
things rather than nothing?") and there remain scientists 
who are confident that if they can read back far enough, 
whether reading the earth or the stars, we can reach the 
beginning. Reaching the beginning, we seem to think, will 
supply us with the shape of the end, and some meaning for 
the time in between. For some scientifically brilliant 
but theologically elementary thinkers, Stephen Hawking 
for instance, that means "knowing the mind of God," which 
is, of course, knowing the mind of the Author of the 
universe (175). Although the folly of the search for the 
mens auctoris has been recognized by some hermeneutical 
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enquiry for some time now, the reading of immanent space 
and spaces continues in the service of the quest for the 
meaning of transcendent time. Space and time, if modern 
physics is to be believed, are inseparable; in fact, they 
are the same thing, and perhaps no other pair of 
fundamental scientific concepts has undergone such 
radical change in the passing century. 
It was very early, around 1915 in fact, that the 
Newtonian conception of absolute space and time was 
challenged, and the idea which held "space and time" to 
be a "fixed arena in which events took place, but which 
Was not affected by what happened in it" gave way to the 
view that space and time were "dynamic qualities," so 
that "when a body moves, or a force acts, it affects 
the curvature of space and time--and in turn the 
structure of space-time affects the way in which bodies 
move and forces act" (Hawking 33)7. What has happened in 
a world in which space and time are no longer reliable as 
unchanging, static concepts is a new understanding of a 
universe which must have had a beginning a "finite time 
ago, and that might end at a finite time in the future" 
(Hawking 34). It was Einstein's general theory of 
relativity which implied all of this, as well as 
rethinking the idea of "absolute time," a rethinking 
which among other things leads to the assertion that time 
and space are not separate, but together form what is 
known as "space-time" (Hawking 23). Simply, if there is 
no space, there is no time. Therefore, before the 
beginning of the universe, if there was no space, there 
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was no time, ei ther. since the universe now takes up 
space-time, it is commonly understood to have begun with 
what is called a process of expansion. "According to 
present estimates," says David Layzer, "the cosmic 
expansion began between 10,000 and 15,000 million years 
ago," at which time the history of the universe began; 
there was no earlier moment in space-time (Layzer 135). 
Stephen Hawking is not quite so emphatic, as he reminds 
one of the argument that scientific laws are no longer 
valid in the vicinity of the big bang, where "the 
curvature of space time is infinite;" therefore, there 
may have been events before the big bang, but since such 
events "can have no consequences. they should not 
form a part of a scientific model of the universe," and 
we should assume "that time had a beginning at the big 
bang" (Hawking 46). Hawking further points out that "many 
people do not like the idea that time has a beginning, 
probably because it smacks of divine intervention," which 
is why, in 1951, the Catholic Church declared that the 
big bang agreed with the Biblical account (46-47). It is 
commonly accepted, however, that the idea that "the 
universe must have had a beginning in time" was proven in 
1970 by Hawking and Penrose, who, while utilizing 
Einstein's general theory of relativity, also proved that 
theory to be "incomplete" and unable to account for "how 
the universe started off, because it predicts that all 
physical theories, including itself, break down at the 
beginning of the universe" (Hawking 50-51). Indeed, 
Hawking offers the explanation that "it is possible for 
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space-time to be finite in extent and yet have no 
singularities that formed a boundary or edge" (135). 
Of course, the implications of "space-time" theory 
have required that the discourses of physics operate 
under a different understanding of time than most other 
discourses. Stephen Happel points out that in scientific 
theory the idea of linear time has been replaced with 
that of "'arrows' of time," required due to the fact that 
"all time is specific to the location of the observer," 
and because in the vast expanse of the universe "there 
can be no absolute simul tanei ty" (96). Of the several 
"arrows of time," one is of particular interest, and that 
is the arrow which relates to the human understanding of 
time, which most often revolves around the reference 
point of "now." As Happel explains: 
"Now" is a shifter in language; its ostensive 
content is determined by shadings into the past 
and anticipations of the future. But what is 
future "now" will become present. Scientists 
often prefer to think of this as ,a purely 
"subjecti ve" phenomenon, a reflection upon a 
relatively stable, spatially limited frame of 
reference in which signals will be heard or 
seen simultaneously, but are apprehended 
through sUbjective distension. There would be 
no now if there were no conscious beings to 
perceive it. Simultaneity appears as a 
concensus of those within a certain spatial 
continuum. (97) 
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Further, Happel states that Penrose has observed the 
human ordering of events to be "'something that we impose 
Upon our perceptions in order to make sense of them in 
relation to the relation of the uniform forward time-
progression of an external physical reality'" (98). 
Drawing from Hawking's treatment of the alleged 
continuity of linear time, Happel notes that it may be 
helpful to distinguish between "real" time and 
"imaginary" time, imaginary time being "indistinguishable 
from directions in space," and real time being "simply a 
figment of our imaginations," helpful insofar as it 
allows us to make sense of the world around us (98). This 
does not necessarily imply that one idea of time is to be 
favored over the other; the idea of real time is useful 
because we exist in and are affected by the processes of 
universal expansion, though it may be that the concept of 
imaginary time "is more basic than real time with its 
thermodynamic arrow," but within such imaginary time 
"past, present and future are functional equi valents" 
(98). 
The overarching importance of the traditional "real" 
understanding of time continues to be questioned, as time 
appears to be yet another metaphysical construct 
alongside God, the self, logos, presence, and a long list 
of other rational grounds the priority of which it has 
become so fashionable to investigate. Paul Davies has 
noted in his examination of the present understanding of 
laws of nature that the seemingly purposive sequence of 
events offered by some orthodox evolutionary theories may 
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not hold up among "particle physicists, cosmologists and 
unifiers, whose thinking is strongly influenced by the 
theory of relativity" (63). The "real" understanding of 
time is fundamental to such theories which give a 
rational narrative account of the history of the laws of 
nature as well as to the universe itself. As Davies 
explains, 
Central to the evolutionary theme is the 
dimension of time. The laws of nature, like the 
cosmos itself, are given a history. An arrow of 
time is built into the operation of physical 
laws. Time is thus singled out from spacetime 
and ascribed a metaphysical significance that 
it lacks in relativist theory, where space and 
time are on an equal footing and spacetime 
itself is part of the dynamical system. (63) 
Relativist theory then, entails a negation of the 
metaphysical transcendence of time itself, and a temporal 
understanding which is not so obviously linear as that 
which informs evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory, 
however, is not exclusively concerned with the linearity 
of time. The acknowledgement of the metaphorical 
character of temporal notions presented in stephen Jay 
Gould's geological considerations adds much to the 
historical meditations of physicists and cosmologists by 
considering "time's cycle" as well as the linearity of 
time, and by acknowledging the textuality of such 
considerations. 
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Even as Altizer writes theology outwith the 
sCholarly theological paradigm in order to preserve its 
dynamic, so Gould operates on the margins of academic 
science as he addresses the questions of historical 
novelty and dichotomy (which are ultimately questions of 
uniqueness) in his fascinating work, Time's Arrow. Time's 
,Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Deep Time. 
Gould's work, which is more philosophical literary-
cri tical text than scientific treatise, explicates the 
thematic tensions within the works of Thomas Burnet, 
James Hutton, and Charles Lyell, as well as critiquing 
the orthodox readings of the authors and their spheres of 
influence. Discussing the interplay of the metaphors of 
"time's arrow" and "time's cycle" in the development of 
modern geological understandings, Gould begins with an 
assessment of the value of sUbsuming historical 
understandings under such a dichotomy . ( 8 ) • Gould 
initiates this assessment with a brief discussion of 
dichotomy itself, in which, turning from his past 
practice of criticizing the drive toward dichotomy as a 
practice of gross oversimplification, he affirms the 
value of the utilization of multiple dichotomies in the 
discussion of a given subject (8-9). Rather than arguing 
for-the truth or falsehood of any given dichotomy, Gould 
suggests that dichotomies should be understood as "useful 
or misleading" ( 8-9) • It is this step away from the 
literalism of scientific theory which makes Gould's work 
here so intriguing. 
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Aside from the fact that geological/archaeological 
discussions were greatly influential in the changing of 
the intellectual climate of the past two centuries, 
Gould's choice of the apparently opposing ancient 
metaphors of linear and cyclic time relates his 
discussion to the whole of western thought. It is often 
thought, especially based upon a simple reading of works 
in which metaphors of time are contrasted (Eliade, Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Altizer come to mind), that the two 
metaphors are diametrically opposed. The contrast here, 
however, is primarily between two metaphors of historical 
time, and not a contrast between an anti-historical or 
ahistorical understanding and a historical understanding, 
as in the case of the aforementioned authors. However, 
the superimposition of the historical/ahistorical 
dichotomy upon the linear/cyclic dichotomy reveals 
degrees of variation within each polar element. 
It is no new task to attempt to embrace the 
linearity along with the cyclicity of history; it is as 
old as the play of night and day and the struggle between' 
transcendence and immanence. For Gould, this embrace 
entails a simultaneous espousal of the "uniqueness and 
lawfulness" of events, the arrow and the cycle of time 
(10). Gould's interpretation of the arrow/cycle dichotomy 
runs as follows: on the one hand, time's arrow denotes 
the irreversibility of historical events, in which "each 
moment occupies its own distinct position in a temporal 
series, and all moments, considered in proper sequence, 
tell a story of linked events moving in a direction;" on 
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the other, in time's cycle "time has no direction," and 
"fundamental states are imminent in time, always present 
and never changing," so that "apparent motions are parts 
of repeating cycles, and differences of the past will be 
realities of the future" (10-11). Gould's delineation of 
this dichotomy, as he acknowledges, is influenced by 
Eliade, but his reason for its use is to effect an 
intertextual critique and comparison of the works of 
three pivotal figures in the history of geology. 
The first, Anglican clergyman Thomas Burnet, 
combined the historical metaphors of arrow and cycle in 
his Sacred Theory of the Earth, published between 16BO 
and 1690, and most often read as a narrative "blending" 
of "earth's history" with a "literal reading" of the 
Biblical account of creation and providence (a circularly 
arranged linear narrative beginning and ending in divine 
immanence: a cycle of unique, historical events) (21-59). 
Gould, rather than dismissing Burnet's work as faulty 
science, suggests that Burnet's combination of science 
and religion was the result of a world-view which 
recognized no delineation between the two (27). As both a 
scientist and King William Ill's private chaplain, 
Burnet's arguments draw from the truths of both Nature 
and the Scriptures~ Burnet's theories grew out of a basic 
assumption that the Bible was "literally" true, and from 
that fact Burnet constructed a physics which would not 
conflict with the one foundational truth (27-2B). To 
criticize Burnet's methodology, Gould asserts, is 
pointless, and is further an exercise in the elitist 
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conviction that the arrow of progress assures present day 
scientists that the methodologies of our predecessors are 
"ever more inadequate the further back we go," an 
assertion which serves to hide the fact that it is our 
manner of reading which is itself inadequate (27). 
Approaching Burnet at such a level guarantees 
misunderstanding, and it is because of this 
misunderstanding that Burnet's work has not been read for 
its valuable dialectical understanding of the uniqueness 
(linearity) and repetition (cyclicity) of history (58). 
Despite its Biblical literalism, which prompted Burnet to 
assign a definite number to the unique repetitive cycles 
of history, Burnet's treatment of both the arrow and 
cycle of history "embodies a great intellectual insight," 
argues Gould, namely that "(h)istory grants absolute 
uniqueness in toto, although timeless principles may 
regulate parts and abstractions" (59). 
Gould's second subject, James Hutton, whose 
"unreadable treatise," Theory of the Earth (1795), "marks 
the conventional discovery of deep time in British 
geological thought" (61), exhibits a thorough ahistorical 
perspective, in which the earth is "a dynamic balance of 
opposing forces" with "no vestige of a beginning, no 
prospect of an end" (82:63). Hutton's geology was 
informed, says Gould, by a pure vision of the cyclicity 
of time, and carrying this vision to its logical 
conclusion, Hutton advocates a consistent denial of 
history ( 80). Hutton's writing on the "history" of the 
earth, states Gould, explicitly disallows the uniqueness 
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of historical events and avoids "all metaphors involving 
sequence and direction" (81). Hutton's earth, according 
to Gould, is " a machine without a history" (61). It is 
Hutton, however, who is credi ted by geology with the 
discovery of "deep time," but Hutton's ancient earth is 
an earth the "history" of which is comprised of Iia 
continuous backing and forthing, never a permanent 
alteration in any direction" (81). In Hutton's most 
recognizable phrase, the earth is a machine with "no 
vestige of a beginning,--no prospect of an end" (Gould 
65). An ancient earth is a simple logical deduction given 
such a system (66). However, Hutton's "discovery" of the 
vastness of geological time, in Gould's assessment, would 
have never reached the public were it not for the de-
emphasizing of his antihistoricism in John Playfair's 
Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory of the Earth; a 
revision made possible, Gould asserts, by the fact that 
no-one read Hutton closely enough to notice the change 
(61,95). History, says Gould, has therefore come to 
remember Hutton as a devoted empiricist, a scientist who 
based his work on geological observation. (67), while in 
fact the opposite is true; Hutton's dedication to an 
ahistorical vision required deep time because cycles and 
processes are not visible in the present (79). 
Finally, and most crucially, the momentous work of 
Charles Lyell, whom Michael Ruse notes as the most 
important intellectual influence upon Darwin (18), is 
presented by Gould as reflecting the processes by which 
Lyell's original cyclic view of history and of the steady 
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state of the earth was forced to deal with the linear 
progressive views of biological evolution (99-179). 
Whereas Hutton's consistent adherence to the abstract 
theory of the unchanging machinistic cycles of the 
earth's "history," earns him Gould's recognition as the 
"Theorist of Time's Cycle," Lyell's struggle to explicate 
both the timelessness of historical principles and the 
uniqueness of historical events, as well as the 
equilibrium of the earth's development against the 
progress of biological evolution, merits his designation 
by Gould as the· "Historian of Time's Cycle" (99). 
Although "textbook history," as Gould calls it, has 
paired Hutton and Lyell as champions of 
"uniformitarianism" (the view that past geological events 
were the result of causes acting with the same intensity 
as those in the present [Ruse 70]), the work of the two 
differs in theory, method, and indeed, in result. Like 
Hutton, Lyell was committed to a cyclic understanding of 
the events which shaped the earth, but while Lyell 
defended a "steady" notion of constant shift throughout 
the globe, "giving the earth a timeless steadiness 
throughout all its dynamic churning, " Hutton had 
preferred a more catastrophic sequence of periods of 
global upheaval (151). Further, Lyell was writing in a 
time which had seen a departure from the "tradi tion of 
general system-building" based upon "fatuous, overarching 
theories" which had held sway fifty years prior, in 
Hutton's day (152). Lyell had to deal as well with the 
emergence of biological evolutionary theory, the 
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progressive nature of which did not easily agree with a 
"steady state" history. The development of the various 
editions of Lyell's Principles of Geology, according to 
Gould, is therefore marked by a decreasing dedication to 
a uniform cyclical vision, a vision which had been 
coherently presented in the first three editions but 
which was gradually muted in the following six editions; 
the tenth edition, published following a thirteen-year 
period of reconsideration on Lyell's part, had become, 
Gould laments, "almost •.. a textbook" (150). But Lyell's 
Principles, taken in the corporate form including all its 
editions, is no ordinary textbook, says Gould, but a 
treatise "dedicated to defending (the cyclical) vision in 
the face of a geological record that requires close 
interpretation, not literal reading, to yield its 
support" (143). The fundamental problem, Gould points 
out, was that Lyell had not only attempted to apply 
time's cycle, acceptable in the description of "physical 
history, II to biological history, but had also excluded 
humankind from that biological history (167). 
originally, Lyell argued that paleontological 
evidence for evolutionary progression was mere negative 
evidence: the absence of mammalian fossils in Paleozoic 
strata was simply not evidence enough to preclude their 
existence--perhaps they had not been discovered yet 
(Gould 138). Further, Lyell explained apparent 
evolutionary progress as the result of climatic changes; 
there was no more an arrow of progress in biological 
species than there was in their surrounding environments, 
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and since the environment of the earth as a whole 
remained in a steady state, so living things have 
maintained "an unchanging complexity and diversity," 
absent of any sort of "improvement" (Gould 149). This did 
not apply, according to Lyell, to humans, however. 
Humanity's divine gift of reason set them apart from the 
normal course of things; the creation of humanity was 
indeed a "miraculous" event in an otherwise steady 
history, but this creation, according to Lyell, had to do 
not with physical, but moral nature (Gould 142). Lyell's 
Principles held to biological uniformitarianism and the 
separate nature of humans from its first publication in 
1831 until 1866, when Lyell's tenth edition conceded, as 
he had in a separate publication in 1862, that "progress 
in life's history was 'an indispensable hypothesis. 
(which) will never be overthrown'" (Gould 168). This 
concession came as a result of the fact that within those 
twenty years, no Paleozoic evidence of mammals or birds 
had been found despite increasing exploration, and based 
on other fossil evidence Lyell conceded also that "human 
origin had been an event in the ordinary course of 
nature" (Gould 168). 
Rather than criticize Lyell for 
steady state vision, Gould 
ability, which enabled him 
praises 
to allow 
compromising his 
his intellectual 
for progress in 
biology, while maintaining his dedication to "time's 
cycle" in terms of physical geology (169). This mutual 
acceptance of time's arrow and time's cycle continues to 
inform current scientific inquiry (196). In short, says 
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Gould, "uniqueness is the essence of history, but we also 
crave some underlying generality, some principles of 
order transcending the distinction of moments" (196). The 
dichotomy of time I s arrow and time's cycle, even though 
the two terms are mere "categories of our invention," 
tolerates individual aspects of both the biological and 
the physical components of the subject of scientific 
observation (196). In the narrative of earth's history, 
the two metaphors grant the ability to show that 
"organisms follow time's arrow of contingent history; 
minerals, time's cycle of immanent logic" (Gould 196). 
Hutton and Lyell were able to comprehend the immensity of 
time through the geological metaphor of time's cycle, but 
the individuality of biological history required "time's 
arrow" to "establish a criterion of uniqueness for each 
moment" (Gould 197). Applying these two criteria to the 
elements of fossil records, Gould states that "two world 
views, eternal metaphors, jockey for recognition wi thin 
every organism--recei ving special attention according to 
the aims and interests of students: homology and analogy; 
history and optimality; transformation and immanence" 
(199). With regard to each individual, the two metaphors, 
according to Gould, "do not blend, but dwell together in 
fruitful tension" (200). This interaction requires an 
interpretive approach which neither "seek(s) one in order 
to exclude the other" (as in Hutton's ahistorical vision 
and Lyell's early espousal of uniformitarianism at the 
expense of progress), nor "espouse (s) a form of wishy-
washy pluralism that. 
vision" (199). 
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.loses the essence of each 
The strength of Lyell's vision, then, lies in the 
fact that his later work allowed for the uniqueness of 
life while preserving the immanent principles which guide 
the formation of physical elements. Rocks and minerals 
are not living organisms, and living organisms are not 
merely physical elements, though composed of them, and 
therefore a more complete scientific vision requires 
metaphors which apply to both; an ahistorical vision of 
time's cycle, pursued at the exclusion of the arrow of 
progress, becomes a static system, and will not withstand 
the dynamic tension which life, 
The work of Hutton and Lyell, 
and history, requires. 
as portrayed by Gould, 
exemplifies this thesis, though only Lyell saw the need 
for the revision of his ahistorical system (his schema of 
eternal return). It is fitting then, that it should be 
Lyell to whom Ellen Ash, in Byatt's Possession, turns. 
Following her husband Randolph's death, Ellen finds 
and reads an unfinished letter from Randolph to 
Christabel LaMotte, in which he begs to know of the fate 
of their child, thinking Christabel and himself to be 
murderers. Ellen burns the letter and thinks to herself, 
"My life. • • has been built round a lie, a house to hold 
a lie" (457). Ellen, who has known of the affair, both 
through her own discovery and by confession from 
Randolph, has ignored the whole matter, not allowing it 
to affect the celibate and oppressive relationship she 
and Randolph share. Ellen, we are told, has thought 
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herself justified in her "charade" by the fact that she 
was "truthful with herself" --but about which charade she 
has been truthful, whether her own resistance to 
Randolph's physical advances, or her knowledge of his 
affair, or whether she regarded the two simply as 
elements in a larger charade, we are not told. Of course, 
Randolph is not told of Ellen's feelings regarding either 
situation, nor is Ellen informed of Randolph's opinion of 
their relationship, and Ellen finds herself wondering 
"how the story of their lives looked to him" (457). Here, 
too, her silence has reigned, for "it was not a matter 
they discussed II (458). Dwelling upon "her sense of the 
unspoken truths of things," Ellen turns her thoughts to a 
passage which she had previously written down, a passage 
from Lyell's Principles of Geology: 
It is the total distinctness, therefore, of 
crystalline formations such as granite, 
hornblendeschist, and the rest, from every 
substance of which the origin is familiar to 
us, that constitutes their claim to be regarded 
as the effects of causes now in action in the 
subterranean regions. They belong not to an 
order which has passed away: they are not the 
monuments of a primeval period, bearing upon 
them in obsolete characters the words and 
phrases of a dead language: but they teach us 
that part of the living language of nature, 
which we cannot learn by our daily intercourse 
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with what passes on the habitable surface. 
(458) 
The passage, likely from the ninth edition, published in 
1853 (Ellen's contemplations take place in 1889; she had 
read Principles in 1859, 
"studying," unbeknownst to 
while Randolph 
Ellen, with 
was away 
Christabel; 
Lyell's acceptance of biological progression had marked 
effect upon his tenth edition of Principles, published in 
1866), reflects Lyell's adherence to uniformitarianism 
within geological structure, while implying that the 
uniformitarian view, that past events are the "effects of 
causes now in action," may not hold up in consideration 
of other cases. That is, Lyell's claim that the 
"distinctness of crystalline formations. .from every 
substance of which the origin is familiar to us. 
constitutes their claim to be regarded as the effects of 
causes now in action," leaves open the idea of progress 
with regard to fossil records and biological 
considerations. Ellen, however, identifies with these 
inhabitants of the cyclical realm. She "liked the idea of 
these hard, crystalline things," which "were not primeval 
monuments but 'part of the living language of nature, "' 
and saw herself as "keep(ing) faith with the fire and the 
crystals" (Byatt £ 458). Ellen wants nothing of carved 
grani te monuments to passed 
the ahistoricality of the 
times, but identifies with 
crystalline "language of 
nature," in which time does not pass. Ellen believes in 
the "unspoken truths," identifying with a realm not of 
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this world and denying that "the habitable surface is 
all" (458). 
Sharing her sentiments, Ellen's reclusive 
counterpart, Blanche Glover, has claimed that it was her 
intent that she and Christabel should live "fully human 
lives. • in harmony with each other and Na ture. 
without recourse to the outside world, II and failing at 
this, joins together with "large volcanic stones" and 
departs to "a fairer world" (307). It was of course 
Blanche who delivered the word that Ellen's solitary 
system had failed, that indeed her life, like Blanche's, 
had been "a house to hold a lie." Upon returning 
Randolph's "Swammerdam" (which he had given to 
Christabel) to Ellen, Blanche mournfully recalls that she 
and Christabel had been "innocent" and "all in all to 
each other" (454). This sterile economy had been ruined 
by Christabel's involvement with Ash and the birth of the 
child: the progress of life subverting the ahistorical 
realm. Her own closed system fragmented, Blanche informs 
Ellen that her "happiness," too, "is ruined, is a lie," 
but Ellen preserves the propriety of her domestic realm, 
instructing Blanche, twice, "Please leave my house" 
(454)8. 
Al though Blanche had later reacted to her "failure 
of ideals" (307) by escaping life itself, life for Ellen, 
albeit a life of repression, had gone on, and the reality 
of Randolph's relationship is not spoken into existence 
until Randolph himself speaks it. Upon his confession, 
however, the concrete roles of the Ash household begin to 
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crumble. Randolph's confession comes as Ellen plays the 
dutiful scribe, copying his words verbatim as he dictates 
a new "Swammerdam." In order to hear his confession, 
however, at Randolph's request Ellen stops writing and 
plays the role of confessor--a confessor who hears of the 
sins of her god. Taking her new role a step farther, 
Ellen restores Randolph's original writing (Swammerdam) 
to him, and banishes his unfaithfulness to that non-
existent realm outside their closed domestic system. It 
does not exist, if not between the two of them: 
"I cannot explain Ellen, but I can tell you--" 
"No more. No more. We will not speak of it 
again." 
"You must be angry--distressed--" 
"I don' t know. Not angry. I don't want to 
know any more. Let us not talk of it again. 
Randolph--it is not between us." (455) 
Ellen had done, Byatt writes, "what was in her nature" 
(455), but her Nature is now being shaken to its 
foundations. Ellen's realm, as we have said before, is 
the realm of the language of Nature, of silence, of the 
unspoken, of the ahistoricality of the exclusive cycle, 
the proper household9 • This "Nature," like Blanche's, is 
the steady-state, cyclical realm of exclusive 
transcendence informed by a nostalgia for pure presence. 
The progress of life, of history, reveals its failure. 
For this reason the same drive to life represented by 
Christabel's child shatters both the exclusive dreams of 
Blanche and Ellen. Life, however, is not all that is 
denied by such systems: death, too, 
and finality, negates this vision 
Fountain 191 
in its historicity 
of eternal return. 
Informed by a vision of eternal return, Ellen has kept 
silence, preserving the non-relationship, maintaining the 
propriety of the household, and is reluctant to admit 
that her idol (Randolph) has passed on. The death of "her 
god," however, and the inadequacy and transgression of 
her system must be endured. Ellen does not choose to 
escape as Blanche does, but faces her crisis, living on 
in the face of the historicity of existence, surviving in 
the realization that her "all in all" exclusivity was 
less than complete. 
Left to wander the household, now absent of its 
divinity, Ellen had found Randolph's unfinished letter to 
Christabel while looking through his desk (455). "She had 
never read his letters," Byatt writes, and looking 
through his desk "filled her with a superstitious bodily 
fear" (455). Allowing herself now these transgressive, 
iconoclastic acts, Ellen, as it were entering her 
household's Holy of Holies, finds the unfinished letter 
"as if she had been guided to it" (455). In addition to 
this unfinished letter, Ellen was also in possession of 
two other letters which she had carried with her: a 
letter from Christabel to Ellen, in which Christabel 
wonders if Ellen knows of her, imagines that she does, 
and requests a response from Ellen--"of forgi veness, of 
pity, of anger"--and encloses a sealed letter to be given 
to Randolph. Ellen, faced with the decision whether or 
not to reply to Christabel, had written letters "in her 
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head," but unsurprisingly, "she wrote down nothing" 
(452). She had wanted to write and tell that she had 
"always known," that she had been told of the affair by 
Randolph long ago, but she did not, knowing that "it 
would not convey the truth of the way it had been, of the 
silence in the telling, the silences that extended before 
and after it, always the silences" (453). NOw, concerning 
'the other two letters, Ellen naturally reduces her 
husband's unfinished letter to Christabel, which 
testifies to the illegitimacy of her own relationship 
("That other woman was. • • his true wife" [460]), to ash 
(a geological element), "keeping faith with the fire and 
the crystals." Thus the letter's incompletion is taken to 
a final form and given closure which can be tolerated by 
the propriety of the household. In the light of the 
purifying flames of the pyre upon which she has 
sacrificed the unfinished letter, however, Ellen holds 
the sealed letter, which she will neither deliver nor 
read, but which she later consigns to the earth--if it is 
discovered, it will be discovered "when I am not here to 
see it," she decides. Ellen buries this letter, along 
with some other items, in a sealed specimen case in the 
grave along with Randolph's coffin, granting them "a sort 
of duration. a demi-eternity" (462). Following 
Randolph's demise and the deconstruction of her domestic 
system, Ellen finds herself oscillating between 
ahistoricality and historicity, between the ashes of the 
unfinished letter, her own mortality, her husband's 
infidelity, and her ability to grant "duration" to these 
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lifeless artifacts, these inanimate papers, these dead 
letters, which are now placed in a container designed for 
life-forms. Does she grant life to these inanimate, or 
once again, merely the appearance? As she lingers there 
by the fire, she also sits down to "manufacture the 
carefully edited. .truth of her journal," which she 
considered "a defense against, and a bait for, the 
gathering of ghouls and vultures" (462). As her husband's 
body is prepared, so Ellen prepares the corpus which will 
be read, a body which she attempts to render proper 
through her preparation. 
It is the preservation of the body proper with which 
Ellen has been concerned throughout the duration of her 
marriage. The primal image of that preservation visits 
Ellen following her recollection of the passage from 
Lyell, when, in her time of loss and remembrance, Ellen 
invokes the image of her honeymoon, the founding of her 
marital institution. This moment is recalled in Ellen's 
ahistorica1, non1inguistic manner: "She did not remember 
it in words," writes Byatt, n(t)here were no words 
attached to it, 
never spoken of 
precisely not 
that was part of the horror. She had 
it to anyone, not even to Randolph, 
to Randolph" (458). Following her 
recollection of the event, or rather non-event, she 
"turned over Christabel's letter" (459). The coincidence 
of her honeymoon and Christabel ' s letter ruptures her 
unspoken sphere, and "threatens to reveal her deception to 
the new members (relatives who had come at Randolph's 
death) of her household, the propriety and exclusivity of 
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which has now been irreversibly transgressed. Here, when 
the origin of her exclusive realm and its transgression 
coincide, when the wordless sterile image and the 
transgressive writing collide, Ellen finds herself, 
alone, and breaks her silence: 
She howled. "What shall I be without you?" She 
put her hand over her mouth. If they came, her 
time to reflect was gone or lost. She had lied 
to them too, to her sisters, implied a lie in 
her bashful assertions that they were supremely 
happy, that they simply had no good fortune 
with children ••• " (460). 
She is undiscovered, and continuing her reminiscence, 
Ellen recalls a time before her marriage, reading from 
one of Randolph's letters to her, a bundle of which she 
has placed in the specimen box. She reads of Randolph's 
prolific writing during the years of their imposed 
courtship; on the day described by Randolph in the 
letter, he has "composed over 70 lines," the subject of 
which has been the pyre of Balder (461). He finds the 
story "most violently interesting" and describes it as 
"an account of the human mind imagining and inventing a 
human story to account for the great and beautiful and 
terrible limiting facts of--existence" (461). "But," says 
Randolph, romantically and nostalgically, "I would rather 
be sitting in a certain garden," with Ellen, of course 
(461). Ellen reads no further, but concluding with this 
innocent, nostalgic image of a prenuptial garden (a time 
before the carnal "fall" of the honeymoon, a fall Ellen 
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has denied) prepares to perform three restorative acts, 
acts which should purify her husband's history, the story 
of which has now allegedly come to an end. Ellen seals 
the box, contemplates the edited writing she will prepare 
for posterity, and considers writing a letter to 
Christabel, but hesitates, as the power of her many years 
of dwelling in the realm of the unspoken takes hold. 
Ellen knows, however, that her efforts at maintaining 
propriety are doomed to failure, and she is faced with 
the reality that both she and Christabel, who remain 
without Randolph, exist in a world of history, of 
progress: 
She thought, one day, not now, not yet, I will 
put pen to paper and write to her, and tell 
her, tell her, what? 
Tell her he died peacefully. 
Tell her? 
And the crystalline forms, the granite, the 
hornblendeschist, shone darkly with the idea 
that she would not write. • • .The other woman 
might die, she herself might die, they were 
both old and progressing toward it. (462 
emphasis mine) 
Here the cyclicity of the geological and the progression 
of the biological collide, and while Ellen settles upon 
her decision to remain silent, Byatt turns toward the 
future, toward the actions Ellen will take in the 
morning, when "she would pick up the black box. .and 
set out on his last blind journey" (462). It is hardly 
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certain, however, that Ellen means to abolish the truth 
of the contents of the box; as Leonora stern notes a 
century later, "Why did she leave it to be found, if she 
didn't entertain the thought of it? Why wasn't it clasped 
to her bosom--or his?" (498). Ellen's actions are 
duplicitous; she abolishes and preserves. By "burying the 
evidence," Ellen, as she wishes, grants the contents of 
the specimen box "a sort of duration," for Christabel's 
sealed letter will not remain sealed, not even when 
sealed by the tomb10 • 
When the tomb is broken and the word is delivered, 
all because, in Maud Bailey's own words, "we need the end 
of the story" (498), Christabel's writing lives again in 
the voice of her descendent, in the midst of "that 
strange gathering of seekers and hunters" (499). There, 
among those gathered for the sake of the truth, perhaps 
to preserve the past, perhaps to obtain some relic, the 
words of Christabel to her beloved are heard, and she 
speaks of the transgressed unity, of the manner in which 
the circle is broken for the sake of the future: 
Do you remember how I wrote to you of the 
riddle of the egg? As an eidolon of my solitude 
and self-possession which you threatened 
whether you would or no? And destroyed, my 
dear, meaning me nothing but good, I do believe 
and know. I wonder--if I had kept to my closed 
castle, behind my motte-and-bailey defenses--
should I have been a great poet--as you are? 
.These things are all mixed and mingled--
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and we loved each other--for each other--only 
it was in the end for Maia •••• (502) 
There is no simple self-reflexive love here--"for each 
other" but "for Maia," for the not yet. The cycle of 
reflection and simple return overflows for the sake of 
the future: no simple union of opposites, no "wishy-washy 
plurality," but the ever-emptying negation of self-
presence. As the love of Christabel and Randolph "for 
each other," is remembered as having existed for the sake 
of another, and does not remain there between the two, so 
also, the actions of Ellen are recalled: 
Maud said, "You know Ellen. Why do you 
think she just put it in the box--with her own 
love letters--" ••• 
Beatrice said, 
"She didn't khow what to do, perhaps. She 
couldn't just give it to him, and she didn't 
read it--I can imagine that--she just put it 
away--" 
"For Maud," said Blackadder. "As it turns 
. out. She preserved it, for Maud." 
Ellen's abolition/preservation for Maud allows Maud, who 
like Ellen, it must be remembered, wants nothing more 
than the self-sameness of "an empty room, white" to read 
her own existence in a new light, calling her self-
subsistence into question. Maud identifies with 
Christabel's "unbroken egg," a pure presence which, like 
the closed identities of Blanche and Ellen, is 
transgressed. "I know how she felt about her unbroken 
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egg, II says Maud, "her self-possession, her autonomy;" 
Maud is reminded of these by the reading of Christabel's 
letter, and yet her self-autonomy is challenged by her 
relationship with Roland, which has by now firmly rooted 
itself. 
Her situation, caught between autonomy, pure self-
presence, and the loss of that self-sufficiency is for 
Maud, as it was for Ellen, and also for Christabel, an 
uncanny and uncomfortable one. The quest which has 
granted her "the truth of her own origins" and "the end 
of the story" has also produced the loss of her autonomy, 
as she is inextricably bound in a web of relationships 
beyond her control. Maud despairs at the irreversibility 
of her ancestry and also the retrospective 
predetermination of her quest and her simultaneously 
developing relationship with Roland. Reflecting upon her 
newfound origin and future, Maud protests, "I don't quite 
like it. There's something unnaturally determined about 
it all" (505). Maud finds herself faced with an 
indi viduali ty and uniqueness, granted by a negation of 
her nostalgia for pure presence, her desire for 
ahistoricali ty, which appears to her, at her point of 
epiphany, tied to a "predestined" history. 
The predestination of her past, however, is the very 
predestination which grants her sal vation, an identity 
and a future. This same "predestination" was experienced 
by Ellen, who finds Randolph's unfinished letter "as if 
she had been guided to it" (Byatt 455). Maud's embrace of 
that predestination, like Ellen's, transforms the 
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"fragment," the "riddle" of all her "it was" with a 
liberative "thus I willed it" (Altizer GA 142; see 
chapter 3). Ending the ahistorical eternal return of pure 
presence by embracing a predestined historicity is 
Nietzsche's vision of eternal recurrence, which, as 
discussed in chapter one, is the "absolute willing of all 
that occurs" (GOG 122) • Historicity does not absolutely 
negate cyclicity itself, but the exclusivity of either 
element in the dichotomy results in a false economy. As 
Lyell, Gould, and so many others discussed here 
understood, two dichotomous metaphors interact in a 
dynamic dialectic, and the repression of one cannot be 
maintained, but results in its irruption into the realm 
of its prohibition, or in the uncanny presence of its 
absence within the discourse which marks its effacement. 
The line requires the circle, but neither exclusively; it 
is for this· reason that Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, 
though resembling eternal return, is, as we have noted, 
actually its very negation. 
"Despite the fact that their purely circular forms 
so fully coincide, says Altizer, Nietzsche's vision of 
eternal recurrence is the negation of eternal return, 
insomuch as eternal return is "a flight from history" (,GA 
138), and "predestination and eternal recurrence are a 
transfiguration of the horror of existence" (142). Both 
predestination and eternal recurrence are, according to 
Altizer, circular, 
• a circle in which the center is 
everywhere, but as opposed to a circle of 
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eternal return, this is a circle of becoming, 
and only of becoming, a totally immanent 
becoming which is the consequence of the death 
of God. (GA 144) 
Thus a willing of eternal recurrence is a willing of the 
death of God, a death which, in Altizer's interpretation 
of Nietzsche, is thereby a universalized immanence and a 
universal, transfiguring grace, a "freedom from history," 
enacted by the very willing of history itself. Eternal 
recurrence, the embrace of history, by which the 
individual is "freed from history," is a dichotomy of the 
circularity of eternal recurrence and the linearity of 
unique, historical events. 
This same recurrence is evident in Byatt's 
"conclusion." The end of the story of Possession, 
actually a post-script, occurring after the conclusion, 
rewrites the entire narrative, and the reader finds 
herself faced with a script which eternally recurs, 
endlessly subverting its own conclusions. The narrative 
of Possession, like the narrative of history, turns out 
to be both a circular and linear narrative, each 
conclusion transforming its own sterility, providing a 
freedom from the letter in a transfiguring grace. 
The "end of the story" and the "truth of the 
origin"? Yes and no. "There is no guarantee," as 
Blackadder cautions Maud, "that that is what we shall 
find" (498). "But," as Maud retorts, "we must look" 
(498). Breaching the realm of pure presence, 
transgressing the transcendent, enacting the coincidence 
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of opposites, these can only be effected by those who, 
like Ellen Ash and Maud Bailey, even as Nietzsche and 
Lyell and others here discussed, are not afraid to look, 
and live. Such looking, and living, is a reading, and 
writing, which is an enactment of the death of God, and 
which brings us face to face with the truth that 
Christabel saw, granting Randolph the story of his child, 
a story which, though it was never delivered to Randolph, 
opened up a future for its readers, a future which 
springs forth from the tension between the origin and the 
ending, a future informed by the conviction that "all 
History is hard facts--and something else • •• " (499). 
While the paradigm of evolution wholly 
dominates our cosmological and biological 
thinking, and does so even when evolution is 
conceived of as being wholly contingent and 
fortuitous, the very possibility of a human as 
opposed to a material evolution is now banished 
from our historical and cultural thinking 
.Yet with the loss of ••• a nonnatural or 
noncyclical evolution, has come the inevitable 
loss of a specifically or uniquely human 
identi ty , and most particularly so insofar as 
that identi ty is seen and known to be 
everywhere the same. .Uniqueness, as 
opposed to natural particularity, then vanishes 
in all its forms, and human meanings and 
identities can never then transcend the 
boundaries of the natural cycle. Consciousness 
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can then be itself only by being everywhere the 
same. .thus there becomes no possibility 
whatsoever of transcending nihilism, unless 
nihilism is thought through to its very 
reversal. (Altizer, HAA 8-9) 
NOTES 
1 This is a view also held by Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
who, in his Systematic Theology, affirms that reality "is 
first and foremost a historical reality;" Ted Peters 
explains Pannenberg's insistence that "even if the laws 
of classical dynamics are reversible, the actual course 
of natural events from which those laws have been 
extracted are not" (pannenberg, Toward a Theology of 
Nature 10). Like Altizer, Pannenberg insists upon the 
temporal uniqueness of events, and while Pannenberg's 
conception of the trinitarian God is of a radically 
different sort than Altizer's, the historical 
understandings of the two, in which, in Pannenberg's 
words "the act of creation did not take place only in the 
beginning. • • it occurs at every moment," and in which 
that recurrent creation is understood as the very mode 
existence of a God who is "not yet," have much in common 
(Toward a Theology of Nature 34). 
2 Perhaps it might then be more correct to amend 
Altizer's point and say that the human experience of that 
"actuality" is understood as irreversible, and fabricated 
as well. The possibility that the irreversibility of the 
human experience of time might open up new dialogues 
between science and the human sciences is a notion that 
has been entertained from time to time, by Ilya 
Prigogine, for instance, whose challenging 1984 essay 
concludes with the hopeful suggestion that "we are 
approaching a point where the rediscovery of time will 
lead not only to a better understanding of the mechanisms 
of change, which we encounter at all levels of the 
universe we observe," but more importantly, "to a better 
embedding of human beings in the universe from which we 
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have emerged" (446). Prigogine suggests a temporal vision 
founded upon a conception of time as "a construction in 
which we all participate," arising out of an attempt to 
'relate human history to the natural processes described 
by natural science as reversible and deterministic' (433, 
446). A more useful contemporary scientific vision of 
time, rather than envisioning humanity at the hands' of a 
deterministic world, must, according to Prigogine, 
incorporate the characteristics of "irreversibility, 
evolution and creativity" (445). 
3In fact, an enquiry into the historical occurrence, 
or not, of the "full embodiment of the death of God" as 
the fullness of presence in history is doomed to failure, 
as is the search for the historicity of the primordial 
originary moment. Such an enquiry resembles a 
misappropriation of the bipolar functions of a societal 
mythic imaginaire of which Paul Ricoeur has written 
(Kearney 64). In the case of Altizer's considerations, 
the "society" in question includes the whole history of 
Western thought, but Ricoeur's ideas are still 
significant, perhaps even more so because of the vast 
expanse of Altizer's historical considerations. Altizer 
considers not just the history of a culture, or even the 
history of known philosophical discourse, but history 
itself. Of course, such a perspective is necessarily 
culture-bound, but Altizer rightly sees no other 
alternative; cultural, or historical, dichotomies such as 
origin and telos cannot be dissol ved, but they may be 
decentered. According to Paul Ricoeur, there is an 
inherent decentering dynamic in the interaction of 
foundational and teleological discourse, dissolution of 
which results in stasis, as Altizer is so adamant to 
demonstrate in his critique of eternal return. 
In Lectures in Ideology and utopia, Ricoeur reckons 
that an "ensemble of symbolic discourses," a "socio-
political imaginaire," is possessed by all societies 
(Kearney 64). Positively or negatively, this imaginaire 
serves to preserve the community's "sense of identity," 
and to criticize when necessary the current state of 
affairs "out of fidelity to an elsewhere" (Kearney 65). 
This dialectic of preservation and criticism is known as 
"reaffirmation" and "rupture," and carries with it the 
potential, when misinterpreted, for oppressive stasis 
(Kearney 64-65). As Ricoeur explains, on the preservatory 
side, 
• • • the imaginaire operates as an "ideology" 
which can positively repeat the founding 
discourse of a society--what I call its 
"foundational symbols--thus preserving its 
sense of identi ty • • The danger is, of 
course, that this reaffirmation can be 
perverted. • into a mystificatory discourse 
which serves to uncritically vindicate the 
established political powers. (Kearney 65) 
On the other hand, describing the critical function of 
the imaginaire, Ricoeur observes that 
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Over against this, there exists the imaginaire 
of rupture, a discourse of "utopia" which 
remains critical of the powers that be out of 
fideli ty to an "elsewhere," to a society that 
is not-yet. But this utopian discourse is not 
always positive either. For besides the 
authentic utopia of critical rupture there can 
also exist a dangerously schizophrenic utopian 
discourse which projects a static future 
wi thout ever producing the conditions of its 
realisation •••• (Kearney 65) 
"In short," says Ricoeur, "ideology as a symbolic 
confirmation of the past, and utopia as a symbolic 
opening towards the future, are complementary; if cut off 
from each other, they can lead to forms of political 
pathology" (Kearney 65). Ricoeur sees the nucleic myth of 
a society functioning both as a "symbolic confirmation of 
the past," and as a "symbolic opening towards the future" 
(Kearney 65). When one element is forgotten, and survived 
only by its ambiguous but zealously affirmed opposite, or 
on the other hand, when the mythic function of origin or 
goal is replaced by a fixed historicity (a past "golden 
age" or a "messianic future"), the result may well be a 
static nostalgia which ignores the realities of the 
present (Kearney 65). Interestingly enough, driven by a 
nostalgia for pure presence, whether the pure presence of 
origin or the re-presentation of that presence in telos 
(the fundamental of eternal return), the negative 
"historicizing" of the mythic symbols of past and future 
ignores the very possibility of historicality itself. 
4 Nietzsche's idea of the historian's backward 
belief in the search for origins might be translated into 
Ricoeur's terms as "negative reaffirmation," and 
Nietzsche's own "formula for happiness": the straight 
line, the goal might be thought of as, again in Ricoeur's 
terms, "positive rupture." 
5 I have in mind here Derrida' s delightful essay, 
"White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," 
and his allusion to Nietzsche's "On Truth and Falsity in 
Their Ultramoral Sense" (Derrida 217). 
6 Carl Raschke clarifies Kuhn's position, noting 
that in Kuhn's writings, "paradigm" designated only "the 
gist of scientific deliberations:" as the term "paradigm 
shift" has come to be understood in reference to "the 
greater intellectual reversals" which affect both 
practical methodology and formal reflection, it has more 
in common with Gerald Holton's "themata," or Michel 
Foucault's "episteme" (Raschke 70). 
7 Milic Capek is not so certain as Hawking: Capek 
suggests that the absolutist notion of time as 
"completely independent of concrete physical events" was 
in the first instance "so elusi ve and so completely 
foreign to sensory experience that it took centuries to 
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be fully grasped" (608). Newton, however, so fully 
ingrained the notion into tradition that it took a full-
fledged "revolution" (relativism) to revise it, and even 
now the question of whether a unity of time underlying 
locally discordant temporal events may be preserved even 
in relativity remains open (608). 
8 "The ideal of happiness has always taken 
material form in the house," writes simone de Beauvoir in 
her classic The Second Sex, "whether cottage or castle, 
it stands for permanence and separation from the world" 
(467). Further 
within its walls the family is established as a 
discrete cell or unit group and maintains its 
identity as generations come and go; the past, 
preserved in the form of furni ture and 
ancestral portraits, gives promise of a secure 
future; in the garden the seasons register 
their reassuring cycle in the growth of edible 
vegetables. • .neither time nor space fly off 
at a tangent, they recur in appointed cycles. 
In every civilization based on landed property 
an ample literature sings the poetry of hearth 
and home •••• 
The home becomes centre of the world and 
even its only reality; "a kind of counter-
universe or universe in opposition" 
(Bauchelard)i refuge retreat, grotto, womb, it 
gives shelter from outside dangers; it is this 
confused outer world that becomes unreal •••• 
Reality is concentrated inside the house, while 
outer space seems to collapse. (467-69) 
9 This theme, of the cycle of exclusivity within the 
household, is further developed, with a strong influence 
from biology, in Byatt's Morpho Eugenia, within Angels 
and Insects. 
10 In his consideration of Derrida, Taylor connects 
"tomb, II as Derrida does in Margins of Philosophy, with 
the silence of the "a" of differance, nsilent and 
discreet as a tomb: oikesis" (Altarity 263). continuing 
the citation from Derrida: 
And thereby let us anticipate the delineation 
of a site, the familial residence of the tomb 
proper in which is produced, by differance, the 
economy of death. This stone--provided that one 
knows how to decipher its inscription--is not 
far from announcing the death of the tyrant. 
(263) 
Taylor further supplies the translation note from 
Margins, which reads: "Tomb in Greek is oikesis, which is 
akin to the Greek oikos--house--from which the word 
economy derives. • • .Thus Derrida speaks of the 'economy 
of death' as the 'familial residence and tomb of the 
proper'" (263). Elsewhere, "tomb," is related to 
"tomb(er)" to fall (292-96). 
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Chapter Five 
(Un)masking Theology: The End of Conclusion 
Beginning is anonymous, hence by necessity it 
is the province of myth and rite, the domain of 
the mask in all its numerable forms, and the 
primal if elusive motif of epic traditions 
throughout the world. (Altizer, HAA 17) 
Over his desk the Ii ttle print of the 
photograph of Randolph Ash's death mask was 
ambiguous. You could read it either way; as 
though you were looking into a hollow mould, as 
though the planes of the cheeks and forehead, 
the blank eyes and the broad brow were sculpted 
and looking out. You were inside--behind those 
closed eyes like an actor, masked: you were 
outside, looking at closure, if not finality 
•• (Roland) touched the letters, which Ash 
had touched, over which Ash's hand had moved, 
urgent and tentative, reforming and rejecting 
his own words. He looked at the still fiery 
traces of the poem. 
He had been taught that 
essentially inadequate, that it 
language was 
could never 
speak what was there, that it only spoke 
itself. 
He thought about the death mask. He could 
and could not say that the mask and the man 
were dead. What had happened to him was that 
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the ways in which it could be said had become 
more interesting than the idea that it could 
not. (Byatt, Possession 473) 
Altizer's critique of institutional Christianity's 
idea of the transcendent God relies on an underlying 
confidence that the image of God thereby portrayed is a 
false one, and not only the image of God, but also the 
image of history, and theology. That is, Altizer's 
critique involves the replacement of an eternal, self-
sufficient God of Christendom with the self-negating 
apocalyptic God, the replacement of an ahistorical cycle 
of eternal return with the notion of historicity and 
actuali ty , and the understanding of theology, and 
Christianity as a dynamic, historically-evolving, even 
self-negating exercise. Altizer's critique might 
certainly be thought of as the unmasking of God, history 
and theology, of which the true image has been obscured 
by the mask of eternal return. This might be enough, if 
the point were not that there is no transcendent realityl 
behind the mask, for the mask is all. 
If theology may be understood as a "mask of God," it 
would not be inappropriate to describe theology following 
the death of God as God's death mask. The death of God, 
however, has made such an impression upon contemporary 
theology as to be understood, at least by some, not as 
the closure and end of the idea of God, but also as its 
genesis, as a dramatic event the enactment of which 
theology, and history itself, effects. This duality is 
illustrated in the above passage from A.S. Byatt's novel, 
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Possession, in which the unlikely iconoclast Roland 
Michell ponders a photograph of the death mask of 
Randolph Henry Ash. Roland's dedication to the study of 
Ash's life and writings has, as noted before, led to his 
discovery of a fragment of correspondence between Ash and 
Christabel LaMotte which not only transforms that 
dedication into possession, but also destroys the fixed 
images of both Ash and LaMotte held by Roland and the 
academic world. Roland, it will be recalled, has stumbled 
upon a textual fragment while following a twofold path 
toward a simultaneous beginning and end. On the one hand, 
Roland was looking for undiscovered sources, for 
beginnings. That is, he was examining Randolph Ash's 
personal copy of Vico's principj di Scienza Nuova 2 , 
scanning the marginalia for the origins of Ash's "Garden 
of Proserpina." This primary original quest becomes the 
very act which brings about the "unmasking" of Ash's 
hidden relations, the ending of 
image of Ash. In the above scene, 
the mythic academic 
gazing upon the death 
mask from without, Roland faces the absolute finality, 
the absolute completion, of Ash. The death mask is an 
absolutely true image, Ash's movements being absolutely 
fixed and his life absolutely completed, but in that same 
way the death mask is the absolute negation of what Ash 
was, indeed, what Ash is. The trueness of the 
representation depends absolutely upon the death of the 
subject, and this oxymoronic "still life" portrays the 
presence of the absence of the author. Gazing from within 
the death mask, Roland becomes Ash, as indeed his reading 
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and rewriting of Ash's work has kept Ash alive. Ash's 
presence is transferred to Roland, but this is a presence 
wholly dependent upon the absolute absence, the absolute 
negation of the (A) (a)uthor. Like the body of God in the 
eucharist, the presence of the representation of Ash 
entails both death and life, negating itself to become 
itself. Eucharistically, the idea of the coincidence of 
the death and life of the body of God is nothing new, and 
the ambiguity and oscillation of theological language 
regarding the death and genesis of God enacted therein is 
necessary for its efficacy as a liturgical event. As we 
have seen, the ambiguity of the language of "the death of 
God" within the past century has given the philosophical 
and theological enactment of the death of God a 
eucharistic flavor. This is an ambiguity not easily 
tolerated by the system of scholastic and institutional 
"theology, II and therefore its preservation finds those 
who do such theology often operating outwith such a 
system, or operating within while drawing from without. 
"He could and could not say that the mask and the 
man were dead:" as it faced Roland in the 
presence/absence of the death mask, a choice faces those 
upon the odyssey that is contemporary Christian theology, 
between the Scylla of "Christian fundamentalism," and the 
Charybdis of what would seem to amount to "no Christian 
faith or praxis whatsoever" (Altizer, "Is the Negation of 
Christiantiy the Way' to Its Renewal?" 10). That is the 
situation as Altizer sees it, asserting that 
Christianity, faced with survival in "a purely atheistic 
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world," may either deny that reality and retrench into 
exlusivity or affirm itself as a "historically evolving" 
religion (12). Al though much "postmodern theology" has 
been written from this standpoint, as witness the whole 
of Mark C. Taylor's a/theological writing, the 
appropriation of Biblical modes of "prophetic critique" 
by liberative theologies3 demonstrate that this is no new 
situation for Christianity. So says Altizer as well, who 
views "historical evolution" as Christianity's "deepest 
ground" (12). Christianity originated within a purely 
atheistic world, says Al tizer, a world in which 
Christiani ty was confronted with the choice of refusing 
the reality of the anti-Christian world (12). Ironically, 
that same atheistic reality was to be the future of 
Christianity itself, as Christianity was the future of 
that world; in the same manner, then, suggests Altizer, 
the atheism of the contemporary world may very well be 
the future of Christianity (14). There is no more 
important theological concept than an understanding of 
the "full and genuine continuity" between the ancient 
ending enacted upon the ancient world by the apocalyptic 
movement of original Christianity, and the modern ending 
of the modern world (11). 
The choice facing Christianity in the present world, 
according to Altizer, is a choice between eternal return 
and its reversal, an historical evolution repeating the 
situation of "the new world of Christianity," a new world 
which, in its ending of an old world, precludes the 
possibility of a way of return ("INCWR?" 15). Death of 
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God theology, says Altizer, is one of several schools of 
thought which sees orthodox Christianity as a reversal of 
original Christiani ty if only in its denial of 
historical evolution. The insistence upon the character 
of historical evolution wi thin biblical scholarship in 
the twentieth century, an insistence shared by Death of 
God theology, evoked modern fundamentalism, which, 
according to Altizer, is "just as modern," as modern 
atheism, and "just as distant from the Bible as are its 
most modernistic counterparts" (16). The attempt of Death 
of God theology, and its theological contemporaries, to 
"recover the lost world of the Bible" served to 
demonstrate, says Altizer, "how lost that world has 
become," insomuch as the Biblical recovery which was 
sought could only take place through "a real and full 
disintegration of everything that is manifest as a 
Christian world" (16). The inevi tabili ty of that 
disintegration, the foundations of which lay in the 
writings of Kierkegaard and the early writings of Barth, 
opened the way toward a delineation of the opposition 
between the self-sufficient God of Christendom and the 
Word of God: 
.now revelation or the Word is the full and 
actual negation and reversal of its 
manifestations in the Christian world, and only 
the real and actual negation of that Christian 
world can make possible an openness to the Word 
of God. Paradoxically, it is the death of God 
that alone makes possible the full revelation 
Fountain 212 
of God, for the Word of God is the very 
opposi te of the Christian God, and most 
manifestly so the very opposite of that God who 
is the center and ground of the modern 
Christian world. ("Is the Negation of 
Christianity the Way to Its Renewal?" 16) 
The possibility of Christianity today, says Altizer, 
arises from the possibility "that the very negation and 
reversal of a dominant and manifest Christian identity is 
the way to a recovery and renewal of Christianity," a 
possibility which has been advocated and enacted by Death 
of God theology (16). If only in its proclamation of this 
possibility, Death of God theology remains theologically 
and culturally relevant today, and reveals its 
fundamental importance for new theological thinking. 
The question, "Can Christianity actually negate 
itself so as to truly transcend itself?" is a question 
Altizer continues to ask, even now following the passing 
of the popularity of death of God theology (GOG 43). If 
Christianity is grounded in a full and genuine 
understanding of the death of God, as Altizer maintains, 
"it can pass into or even realize a universal historical 
movement," but if it is not, it remains "inevitably 
destined to be a sectarian or historically isolated 
faith" (~ 46-47). The delineation which Altizer draws 
between a forward-moving Christiani ty and orthodox 
Christendom relies upon a delineation between the 
"apocalyptic God" and the God of Christendom, a god "far 
more purely transcendent" than the God of Israel, and 
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more "transcendent and majestic" than the God of the New 
Testament (GOG 171). The primary difference, however, 
between the apocalyptic, self-emptying God of which 
Altizer writes and the God of Christendom is the latter's 
lack of "that very movement of actualization which is so 
primary in prophetic Israel, a movement which is totally 
realized in an original Christian apocalypticism" (GOG 
171). That realization is a realization of the "absolute 
triumph of the Kingdom of God," the Kingdom of God which 
is the immanent Word of God, enacting a radical and 
universal grace: the reversal of this understanding, 
progressively enacted by the Christian Church, resulted 
in an understanding of the "absolute transcendence of 
God," a God of glory alone, manifest as "an absolutely 
unmoving and inactual or passive transcendence" (171). A 
contemporary reversal and negation of the God of 
Christendom entails an understanding of the "triumph of 
the Kingdom of God" and the Word of God as God's self-
enactment, even as the enactment of an original 
Christianity was also an apocalyptic movement. 
Such an apocalyptic movement is also demonstrated in 
Mark C. Taylor's 
groundbreaking work 
previously mentioned 
which Altizer calls 
Erring, a 
"apocalyptic 
theology with a vengeance, II and in which, again according 
to Altizer, "Taylor seeks a genuinely Christian theology, 
centered in Incarnation and Crucifixion" ("The Triumph of 
the Theology of the Word, " in Wyschogrod et aI, "On 
Deconstructing Theology," 528, 525: hereafter "TTOW"). 
However, Altizer goes further (admitting more of the work 
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than Taylor himself would), and claims that 
also "in quest of a purely Biblical or 
Erring is 
scriptural 
writing," seeking "a pure revelation of Word which can 
only be a total erasure of word" (525). Further, while 
condoning Taylor's subversive method, Altizer criticizes 
Taylor's tendency to ignore the actuality of texts in 
favor of a "pure or disembodied thinking," the "trace" 
which dissolves all actual presence ("TTOW" 525). 
However, Altizer does point out that, following 
Scharlemann, Taylor understands "the crucified God" as 
"eternally and kenotically embodied in word," so that 
"God is what word means, and word is what God means" 
("TTOW" 527). Thus Taylor"understands "the divine itself 
as wr i ting" 
"inscribing 
signified" 
Altizer's 
and writing as enacting the death of God, 
the disappearance of the transcendental 
(527). Surely this is not 
distinction between the 
so far away from 
unmoving, self-
sufficient God of Christendom and the God who is 
incarnate in the Word and the Kingdom. The important 
distinction here, however, as noted previously, and as 
Taylor points out in his response to Altizer, is that for 
Altizer the death of God implies the "total presence" of 
the parousia, the Kingdom, or the word, while for Taylor 
the death of God entails its deferral and total absence 
(Taylor, "Masking:Oomino Effect," in Wyshogrod et aI, 
551: hereafter "MOE"). However, if the apocalyptic moment 
is the deferral of apocalypse, or if, in Altizer's terms, 
total presence is known apocalyptically, in its passing, 
in its absence, there is finally no disagreement between 
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Altizer's "total presence" and Taylor's deferral of 
presence, or at least there is a dynamic oscillation 
found in both. Denying the dissolution of dichotomy, 
Taylor's theology, like Altizer's, "errs" in that space 
between presence and absence. "The time and space of 
erring," says Taylor, are opened by a fourfold "domino 
effect" comprised of "Hegel's acknowledgement of the 
death of God," "Kierkegaard's claim that Christendom is 
at its end," "Nietzsche's announcement of Dionysus (whose 
other name is the Anti-Christ or Bacchus)," and 
"Derrida's recognition of the closure of the book" ("MDE" 
555). "In erring," Taylor asserts, "I am doing nothing 
other than struggling to think the domino effect of 
masking by thinking the unthinkable oscillation of 
alterity and the impossible alterity of oscillation" 
("MDE" 555). Such oscillation is not dissolution; 
. 
oscillation, marks Taylor, "deri ves from the Latin word 
oscillum, which means a swing and originally referred to 
a mask of Bacchus that hung from a tree in a vineyard to 
sway in the wind" (555). Taylor's Erring is indeed a 
series of unmaskings: unmasking the self to find God, 
unmaSking God to find presence, and on and on, even as 
Altizer's iconoclastic writings unmask the God of 
Christendom; but the process of unmasking is unending, as 
mask upon mask is revealed. Masks form the recurring 
theme of Taylor's response to the criticisms of his 
Erring, a response which begins with a quotation, 
unci ted, from Bataille: 
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"You know quite well," I said slowly, "that as 
far as I'm concerned, there's no longer any 
difference between a mask and a cassock. There 
isn't anything you've said to me for a long 
time that hasn't seemed a sham. II ("MOE" 
547) 
The coincidence of mask and cassock, both veiling the 
imago dei, is a coincidence explored not only by 
Bataille, but also by Iris Murdoch, in her 1966 The Time 
of the Angels, published at the same time deconstruction 
was being born in America, and death of God theology was 
making the news4 • 
According to Byatt, whose writing bears a marked 
influence by Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, the title 
of which evokes an image of a transcendent atemporality, 
a heavenly eternity, is an early fictional attempt to 
address the death of God, a subject, among many others, 
dealt with in Byatt's forthcoming sequel to still Life, 
the third in what will have been a fourfold setS. Perhaps 
a retrospective look at Murdoch's novel might anticipate 
Byatt's forthcoming work. 
Religion, I suggest, is that institution 
created by the Father's discourse to conceal 
the origins of society in the murder of the 
mother: religion's walls of order are built 
over her body. Religious discourse offers a 
sanitized version of the linguistic history of 
how we came to be, detailing the necessary 
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refusal of the mother and the triumphal 
accession to the Father's Law. (Reineke 262) 
The Time of the Angels is the story of the 
mysterious house of Carel Fisher, an eccentric Anglican 
priest who has recently moved into an all-but-defunct 
London parish. Carel's eccentricities include, among 
others, hallucinations of pests within his home, speaking 
to no one who visits (at his instructions no one gets 
past his maid Pattie, who is also his mistress), carrying 
on an incestuous relationship with his niece, who, we 
find out in the course of the novel, is actually his 
daughter, and perhaps the least of these, adhering to 
unorthodox atheistic beliefs. Carel's brother, Marcus, 
also lives in London, and has some concern over his 
brother's reputation, as well as his mental state, and 
his prohibition from seeing his alleged neice, Elizabeth, 
who is supposedly the daughter of the third Fisher 
brother, Julian, now deceased. Following a hard-won 
battle to gain entry into the almost impermeable fog-
shrouded rectory, Marcus is allowed to confront his 
brother, and it is within the dynamics of this dialogue 
that Carel's "beliefs" are revealed. 
Asked if he is aware that some think him insane, 
Carel responds by evading the question ( or perhaps by 
answering it after the manner of "Whom do you say that I 
am?"), and asks Marcus, "Do you?" (162). Marcus denies 
that he does, although it has crossed his mind before, 
and does again during the course of their conversation, 
and states simply that Carel does "behave strangely" 
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(162). He then inquires, "Is it really true that you've 
lost your faith?". Carel's answer is again evasive, 
requiring clarification in a bit of elitist posturing. 
"You use such an odd old-fashioned vocabulary," he says, 
"Do you mean do I think there is no God?" (162). "Yes," 
Marcus answers. "Well then, yes, I think it. There is no 
God," responds Carel. Marcus is taken aback by his 
brother's remark, even though Marcus himself claims to be 
an atheist, and is at work on a book provisionally 
entitled Morality in a World without God, a work which 
undertakes the "demythologizing of morals" (68). Marcus 
obviously thinks it improper that a man of the cloth 
should maintain such heresy and cautions, "if you really 
don't believe, you shouldn't go on being a priest. Your 
vocation--" (162). "My vocation is to be a priest," Carel 
retorts, "And if there is no God it is my vocation to be 
the priest of no God" (162). with that, Carel attempts to 
dismiss Marcus from his presence, but Marcus wants a full 
explanation, which runs in this way: 
"Nobody wants to hear, Marcus. It is the 
most secret thing in the world. And though I 
may tell you, you will not retain it in your 
mind because it cannot be borne. " Carel was 
still pacing the room, not with a steady stride 
but as if wafted rather irregularly to and fro. 
The cassock rustled and swung, was checked and 
swung again. (162) 
Here the ultimately veiled unbearable truth and the 
oscillation of the messenger coincide, the "truth" cannot 
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be remembered, but remains covered, concealed, like the 
fabric which envelopes the figure of the messenger. The 
discourse continues, 
Carel went on. "You cannot imagine how 
often I have been tempted to announce from the 
pulpi t that there is no God. It would be the 
most religious statement that could be 
conceived of. If there was anybody worthy to 
make it or receive it." (163) 
Marcus is not entirely impressed, and points out the lack 
of novelty in Carel's words. "It's not exactly new-- II he 
says, and Carel answers, 
"0h yes, people have often uttered the words, 
but no one has believed them. Perhaps Nietzsche 
did for a little. Only his egoism of an artist 
soon obscured the truth. He could no hold it. 
Perhaps that was what drove him mad. Not the 
truth itself but his failure to hold it in 
contemplation." (163) 
Again Marcus finds fault, this time with Carel's gravity, 
and remarks, "I don't see anything so dreadful about it 
••• atheism can be a perfectly humane doctrine-- II (163). 
Carel reacts by revealing the foundation of his doctrine, 
the unmasking of theology: 
"It is not as the German theologians imagine, 
and the rationalists with their milk-and-water 
theism, and those who call themselves atheists 
and have changed nothing but a few words. 
Theology has been so long a queen, she thinks 
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she can still rule as a queen in disguise. But 
all is different now, toto caelo. Men will soon 
begin to feel the consequences, though they 
will not understand them. (163) 
"A queen in disguise:" masked or unmasked theology? 
Marcus' interest has begun to fade now, as he mutters a 
faintly ridiculing "Do you understand?" (162). still 
Carel perseveres, 
"It is not that all is permitted. To say that 
was the reaction of a babbl ing chi ld. No one 
who had enough spirit to say it ever really 
believed it anyway. What they wanted was simply 
a new morality. But the truth itself they did 
not conceive of, the concept of it alone would 
have killed them." 
Again Marcus criticizes, and says, "But all the same 
morality re~ains--" (163). Carel waxes parabolic in his 
response, 
"Suppose the truth were awful, suppose it was 
just a black pit, or like birds huddled in the 
dust in a dark cupboard? Suppose only evil were 
real, only it was not evil since it had lost 
even its name? Who could face this? The 
philosophers have never even tried. All 
philosophy has taught a facile optimism, even 
Plato did so. Philosophers are simply the 
advance guard of theology. They are certain 
that Goodness is there in the centre of things 
radiating its pattern. They are certain that 
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Good is one, single and unitary. • .Only a few 
of them really feared Chaos and Old Night, and 
fewer still ever caught a glimpse--And if they 
did perhaps, through some crack, some fissure 
in the surface, catch sight of that, they ran 
straight back to their desks, they worked 
harder than ever late into the night to explain 
that it was not so, to prove that it could not 
be so. They suffered, they even died for this 
argument, and called it the truth." (163-64) 
Marcus now calls Carel's motive into question, 
"But do you yourself really believe--?" (164). 
asking, 
Carel 
responds by announcing that "any interpretation of the 
world is childish," and that "all philosophy is the 
prattling of a child," and by then referring to Judaism's 
grimness as its redeeming characteristic. The Book of 
Job, for example, agrees with Carel's philosophy, he 
says, since therein there is neither sense nor justice, 
"there is only power and the marvel of power, there is 
only chance and the terror of chance, " and therefore 
there is no God, nor any unitary Good (164). It is the 
nonexistence of the unitary which for Carel implies the 
darkness of his entire system, as he points out, "If 
there is goodness it must be one, ••• multiplicity is not 
paganism, it is the triumph of evil" (164). Following 
much more one-sided debate, Marcus retaliates against 
Carel's assertion that the most important fact for humans 
is their contingency, the fact that they are controlled 
by chance and that "spirit" is unavailable to such low 
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creatures, with a compromising "All right, there have 
been illusions-- but now at least we know the truth and 
we can start from there--" (165). "We do not know the 
truth," Carel counters, " ••• it is something that cannot 
be endured" (165). Carel holds firm to the impossibility 
of human good and maintains that the whole of theology 
and philosophy has been a masking of that fact: 
"People will endlessly conceal from themselves 
that good is only good if one is good for 
nothing. The whole history of philosophy, the 
whole theology, is this act of concealment. The 
old delusion ends, but there will be others of 
a different kind. • It would be a 
consolation, it would be a beatitude, to think 
that with the death of God the era of true 
spirit begins, while all that went before was a 
fake. But this too would be a lie, indeed it is 
the lie of modern theology. with or without the 
illusion of God, goodness is impossible to us." 
(165) 
Marcus, exhausted and bewi tched by this and the 
continuation of the exchange, can only summon the 
strength to confront his brother with "I've changed my 
mind ••• 1 think you are insane" (166). It is then that 
the reader is allowed to witness the extent of Carel's 
heresy, as he proclaims, "Where wast thou, Marcus, when I 
laid the foundations of the earth, whe the morning stars 
sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" 
Marcus ignores his brother's self-deification, and 
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inquires pragmatically, "So you are going to go on being 
a priest. • .with all those things inside you?" Carel 
does go on, if for no other reason than because "when 
(he) celebrates mass (he) is God" (166) (this is a 
reversal of the priestly function of which Altizer 
writes, in which the priest identifies with the assembly, 
not with the divine: see the discussion of Altizer and 
catholicism and eucharist in chapter two). The discourse 
disintegrates until Marcus launches one last attempt to 
reverse the passing conversation; Marcus grabs Carel's 
garment, is rebuked, and a feined embrace lands a 
shameful blow across Marcus' face. "You exist, Marcus," 
Carel murmurs, "just for a moment you exist. Now get out" 
(168). 
Now Marcus has already been dissatisfied with his 
complaining to the Bishop, who seemed a great deal more 
sympathetic toward Carel than he should have been. In his 
meeting with Marcus and his house-mate, Norah Shadox-
Brown, the Bishop numbers Carel among the Anglican 
church's noted "eccentrics," and recommended patience 
regarding Carel, since "belief is such a personal matter" 
(89). Regarding Marcus' atheism, the Bishop is pleased to 
hear of Marcus' book, despite Marcus' clarification that 
he is not a beleiver (89). Marcus' belief is not such an 
issue, claims the Bishop, since "the dividing lines are 
not by any means as clear as they used to be" (89) • 
"Passion," says the Bishop, "Passion, Kierkegaard said, 
.that's the necessary thing" (89). This displeases 
both Marcus and Norah, who declares, "But there's a 
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difference between believing in God and not beleiving in 
God" (89). The Bishop confirms this, but clarifies that 
"perhaps this difference is not what we once thought it 
was. We must think of this time as an interregnum" (89). 
The following conversation strangely parallels Marcus' 
conversation with Carel, which has yet to take place. 
Here the Bishop recommends theological demythologizing, a 
"change of symbolizing," which "is nothing new," but as 
"God lives and works in history, (t)he outer mythology 
changes, the inward truth remains the same," (90). Marcus 
counters with a recommendation that society "say he 
doesn't exist and be done with it," but the Bishop 
maintains that "the Church will have to endure a very 
painful transformation" (90), a point which upsets 
Marcus, who realizes that despite his disbelief, the 
structure of the beliefs of others is a reassuring 
presence. "That they should be deciding that God was not 
a person, that they should be quietly demoting Jesus 
Christ, this made him feel almost frightened" (91). 
Foreshadowing his brother's words, Marcus challenges the 
Bishop with, "suppose the truth about human life were 
just something terrible, something appalling which one 
would be destroyed by contemplating," and complains, 
"You've taken away all the guarantees" (91). The Bishop, 
with expected aplomb, replies, "That's where faith comes 
in" (91). Norah ends the scene by observing that the 
Bishop's reponse is "meaningless" (91). 
Norah's response to Carel's violently-ended exchange 
with Marcus is equally disapproving, finding it grim 
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"romantic nonsense" (185). Marcus, however, says that he 
finds a sort of hope, a "difficul t hope," in what Carel 
has said: even though lithe situation is terrible, ••• the 
human spirit can respond" (185). Marcus agrees with the 
futili ty of past theology and philosophy, and affirms 
that what is necessary is that one "learn to live without 
the idea of the Good being somehow Oneil (186) • Again 
Norah is unimpressed, and takes a pragmatic, common-sense 
approach, arguing, "I don't see any point in either 
affirming or denying that the Good is One. I still ought 
to pay my bills" (186). Marcus does not share Norah's 
confident common-sense, common-sense which enables her to 
see to the root of Carel's affect upon Marcus. Carel's 
tirade has ruined Marcus' great construction: 
"Has this conversation with Carel wrecked 
your book? rr said Norah. 
"Yes." 
Since the talk with Carel, indeed since 
fully apprehending the existence of Carel, 
Marcus had known that his book just wouldn't 
do. (186) 
His systematic explication of the moral good thus torn 
asunder, Marcus declares to Norah that he will do unto 
Carel as Carel has, might one say, done unto him? Marcus 
intends to save Carel: "save him. • by love, II says 
Marcus, who settles upon his actions toward Carel and 
upon the course of the revision of his writing: 
"By love," said Marcus. It was now clear to him 
that this was the answer. His great book would 
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not be about good, it would be about love. In 
the case of love the ontological proof would 
work. Because love was a real human activity. 
He would save his brother by loving him. Carel 
could be made to recognize the reality of love. 
"Is love One, I wonder?" ••• (187). 
In the end, of course, reality, perhaps the reality of 
love, does not save Carel, but destroys him. Just as his 
revelation unto Marcus has destroyed and transformed his 
writing, so another piece of writing, a letter from 
Pattie declaring her liberation, seals Carel's fate, 
prompting his suicide. 
The Time of the Angels is comprised of a web of 
interconnected revelations and deceptions, veilings and 
unveilings, all of which may be related to the central 
concept of unity and multiplicity explicated in Marcus' 
discussions. At the same time that deconstruction and 
death of God theology were doing so, Murdoch's narrative 
was exemplifying the manner in which one deconstructive 
unmasking leads to another, tracing the breakdown of the 
entire System. This notion is supported by the 
consideration that Carel's efforts throughout the novel 
are aimed toward molding the fog-enshrouded rectory into 
an entirely exclusive universe, complete with 
transcendent Elizabeth and corporeal Pattie. Elizabeth, 
however, lies within the gaze of the all-too-human Leo 
and his dominie Muriel, whose eyes are opened in their 
"prayer-closet" revelation (granted by the rift through 
which she beholds her father's body in its profane 
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embrace). Pattie, too, finds herself involved in a 
relationship with a fallen prince of sorts, now 
consigned to maintain Carel's household, resided in small 
quarters with only his icon with which to maintain his 
connection to his origins. This connection is, of course, 
severed, by Leo's selfish transgression, but painfully 
re-enacted by the indirect and camouflaged restoration of 
the icon by the marginal figures, Marcus, Muriel, and 
Pattie. Pattie, whose role as the fallen creature chosen 
and blessed by Carel is threatened by the revelation of 
Carel's relationship with Elizabeth, proves to be the 
most potent decentering force, as it is her writing, 
prompted by her knowledge of the transgression of her God 
(as Murdoch directly refers to their relationship) which 
accompanies Carel's dead body. Of course, Pattie's 
writing is witnessed at Carel's death by Muriel, flesh of 
Carel's flesh, whose acquiescence allows Carel's suicide 
to SUcceed. It is there, given "the power of life and 
death," that Muriel experiences "the utter and complete 
absence of God" (209). with Carel's demise and the 
collapse of his domestic world, Muriel, re-enacting the 
disclosure of the holy of holies, witnesses a "bright 
streak of light between the curtains," which prompts her 
to "pull the curtains back," and discovers that "the fog 
had gone away" (212). This is no mere "happy ending," as 
Pattie's sins have cost her relationship with Eugene, 
Eugene is given the gift of the memory of his first 
tragedy, Muriel and Elizabeth had been "riveted together" 
by Carel, "each to be the damnation of the other until 
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the end of the world" (212). In addition, Marcus 
discovers that his book is all but impossible to write, 
and is reacquainted by the recurrent once-Christian-now-
sort-of-Buddhist Anthea, whose name is obviously a subtle 
pun on the absence of God. "Fancy old Anthea turning up 
again like that" (221). The recurrence of the death of 
God seems to inevitably accompany the efforts of those 
outside, and those on the margins, to gain entry, to look 
behind the mask, to witness the transgression and to 
wri te liberation, efforts which lead to the incessant 
decontsruction of the edifice. Perhaps Marcus would write 
his book, but it would never be completed, and Marcus had 
come to understand that now he must write differently, 
beyond the realm of theo-ry: 
Marcus found that he had left Carel's room 
and was walking down the stairs. Would he go on 
working on his book? Perhaps it was a book that 
only a genius could write, and he was not a 
genius. It might be that all he wanted to say 
about love and about humanity was true but 
simply could not be expressed as a theory. 
(221) 
Perhaps Murdoch, through Marcus, takes her reader toward 
an insight noted by Thomas Altizer more than twenty-five 
years later: 
.truly theological writing cannot be 
scholarly writing, just as truly theological 
reading cannot be scholarly reading, and this 
is true not only of theological reading and 
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wri ting , but of philosophical and poetic 
reading and writing as well. (GA 14) 
Marcus' thoughts also echo Pattie's sentiments following 
her reading of an excerpt from Being and Time which she 
had noticed upon Carel's desk while cleaning his room. 
The passage, which in Pattie's reading reverberates with 
obscure references to Dasein, Being-at-an-end, Being-
towards-the-end, the ready-to-hand and the not-yet, 
sounds to Pattie "sen~eless and awful," even apocalyptic, 
"like the distant boom of some big catastrophe" (144)6. 
Perhaps Pattie's displeasure, even as Marcus' later 
enlightenment, comes as a result of the impossibilities 
inherent in theorizing. Those impossibilities are 
certainly understood by Mark C. Taylor, whose "The 
Politics of Theo-ry," states succinctly, "(t)o rush from 
theology to theory is not to escape God: it is merely to 
exchange overt faith for covert belief in the One who 
excludes difference(s)" (30). 
In his discussion of Heidegger, whose writings 
increasingly demonstrate Altizer's theological/ 
philosophical/poetic non-scholarly orientation, Taylor 
focuses upon the "Abgrund" noted by Heidegger in the 
twentieth century's experience of the absence of God (In 
"What Are Poets For?" in Poetry, Language, Thought). 
Heidegger uses Abgrund to denote "the complete absence of 
the ground," the origin the absence of which creates a 
nostalgia, a longing for return (Taylor, "The Politics of 
Theo-ry" 30). "Throughout the history of western 
ontotheology, " notes Taylor, "God and Being have been 
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interpreted as one or the One, " a unity, a circular 
Presence which in Heidegger's terms "is everywhere as the 
Same in its own center" ("PT" -30). This presence, says 
Taylor, is tenaciously pursued by theory, by 
ontotheology, which craves its "overarching or underlying 
unity that will unite multiple data" (30). Its absence is 
the absence of the singular origin of pure identity. In 
Taylor's scheme, "the inaccessibility of the origin 
implies the impossibility of the end;" there is no 
"return to, or of," the primal origin, and the end, the 
apocalypse, is always delayed (34). Curiously enough, it 
is this same singular unity, eternal return, which in 
Altizer's writing is negated by the actuality of history, 
the absolute beginning. In both cases, the impossibility 
of return defers "Presence" and precludes the possibility 
of the "sacrifice of difference" (Taylor, "PT" 34). In 
the case of Marcus' book, the inability of theory to 
contain, and neutralize, multiplicity, ends in the 
author's departure to a place of recreation, taking a 
leave of absence, a holiday, away from the realm of his 
efforts to theorize. Carel, on the other hand, turns out 
to have in fact suffered from the very nostalgia which he 
so decried. His exclusive domestic efforts were directed 
toward the re-establishment of -his connection with his 
own origin, in Freudian terms, the absent Mother, the 
womb, the uncanny "home (Heim) from which we come and to 
which we long/dread to return" (Taylor, "PT" 18). "Within 
the FreUdian economy," Taylor points out, "the mother is 
the savage origin that is our end," and which "stands 
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before us "naked except for a monstrous primitive mask," 
a mask that is "the face of our desire" (18). The fog-
shrouded house and the captive and secluded Elizabeth are 
created by Carel in the image of this uncanny home. Carel 
is quite direct, however, in his discussion with Marcus, 
about his nostalgia for the ultimate return: 
"We are clay, Marcus, and nothing is real for 
us except the uncanny womb of Being into which 
we shall return. • • .Meanwhile I endure in the 
place in which I am. I endure, my Marcus. I 
wait for it all to finish." (Murdoch 165-66)7 
Carel's existence turns out to have depended upon the 
continuation of the representation of the atemporal, 
undifferentiated cycle of the same, to which he resigns 
himself following the collapse of his system, caused by 
the permeability of its outer membrane--that is, its 
inability to keep Pattie properly inside and others 
properly outside. Both marginal characters on the inside 
of Carel's institution transgress the limits of its 
masking and, in Murdoch's words, "commit the crime of 
looking:" they are "guilty of seeing, of knowing," (171) 
and reveal the endless interplay of veilings and 
unveilings which topples the proprietary system of 
original presence8 • 
Perhaps there are no two symbols more intrinsically 
related to the cycle of eternal return and unitary 
original presence than "the virgin" and "the garden." The 
two are joined by A.S. Byatt in the first novel in an as-
yet-unfinished tetralogy, The Virgin in the Garden. From 
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its reminiscent beginnings in its prologue, which 
already, like the postscript of Possession, decenters the 
temporality of the narrative insomuch as this is a 
prologue which takes place some sixteen years later than 
the story itself, The Virgin in the Garden introduces a 
recurrent tension between the historic and the 
ahistorical9 , a tension heightened by the 
im/possibilities of beginnings and the irreversibility of 
exile: 
Alexander had a strongly linear sense of time. 
Chances did not come round again, they went, 
and stayed, past. He had sometimes thought of 
more modern, more artificial ways of rendering 
that matter, the virgin and the garden, now and 
England, without undue sentiment or heavy 
irony. But he would not try. 
"It was good the first time, though," 
Frederica was saying. "In the first place. All 
the singing and dancing. Funny, the fifties. 
Everybody thinks of it as a kind of no-time, an 
unreal time, just now. But we were there, it 
was rather beautiful, the Play, and the 
Coronation and all that." 
"A false beginning," said Alexander. 
"All the beginning there was," 
"My beginning, anyway. That was 
happen." 
she said. 
what did 
"I must go," said Daniel. "I must go."(15) 
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In the subtly' foretelling absence of Stephanie potter, 
Byatt's other three primary characters synoptically trace 
and enact the events of the historically past but 
graphically future "no-time" of the 1950's. Alexander 
Wedderburn, the writer of the myth of the age, desiring 
to tell a circular story but bound to inscribe lines 
looks back with regret. Frederica analyses and praises 
the aesthetic and the existential, noting what "everybody 
thinks, II the beauty of the time, the fact that "we were 
there" and that it was, after all, "her beginning." 
Daniel, apocalyptic dweller in silence , witness to the 
revelation of glory and tragedy, simply enacts his own 
exodus. 
Together with still Life, The Virgin in the Garden 
reveals the duplicitous, oppressive exclusivity of 
insti tutions and insti tutional systems, and places 
opposing metaphors within a dynamic dialectic, the 
progress of which remains open-ended. Alexander's 
inabili ty to "capture" the times, Daniel's antagonistic 
relationship with the church, Stephanie's forsaking of 
her father's atti tudes toward the Church in her 
relationShip with Daniel, Frederica'S developing identity 
and the strange relationship between Marcus and Lucas 
Simmonds contrapose the central issues of the stability 
and exclusivity of narratives (self-sufficient 
institutional systems), and the interpretation (which may 
mean reinforcement, 'continued "veiling" or abolition, 
"unveiling," or both, as in "revelation") of them. When 
the search for transcendent unity (the One) fails in the 
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face of immanent multiplicity, theo-ry gives way and the 
end of interpretation, the apocalypse is deferred, or 
perhaps its deferral is its occurrence. 
The Virgin in the Garden's recurring theme of the 
chronicle, the writing of the story of the times, masque-
ing history brings the issue of the reconciliation of the 
immanent and the transcendent to the fore. The immanent 
writing is obviously intended to be a representation, an 
image or an occurrence of the presence of the 
transcendent reality of which it speaks. On the other 
hand, such writing, such interpretation arises as an 
effort to find within transcendent nature and history the 
story of one's own life. But within such rewriting, the 
retranslation of actual history in terms of a mythic 
narrative, there occur the opposing efforts of connecting 
with the past and breaking with it, as Eliade's 
distinction between the religious and the non-religious 
elucidate. As Taylor points out, the "relig-ious" points 
to this double bind (religare)· ("PT" 34). Byatt's use of 
an excerpt from the Easter "Times" implies this dual 
nature. Paradoxical images of old and new fill the 
excerpt's examination of the repositioning of Easter day 
"back to its natural and primeval place in the year. 
Old New Year's Day" (151 emphasis mine). Easter is 
opposed to Christmas as that holiday which "makes a 
clean-cut break with what has gone before," and entails a 
"sudden discovery that the annual miracle of the spring 
has come" (151 emphasis mine). Further, the human effort 
to "see in the passing of the seasons an image of 
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himself," is noted as an eternal occurrence; and not only 
wi th the seasons, but with the transformation of the 
government, the rising of a new Queen, the commoner is 
called upon to identify: 
But the spring comes 
that all disasters 
wi th its annual message 
and losses can be 
transcended by the unconquerable power of new 
life. As a nation, as a Commonwealth, we take 
as our suprememly representative person our 
young QUEEN, and in her inauguration dedicating 
the future by the ancient forms, we declare our 
faith that life itself rises out of the shadow 
of death, that victory is wrested out of the 
appearance of failure, that the transfiguration 
of which our nature is capable is not a denial 
of our temporal evanescence but the revelation 
of its deepest meaning. (152) 
Such a full identification is not always possible, 
however, as the real tragedy which takes place in still 
Li.:fg, a tragedy foreshadowed by the situation of Mrs 
Thone, who is "little moved" by the spectacle of the 
Coronation, since "her interest in the future, and her 
real interest in the outside world" had passed following 
the death of her son. Her faith in the transcendence of 
the ahistorical has passed irreversibly into the 
historical, and the natural/governmental unity had been 
shattered by the excessive multiplicity of her senseless 
loss. Mrs. Thone's hopelessness testifies to the failure 
of her informing narrative: 
Fountain 236 
Once she had understood that between a good 
breakfast and an end of a break bell a boy 
could run, fall, smash, twitch, stop, moving 
forever and begin to decay, she understood also 
that nothing could be undone, no air raid, no 
death camp, no monstrous genesis, and that the 
important thing about herself was that she had 
not much time and it did not matter greatly 
what she did with it. (243 emphasis mine) 
Unlike the complete hopelessness in this description of 
Mrs. Thone's survival, the tragedy of Stephanie's death 
is survived by Daniel through the revision of his own 
narrative. The simultaneous beginnings and endings of 
relationships and marriages in The Virgin in the Garden, 
too, are rewritten in consideration of the radical ending 
of still Life: 
Death is more of an end than marriage. 
Tragedies end with death • 
Surviving. • is not exactly resolution. Over 
the next few weeks he retold himself his own 
story, backwards from that moment, forwards 
into a future of which that moment was the 
origin. The rest of his life was life after 
this death. (344) 
Stephanie, who bears of course the feminine form of the 
name of the original Christian martyr, has, from the 
moment she and Daniel met, thrown his beliefs into 
question. Her father's reccommendation that Daniel read 
"King Lear," a far superior life-narrative than the 
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Bible, in his opinion, Daniel's obsession with her and 
their premarital sexual activities, as well as her death, 
revealed to Daniel the shortcomings of his own informing 
narratives. Following her death, Daniel is forced to 
admit that he does not believe that the dead rise again, 
a sentiment which brings the recurrence of the passage 
"if after the manner of men I have fought with the beasts 
at Ephesus, what advantageth it me if the dead rise not?" 
(341, 350). Other words, too, heighten the fact that 
Daniel can make no sense of this occurrence, that he 
cannot stretch his unifying narrative far enough to 
contain it: 
There was more: ordinary words, like stones, 
turning live Stephanie into remembered 
Stephanie, good-natured and distancing. Daniel 
took the words as another lesson of truth. She 
was, she was. (SL 338) 
The metaphor recalls Byatt's description of Daniel's 
religion in The Virgin in the Garden, given following 
Daniel's advances toward Stephanie and the development of 
the tensions between their views of each other and the 
Church. Daniel "never addressed God. .in words of his 
own," finding the words of the church like the "Church's 
stones, there" (108). Repeating the words of the church 
reassured Daniel, letting him "sense the tug and rush of 
forces behind his perception or comprehension" (108). 
Daniel's "common sense Christ" was also such a 
reassurance, having known of the "machinery of the soul," 
and "di vine justice," but also being, Daniel believed, 
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long since dead (108). Beliefs had not mattered so much 
to Daniel, we are told, "compared to the certainties of 
strength and solidity he had felt, alone with God:" 
Stephanie, however, had come "between him and God," and 
his desire for her had dislodged a few of the stones from 
his religious foundations. Her death would shake that 
foundation to its core. Daniel's God of the powers of 
di vine justice must undergo radical revision. The 
coincidence of the lessons of Lear and the Bible exhibit 
Daniel's attempts at that revision, following the well-
intended suggestion by a sympathetic deaconness that 
"maybe Stephanie had been taken. .because our Lord 
wanted Daniel to know the way of a life without such 
love" (346). Daniel considers that Christian critics 
maintain that Cordelia "was killed to effect the 
reconciliation of Lear with the heavens," but "who could 
believe in a God who killed that life to teach Daniel 
Orton a lesson about suffering?" (346). Soon impatient 
of considerations of with the self-referentiality 
Shakespeare, and now quite unsure of the purpose of the 
powers that be, Daniel sinks into a nihilistic 
apprehension of his own future: 
There were times when he was amazed that 
anything was alive, a greenfly or an early 
daffodil someone brought him, when he feared 
for its silky green weightless life as much as 
he feared for 
perhaps, hoped 
his children. 
that they 
.He had, 
would be a 
consolation. Instead, they were a source of 
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fear. He feared for them, and he feared them. 
(347) 
- Daniel is unable to reconcile himself to such a God, even 
though it is to this God that he "tries" to pray; "not to 
Christ," Byatt specifies, but the "undifferentiated God 
who held together the stones of that place" (350). That 
is, of course, the God of ultimate unity, the God of no 
difference, providing the statici ty of the institution. 
Daniel feels a kind of sympathy for Christ and for his 
own situation there in the realm of the undifferentiated 
God, believing that that God had no compassion for him, 
but only laws. Laws which Christ had understood, to a 
limit, and laws which might bring some comfort in the 
rationalization of his wife's death: 
Christ had said that the Father cared for the 
fall of a sparrow, but though it was clear that 
Christ had cared, it was not at all clear that 
the powers did. The power struck, according to 
law. Men had fragile skulls, their hearts 
pumped efficiently, delicately, robustly, and 
an air bubble could stop them. (350) 
Rationalization, however, brings no end to the suffering; 
but Daniel considered the image of the crucifixion to be 
a call for the system to be otherwise, "for human 
suffering to be at the centre, for man to be responsible 
for his own destiny and for the destroyed to come again 
• .like st. Paul's wheat sown in corruption" (350). 
Daniel's episode within the structure of the Church only 
brings him back to his recurring theodical question, 
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"what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not?" (350). 
That question remains unanswered, and Daniel has not 
really come to terms with his wife's death by the "end" 
of still Life, though he has vented his rage at Gideon, 
and "for a moment ••. felt peace". Daniel ends his story 
"walking," tracing the steps of his own exile, and 
returning to write and rewrite the story of his life 
after death (358). We may return to the beginning, to the 
prologue, for a glimpse of the future however, a future 
in which Frederica notes that "Daniel does not change," 
and in which one finds Daniel, still in priestly costume, 
"in the habit of thinking of himself as a survivor, a 
battered and grizzled survivor" (4). 
The narratives of Stephanie, Frederica, Alexander 
and Marcus evolve similarly. Stephanie's relationship 
with Daniel and to the Church, her ensuing family life, 
Frederica's self-image and her self-discovery, the 
mystical relationship between Marcus and Lucas Simmonds, 
Marcus' development and Bodhi-tree experience in still 
~, and Alexander's writing all entail the negation of 
the insufficiencies of the undifferentiated unity and its 
endless revision. 
Stephanie, following Daniel's calling her out of her 
father's house on a mission of mercy, and following his 
own admissions of desire for her, attends Daniel's Easter 
service, in which "her dislike of Christianity hardened 
like ice," as she witnessed the opposition of her desire 
to be part of the tradition and her repulsion at the 
"realities" of English Easter. Like the "Times" excerpt, 
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stephanie counters Easter with Christmas, preferring 
Christmas' true miracle of birth. Unsurprisingly, it is, 
in her opinion, a failed revision which was responsible 
for her repulsion. "It had not been possible," stephanie 
ponders, "to graft Eastern blood ri tes and dismembered 
God on to English Spring as it had been possible to bring 
together Northern celebrations of the winter solstice," 
since "there was a hot, barbaric quality about the 
lessons for Easter Day," which did not fit with the light 
prettiness of English Spring, except perhaps in its 
reminiscence of "forgotten Druidic atrocities". Even the 
Apocalyptic city seems offensive to Stephanie, 
intriguingly enough because of its ahistoricality: 
The English mind was secretly horrified by 
glassy sea, crystal walls , white wool, brass 
feet and throne of the New Jerusalem where 
Spring would never come again because there was 
neither grass nor winter. (VIG 154-55) 
It is not simply because of the incompatibility of 
England and Easter that Stephanie's mind wanders so 
during the service, but also because of her presence in 
that place, and its place in her life, and Daniel's place 
in her life as well, a life which had before been 
informed by strict rationality. She is also put off by 
what she sees as Daniel's hypocrisy, thinking that he 
"doesn't believe a word" (159). Following this episode of 
the inability of Stephanie's rationality to contain 
Daniel's presence, she is driven toward the nostalgic 
image Byatt uses recurringly, and she dreams of "a bare 
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room" (160). stephanie does not allow this nostalgia to 
linger, however, nor does she exclude Daniel and her own 
shifting religious attitudes from her mind. Instead, in 
an embrace of transgression and historicali ty, she is 
soon recalling that "I went to bed with him. • • • It was 
a revelation" (188). The nostalgia soon returns, however, 
when, at Alexander's side, stephanie desires "not to be" 
(200). Stephanie's oscillation continues into still Life, 
in which she is torn between domestic duties and her own 
desire to continue her education, the tension between the 
two being played out within her ironic considerations of 
Wordsworth's "Immortality Ode." Stephanie further 
epitomizes the paradoxical relationship between will and 
human nature, generally in the juxtaposition of her drive 
toward both self-improvement and continuation of the 
species, and specifically in her final words, in which 
she tells her son will that the cat which has captured 
the sparrow, like the power which will soon seize her, 
and like herself, has only acted according to its nature, 
and is therefore not "bad." Stephanie, however, attempts 
to keep this necessary "evil" properly outside her 
domestic system, and her final act comes as a result of 
her conviction that "cats eat birds ••• (b)ut not in our 
house" (332). 
The construction and maintenance of the realm of the 
proper is, of course, dri ven by a' nostalgia for an 
original paradise. That nostalgia is inevitably thrwarted 
within The Virgin in the Garden and still Life, and 
certainly within the development of the character of 
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Frederica, the self-reflective autonomous subject who, 
lacking the compassion of her sister, approaches her many 
relationships, and the very future itself, as 
opportuni tes for "self"-development. Byatt portrays 
Frederica's development as an . evolution marked by 
oscillation between self-assertion and nostalgia, from 
the. "mirrored Frederica" of The Virgin in the Garden, who 
"had desired and admired only Frederica," and considers 
her virginity a burden, into the prophesied image, beyond 
the temporal realm of the text itself, of 
an ageing woman walking along a London street 
she could almost with certainty tell herself: I 
have come to the end of desire. I should like 
to live alone. (325) 
Within the "present" of the narrative of The virgin in 
the Garden, Frederica's developing post-adolescent psyche 
is paralelled by Byatt with the spirit of the age of the 
Coronation, marked by an overoptimistic attitude toward 
the recovery of lost innocence, an innocence for which 
the older Frederica would despair, despite the younger 
Frederica's attempts to lose it. "There had been," 
Frederica considers, "some sort of innocence about the 
rejoicing" at the time of the Coronation, an innocence 
described as "a truly aimless and thwarted nostalgia" 
(241). Although Frederica had at the time no appreciation 
for that nostalgic age, upon her later reflection, in 
which she has gained the knowledge that "everything is a 
new beginning," she mourns its loss: 
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True Paradise, Proust said, is always Paradise 
Lost. Only when Frederica was old enough to 
equate the tenuous pastel hopes of 1953 with 
her own almost-adult knowledge that everything 
was a new beginning, that reality for her was 
the future, did she come to feel nostalgia for 
what at the time she diagnosed boldly as blear 
illusion. (242) 
still Life finds Frederica, safe in the knowledge that 
"everything is a new beginning ," writing herself into a 
"model universe" (Cambridge) and loving a stranger (one 
"without a native tongue"), both of which result in her 
recognition that "the world was larger than it had been" 
(216). The expansion of Frederica's world, however, is a 
cause of crisis, eradicating the unity of her autonomy. 
Seeking to preserve the One in the face of the Many, 
Frederica's problem, Byatt writes, "was the existence of 
too many, and conflicting purposes" (283) • However, 
Frederica's development as a "present subject" in still 
Life depends upon the existence of "two hypothetical 
future Fredericas," both writers, one reclusive and one 
"worldly," and both of whom, Frederica insightfully 
notices, "might be indissolubly oneil (283). 
Marcus, the solitary I mystical younger brother of 
Frederica and stephanie, who is visited by visions of 
light and falls victim to the duplicitous efforts of 
Lucas Simmonds to interpret those visions, supplies yet 
another of Byatt's examples of oppressive, exclusive, and 
in this case ultimately destructive, relationships. While 
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Lucas' enchanting of Marcus depends upon his theosophical 
revisioning of ecclectic bits of science and religion, he 
is driven by his desire for and his puritanical 
resistance to the sexual fiasco enacted between them. 
Lucas' grand vision seeks the pure transcendent beyond 
the corrupt corporeal, a purely original realm the 
revelation and reinstatement of which his intentions and 
actions evoke. Foreshadowing her use of paleontology, 
psychology and mythology in Possession, Byatt blends the 
scenes before the sexual encounter between Lucas and 
Marcus with images mythical, scientific and sexual: 
• the ammonites are early records of the 
true history of creation, and the secret 
meaning of the petrified snake, its real 
relation to holiness, is to be found in Jung's 
account, in Psychology and Alchemy, of 
Mercurius--as a dragon. He read out a whole 
page to Marcus, with mounting excitement. • • • 
together bird and snake made the finished 
circle, tail-in-its-mouth dragon, a meeting of 
earth and air which was just what he and Marcus 
wanted •• (299-300) 
While the homeostatic relationship between Marcus and 
Lucas provides companionship for two otherwise socially 
marginal characters, each possesses the potential to 
fulfill the other's sense of completion, of closedness. 
Lucas, in Marcus' eyes, bears the power to control the 
strangely immanent infinity within Marcus' mind, granting 
boundaries to the powers therein. When Lucas doubts his 
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eff icacy , Marcus assures him that he has changed his 
life, since Marcus "did not want his closed world to go," 
gi ven that "Lucas Simmonds was his protection from the 
importuni ty of the infinite" (307). Lucas, on the other 
hand, sees Marcus as his virginal mediator, a bodily 
connection with whom might ironically bring purity from 
the corporeal realm: 
"I am not pure. That's what it is. Partly. 
Of the ear~h, earthy, though it smells and I 
hate the smell, I hate the whole messy 
business. I hate my body, I hate bodies, I hate 
hot and heavy ••• You are pure. One recognises 
it when one sees it. You are a clean being, you 
see cleanly ••.• " (307) 
Rather than connecting Lucas with the "where we began," 
the asexual sphere, Marcus' touch, described by Byatt in 
botanical terms (311), marks an apocalyptic moment, a 
rupture of Lucas' attempts to recapture the 
ahistoricality and propriety of "the garden," his prima 
materia, by means of "the virgin," Marcus. Recognizing 
this demise, Lucas notes, "It's a disaster. It's the 
beginning of the end" (311). From there it is a short 
step to the institutionalization of Lucas following his 
self-destructive episode, Marcus' rebellious visitation 
of Lucas, Lucas' final admission to Marcus that "God, or 
something, or me, wants you" (405), his warning to Marcus 
not to let "them" 'get his brain,' and Marcus' reluctant 
removal and return to his home. Now Marcus remains alone 
to reconcile his own body and mind, finitude and 
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infinity, without his 'errant teacher, who was now to be, 
at least Lucas thought, mutilated, and in precisely the 
wrong manner: "They' ll--take bits of me away," Lucas had 
said, "not the right bits" but "bits of brain" (404). 
The Marcus of still Life finds himself striving to 
reconcile, or at least to hold in tension, the body and 
the mind, the finite and the infinite, without 
sacrificing one for the other. This means forgetting 
things parapsychological and concentrating on things 
"ordinary" (238). Marcus has in the past viewed the world 
outside his own mind as a "threatening, shapeless mess" 
given order by the terrifying power of his mental 
geometricizing, but by means of the biological, botanical 
and social experiences given Marcus by new friends and 
new interests, through the activities organized by Gideon 
Farrar, at the Centre for Field Studies, for instance, 
Marcus finds "peace," and particularly so through one 
transformati ve experience. Upon contemplation of an elm 
tree, upon both the tree as a site of "the intersection 
of light and earth," and his own imperfect ability to 
contemplate the tree itself, Marcus feels that "he 
himself was not there for nothing," that " he had his 
place, he was part of something" (241). However, while 
his contemplation of the tree and its relation to earth 
and light brings Marcus a new understanding of the word 
"earthed," insofar as it provides him a place to be, the 
coincidence of power and site recalls the "God of power" 
contemplated by Daniel, and foreshadows the fact that it 
will be Marcus who will witness the destructive force of 
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that power in stephanie's death. That death will force 
Marcus to acknowledge the historical actuality which even 
as he moves toward enlightenment in meditation upon the 
tree is subsumed under his ordering and unifying 
structure. The English elm which Marcus contemplates, 
Byatt points out, "might be thought a particularly happy 
tree, a self-sufficient tree, a kind of single eternity" 
which asexually "propogates itself underground;" 
unsurprisingly, the tree's "lack of variation" makes it 
particularly susceptible to disease. The elm represents, 
Byatt tells us, a "sempi ternal, essential part of our 
English landscape" in 1955 (242). Dis-ease, and 
instabili ty, and historicali ty haunt the myth of self-
sufficiency, despite the efforts to eradicate the causes 
of such instability. The Virgin in the Garden and still 
Life are marked, more than by any other single element, 
by an attempt to write out instability from the 
chronicles of the age. 
It is of course Alexander Wedderburn who provides 
that writing, as The Virgin in the Garden and still Life, 
like Possession as well, are distinguished by an 
underlying "mythic narrative" which informs the primary 
narrative. In The Virgin in the Garden, that myth is, as 
we have seen, presented in Alexander's play, a play which 
Bill Potter summed up as "a nostalgia for something that 
never was, a charming, airy dream of a time which was in 
fact nasty, brutish, and bloody" (368). It is easily 
understood that the overarching tone of The Virgin in the 
Garden is one of such nostalgia, felt by Alexander 
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preceding the play itself, when he is described with 
Byatt's recurrent white room image, "he wanted a clean 
whi te empty room and silence" (314). Despite Alexander's 
"strongly linear sense of time," the nostalgia of the 
system of eternal return at work in The Virgin in the 
Garden requires that the narrative remain entirely open, 
or at least that it seem so, its final lines offering no 
closure whatsoever, but a sustaining of its self-
sufficiency, a self-sufficiency that is preserved and yet 
broken by its lack of an ending: 
That was not an end, but since it went on for a 
considerable time, is as good a place to stop 
as any. (428) 
That is, self-sufficient though it may be, without 
beginning or end, a closed system like the virgin or the 
garden, the text requires another to follow it; that 
other text is of course still Life. 
The narrative of still Life is informed by 
Alexander's development of another play, this time 
involving the life and work of Van Gogh. It is in the 
context of Alexander's discussion of Van Gogh with the 
eminent scholar, Professor Wi jnnobel, whose words 
serendipitously grant Alexander "a priveleged insight 
into the order of things, in which all things are 
experienced as parts of a whole" (175). Alexander wants 
to grant to Van Gogh's painting (specifically "Breakfast 
Table" in this case), as Van Gogh had desired, a kind of 
liveliness, in fact, a "spermaticity" which Van Gogh 
sought through abstinence. Wijnnobel disagrees, and 
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counters with the concept of still life, "nature morte," 
as disguising a homeostatic nostalgia, the Freudian 
death-drive: 
Maybe we could see our fascination for still 
life--or nature morte--in these terms? Maybe 
the kind of lifeless life of things bathed in 
light is another version of the golden age--an 
impossible stasis, a world without desire and 
division? 
Thanatos. (179) 
.Nature morte, Mr. Wedderburn. 
The drive toward the unifying silence and stillness of 
death typifies Alexander's problem with his play, which, 
as he admits to wijnnobel, is that its unity is 
restrictive. Asked if he has dramatized the fact that the 
historical Vincent was "a man you would move quickly away 
from, if he sat next to you in a cafe," Alexander 
responds tellingly, "I have tried. I can't get it all in" 
(179). The problem of the insatiability of the death-
drive is also the problem of analogy, the inability of 
artifice to "make present" that of which it is a symbol, 
presented by Byatt through the comparison and contrasting 
of linguistic metaphor and artistic representation. Both 
are masks of "reality," and Alexander's struggle to 
relate Van Gogh's reality with words in at least a manner 
equal to the way Van Gogh had related reality with paint 
provides Byatt opportunity to critique her own process of 
writing. Alexander learns, "working with words on a 
painter who was an articulate painter," that 
visualization of things can precede their linguistic 
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articulation, in fact, visualization can occur without 
articulation. Alexander, however, is confined to work 
within his prison-house of language, as is Byatt, who 
notes that language behaves differently than paint, being 
an existential medium: 
Language runs up and down, through and round 
things known and things imitated in a way paint 
doesn't: no one ever painted "Put those apples 
in the basket an~ help yourself •.•• 
We know paint is not plum flesh. We do not 
know with the same certainty that our language 
does not simply, mimetically coincide with our 
world. There was a cultural shock when painters 
shifted their attention from imitating apples 
to describing the nature of vision, paint, 
canvas. But the nausea Jean-Paul Sartre felt on 
discovering he could not, with language, 
adequately describe a chestnut tree root is a 
shock of another kind. (It should be noted that 
though he failed to describe the thing 
mathematically, or wi th nouns and colour 
adjectives he did at least evoke it with 
metaphors, seal-skin, serpentine, a tree root 
connected to the world by a man describing a 
vision of unconnectedness.) (166) 
Sartre's "vision of unconnectedness" of course parallels 
Marcus' elm tree experence, but Byatt also identifies her 
own abandoned intention to reach, or at least to 
exercise, a pure language, much like the early 
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Wittgenstein. Byatt, however, in Nietzschean/Derridean 
mode, observes that the original purity of such 
assertive, correlative "truth" quickly dissolves, and 
exists only in the realm of the mythic edenic origin: 
I had the idea when I began this novel, that it 
would be a novel of naming and accuracy. I 
wanted to write a novel as Williams said a poem 
should be: no ideas but in things. I even 
thought of writing without figures of speech, 
but had to give up that idea quite early. 
Adam in the Garden named the flora and fauna 
(and the rocks and stones, presumably, and 
perhaps also the gases and liquids, atoms and 
molecules, protons and electrons). But even in 
the act of naming, we make metaphors. Consider 
the grasses, so carefully distinguished one 
from the other. They are little figures of 
speech. (301) 
Byatt's dismissal of the privileged non-metaphorical 
realm recalls Nietzsche's iconoclastic considerations of 
the nature of language. In his The will To Power, 
Nietzsche asserts that "(W)hat matters with words is 
never the truth, never an adequate expression, " truth 
remaining beyond "the creators of language" (218). The 
metaphorical process merely begins with the word: "A 
nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image--first 
metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound --
second metaphor • .'. " (218). When the word becomes a 
concept, it is still bound up in the endless shifting and 
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renaming process of knowing "numerous individualized, and 
thus unequal actions," or situations or things to which 
we might apply the name of a given concept, "which we 
equate by omitting the unequal ll and then naming with the 
concept (219). The picture of truth that Nietzsche draws 
from all this is an unsettling one: 
What then, is truth? A mobile army of 
metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms--in 
short, a sum of human relations, which have 
been enhanced, transposed, and embellished 
poetically and rhetorically, and which after 
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory 
to people: truths are illusions about which one 
has forgotten that this is what they are; 
metaphors which are worn out and without 
sensuous power; coins which have lost their 
pictures and which now matter only as metal, no 
longer as coins. (219) 
Byatt's focus upon the concept of metaphor, which is 
shared by her character, Frederica, whose Phd thesis will 
be written on metaphor, calls into play the "theological 
delineation between sign and symbol ll (Taylor, Erring 57), 
a distinction noted by Frederica's mentor, Raphael Faber, 
who informs Frederica that 'what she needs is a 
theologian' with whom to discuss metaphor (286). 
Frederica's thesis, which Raphael Faber describes as lIa 
work of incredible theoretical complexity, a life-work," 
promises to approach conflicting views of the quality of 
metaphor, specifically in Milton, based upon a 
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dissociation from "sensibility" which mayor may not have 
occured with Mil ton, and in so doing, to address the 
concept of Incarnation (in Milton and Marvell and so on) 
as perhaps a relocation of that dislocated sensuousness. 
The ironically named Faber, however, reveals himself an 
"artificer" against artifice in his antipathy toward the 
concept of incarnation, and with it, the whole of 
Christianity: 
" .as I see it--the Christian religion 
itself is the final presumptuous image-making. 
I find the Incarnation absurd. I don't say you 
haven't got something, about the metaphoric 
difficulty of making a character out of 
incarnate Christ. But you can't expect me not 
to feel a little repelled. It's simply the 
final graven image, from my point of view." 
(287) 
The fundamental quality of metaphoric incarnation to the 
whole of western thought from Aristotle to post-
Nietzschean thought has 
leastly in his essays in 
metaphysics is described, 
"derivative from metaphor" 
been shown by Derrida, not 
"Whi te Mythology,". in which 
in one of many ways as 
(releve de la metaphore); 
deri vati ve in this sense however, "releve ," is a 
translation of Hegelian Aufheben, and carries its 
paradoxical implications (258). The task of metaphysics 
has been to control the loss which metaphor carries with 
it, the slippage from the realm of the proper name, the 
de-centering of presence, the inability of the symbol to 
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re-present the original--in short, to mask the death of 
God. "Metaphor," says Derrida, "always carries death 
within itself" C"WM" 271), as that which is "carried off 
to a horizon or proper ground, and which must finish by 
rediscovering the origin of its truth"--a failing eternal 
return which marks "Platonic, Aristotelian and cartesian 
discourse," and which is represented in those discourses 
by the images of the Sun and light ("WM" 268-69). Hegel, 
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, utilized 
the images to describe tithe history of the world," as 
traveling East to West, beginning in Asia, ending in 
Europe, as well as the accompanying process of Spirit's 
becoming conscious of itself, symbolized by the 
coincidence of the subject's creative 
considered higher than the external sun 
the light of reason, the metaphor, 
"inner sun," 
("WM" 269). 
the symbol, 
In 
is 
"grounded" and "has roots," which "bestow upon the symbol 
its revelatory power" (Taylor Erring 57). Consider here 
Marcus' contemplation of the tree, bathed in light, and 
in meditation upon the power of his own inner light:· 
here, "between two suns," the end of metaphor becomes, 
as Derrida observes, "an interiorizing anamnesis" ("WM" 
269). This episode takes place within a chapter 
entitled by the printer, despite the author's intentions, 
"A Tree, of Mary, One," a mistranslation of 
WordsworthlO into an image reminiscent of the Stabat 
Mater, upon which Kristeva meditates--both portraying an 
image of the revelation of the virgin before the tree, 
that image which in chapter two recalled Eve's fall and 
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the eucharistic act of the reader before the book (the 
edible tree). Kristeva's reflections from "Stabat Mater," 
are held here in tension: 
"Between two suns," the end of 
metaphor becomes "an 
interiorizing anamnesis." 
Consider the inability of the 
graven image to "present" the 
transcendent, presenting only 
its absence, an unending 
metaphor-making, rather than a 
sUfficient reflective 
"naming. II 
Might the tree of Mary, 
the 
One, 
many? 
re-presentation of the 
have hidden the tree of 
A 
topographical, 
error. 
typographical, 
tropographical 
.A scandalous 
suggestion, masked and 
the eradicated to preserve 
proper, the unity, and the 
authority, of the One. 
The "end of metaphor" 
denotes the 
sufficiency of 
Sun, the Good, 
transcendent, 
end 
the 
the 
of the 
original 
One, the 
in a 
recollection, a remembrance, a 
'Mamma : anamnesis (Kristeva "stabat 
Mater" 166). 
Let a body venture at last 
out of its shelter, take a chance 
with meaning under a veil of words. 
WORD FLESH. FroD one to the other, 
eternally, broken up visions, 
metaphors of the invisible (Kristeva, 
ISMI 162). 
It would seem that the 
'virgin' attribute for Mary is a 
translation error. • The fact 
remains that Western Christianity has 
organized that Itranslation error,' 
projected its own fantasies into it 
and produced one of the lost powerful 
imaginary constructs known in the 
history of civilizations (Kristeva, 
"Stabat Mater" 163). 
The cal. of another life, the 
life of that other who wends his way 
while I relain henceforth like a 
framework. Still Life. There is hi., 
however, his own flesh, which was 
line yesterday. Death, then, how 
could I die to it? ("SM 169). Every 
God, even including the God of the 
recurrent anamnesis of the 
death of the transcendent and 
its kenotic negation. 
The eternal return of re-
presentation is the recurrence 
of the primordial womb, and 
the desire toward unity finds 
that unity marked by 
separation to its core. 
Beginning as negation of 
transcendence; beginning as 
the realm of the mask. 
The endless play of 
metaphor unmasks the self-
sufficiency of the tran-
scendent powers, the One, the 
Good, which, interestingly 
enough, is just what Carel 
Fisher spoke out against, just 
what Marcus Fisher kept alive, 
and just what keeps 
reappearing in Iris Murdoch's 
metaphysical journeys into 
morality ("the good is--in the 
Platonic image of the Sun 
which has dominated Murdoch's 
ethics--the light in which 
human existence is lived" 
[Antonaccio 279]). It is the 
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Word, relies on a mother Goddess. 
Christianity is perhaps also the last 
of the religions to have displayed in 
broad daylight the bipolar structure 
of belief: on the one hand, the 
difficult experience of the Word--a 
passion; on the other, the reassuring 
wrapping in the proverbial iJage of 
the mother--a love. For that reason, 
it seems to Ie that there is only one 
way to go through the religion of the 
Word, or its counterpart, the more or 
less discreet cult of the Mother; it 
is the "artists'" way, those who lake 
up for the vertigo of language 
weakness with the over-saturation of 
siqn-systems ("SM" 176-77). 
! lother is a continuous 
separation, a division of the very 
flesh. And consequently a division of 
language--and it has always been so 
••• (ISMI 178). 
What an inconceivable lania 
it is to aspire to singularity, it is 
not natural, hence it is inhUllan; the 
lania slitten with Oneness (Ithere is 
only One wOlan l ) can only impugn it 
tendency of the Platonic Sun 
to burn away difference, it is 
the tendency of the Eternal to 
negate itself, 
difference to 
to 
the 
reduce 
ash of 
apocalypse, 
retains the 
but that 
fire of 
ash 
that 
burning, or so Derrida writes: 
language, words, ash, cinders, 
bearing the trace of the 
original flame, and that ash 
is seen as fertile soil, the 
ground from which the seed of 
the same grows to preserve the 
originary presence, in absence 
--dissemination, germination: 
"Pure difference, different 
from (it)self, ceases to be 
what it is in order to remain 
what it is. That is the origin 
of history, the going down 
(declin), the setting of the 
sun. • then in place of 
burning all, one begins to 
love flowers. The religion of 
flowers follows the religion 
of the sun" (Derrida, Cinders 
45-46). Of course all this 
should be taken with a grain 
Fountain 258 
by condemning it as masculine. • • 
Wi thin this strange feminine see-saw 
that makes "me" swing fro 1 the 
unnameable community of women over to 
the war of individual singularities, 
it is unsettling to say III •••• Did 
not Christianity attempt, among other 
things, to freeze that see-saw? To 
stop it, tear WODen away frOD its 
rhythl, settle thai peI1lanently in 
the spirit? Too permanently. . • 
("SM" 182-83). 
The love of God and for God 
resides in a gap: the broken space 
Dade explicit by sin on the one side, 
the beyond on the other. 
Discontinuity, lack and 
arbitrariness: topography of the 
sign, of the sy-abolic relation that 
posits Iy otherness as ilpossible. 
Love here, is only for the 
ilpossible. 
For a lother, on the other 
hand, strangely so, the other as 
arbitrary (the child) is taken for 
granted. As far as she is concerned--
impossible, that is just the way it 
is: it is reduced to the implacable. 
The other is inevitable, she seels to 
of salt (lightly), for as 
Nietzsche, quoted by Derrida 
in "The Flowers of Rhetoric: 
The Heliotrope" reminds us, 
"0ne day all that, II that 
all philosophizing 
moralizing, "will be of 
is, 
and 
just 
as much value, and no more, as 
the amount of belief existing 
today in the masculinity or 
feminity of the sunil (IIWM" 
245). 
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say, turn it into a God if you wish, 
it is nevertheless natural, for such 
an other has come out of Iyself, 
which is yet not Iyself but a flow of 
unending germinations, 
cosmos ("SH" 184-85). 
an eternal 
We two remake our world by naming it 
Together, knowing what words mean for us 
And for the others for whom current coin 
Is cold speech-- but we say, the tree, the 
pool, 
And see the fire in air, the sun, our sun, 
Anybody's sun, the world's sun, but here, now 
Particularly our sun. • (Byatt, £ 114: a 
passage from the poetry of Randolph Henry Ash; 
a passage which is particularly meaningful to 
Beatrice Nest, whom Byatt describes as 
"transfigured" at the opening of Ash's grave.) 
Murdoch's heliotropism is shared by Byatt, by her own 
admission, but with a difference; a difference which 
acknowledges, as Nietzsche did, a connection wi th the 
maSCUlinity or femininity 
heliotropic, II says Byatt, 
of the sun. "What I write is 
whose uncompleted PhD thesis 
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dealt with neoplatonic creation myths, in which "the Sun 
is the male Logos, or NOus, or Mind, that penetrated 
Hyle, or matter, or female earth, and brought it to life 
and form" (The Shadow of the Sun xiii). Byatt finds 
this analogy both "exciting and depressing," because of 
its coincident physical truth, given that "life does 
depend absolutely on light, II and analogical falsehood, 
since "there is nothing intrinsically male about the sun, 
or female about the earth" (xiii). In light of this 
male/female geological dichotomy, Byatt states that her 
novels "all think about the problem of female vision, 
female art and thought, using these images (amongst 
others, and not without interest in the male, too) " 
(xiii). "In The Virgin in the Garden," says Byatt, the 
complicated imagery finds "the helpless visionary who saw 
too much light" both male and a mathematician, while the 
"power figure was female, Queen Elizabeth I, who presides 
over the pale world of her successor, all ruddy and 
shining" (xiii). still Life presents Vincent Van Gogh as 
the central figure, Ira whole-hearted sun-driven, light-
driven maker (but who also had problems about sexuality 
and work)" who, while "he was mad with too much light," 
still "got something done, he made something" (xiv). "In 
Possession," says Byatt, "where there are two poets, both 
of whom can and do write, and can and do feel sexual 
passion, even if tragically, the sun becomes quietly 
female for both of them," drawing upon Norse and German 
sources in which the sun is female (xiv). "My poets," Ash 
and Lamotte, says Byatt, "quietly accepted the 
personification, destroying 
wi thout even shouting about 
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the old Nous-Hyle 
it" (xiv) • Altizer, 
myths 
as we 
have seen, in his reflections upon "radical catholicism," 
equates the death of God in the modern world with the 
rise of the feminine deity, a figure found in Dante's 
Beatrice, Blake's Mother of God, and Joyce's Anna Liva 
Plurabelle: 
(I)n the modern world ••• the Christian God and 
the Goddess are at this point one and the same, 
or the redemptive God and the redemptive 
Goddess are inseparable, and so inseparable 
that the redemptive God can now only be 
manifest and actual as the Goddess. Thereby we 
can see the deep necessity of the death of God 
in the modern world, a death or nullification 
which can alone now release an apocalyptic 
epiphany of the Goddess. • ("The 
contemporary Challenge of Radical Catholicism" 
193) 
The presence of the (M)other (and this is no virginal 
feminine repesentation of pure presence, no mere female 
counterpart to the Eternal male), as discussed in chapter 
two, is known in the absence of the Father, of the 
(A)(a)uthor(ity), a death which is a genesis, and a death 
the historical knowledge of which announces the birth of 
a new writing, the reading of which enacts the presence 
in absence of the body of the Author, of the Father, and 
of the SunIl. In his "The Ellipsis of the Sun," within 
"White Mythology," Derrida points out that "there is only 
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one sun in (the Aristotelian) system. The proper name, 
here, is the nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, the 
father of all figures. Everything turns around it, 
everything turns toward it"; but he also points out that 
"if metaphor, the chance and risk of mimesis, can always 
miss the true, it is that metaphor must count with a 
determined absence. • ("WM" 241-243) • It is a 
"reasonable" (that is, for the subject illuminated by the 
light of reason) tendency to denote, to pronounce the 
proper name, but "even in naming, we make metaphors," 
says Byatt, and her post-Nietzschean interpretation of 
language brings into relation her own work as writer as 
well as the work of her characters in correlating, 
contrasting and revisioning narratives, both their own 
and those to which they find themselves related (or not). 
The Virgin in the Garden, still Life, and Time of the 
Angels, present the inevi tabili ty of the breaching of 
uni tary homeostasis, the metaphorical process which is 
that breaching, and the continual masking which, 
acknowledged or not, constitutes its continual and 
simUltaneous confirmation and negation. That breaching is 
known in the negation of eternal return found wi thin 
Altizer's reading of Eliade, Hegel and Nietzsche, and the 
concentration of that reading upon the self-emptying God 
known in the incarnational movements of creation, Fall 
and Crucifixion. It is exercised in Altizer's re-writing 
of the re-writing of' scripture exhibited through Milton, 
Blake and Joyce, and in the developing knowledge of the 
negative movement of the transcendent, a movement known 
Fountain 263 
in the eucharistic language of immanence, a language 
which marks the sacrifice of the (A)(a)uthor-ity and the 
rise of the voice of the repressed. AS the negation of 
the eternal One, that is a voice of plurality. That voice 
is heard in the contemplation of the death of God, a 
contemplation which finds the subject suspended, between 
the symbolic and the semiotic, before the Book, before 
the tree, before the cross as the dreamer of the dream of 
the Rood, faced with the fragment, in that place which is 
the site of jouissance, the site of the breakdown of 
systems of exclusion. It is the one who reads from such a 
posi tion to whom Irigaray writes, "To interpret Him (the 
Crucified) therefore means 'go beyond' if possible 
without return. Not be satisfied with such a love. Leave 
it to the men of ressentiment, and try to create another 
world" (Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, in Oppel 
106). That world is, like Byatt's textual locus, a place 
and time of neither pure cyclicity nor pure linearity, 
but a place which marks the jouissant labor of evolution 
and relati vi ty, a labor which brings forth the birth of 
one outside "proper lineage" and the closed "family 
circle." That is a birth the story of which is 
consistently masked, hidden, discovered and re-wri tten, 
and the story of that origin, like the story of Maia's 
origin, is a story without end. 
Shall we know the death of God as the genesis of a 
"return to an original Christianity" which is also a 
negation of 
Christianity" 
theology? Altizer's return to "original 
is a return to a "historically evolving 
faith," which acknowledges 
metaphoric continuation. The 
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the inevitability 
movement away from 
of 
the 
eternally returning unity, represented by the One, the 
Good, the patriarchal Sun, the eternal, unmoving God of 
Christendom, requires an understanding in which God is no 
longer an objective subject of theology, but the abject 
Word which is written from within the poetic discourse, 
not the origin of metaphor, but the trace of absence 
which marks the course of metaphorical anamnesis. The 
negation of eternal return is the birth of historically 
evolving faith, a universal faith freed from the limits 
of the phallogocentric, unitary oppression for the sake 
of the economy of the proper. For those who would read 
religiously, the self-kenotic God, the God who is other-
than-God, requires theology which is other-than-theology, 
a writing which is the total presence of apocalypse, the 
embodiment of the God who is Word. 
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NOTES 
1 It should be stressed that Altizer's refusal to 
name God as eternally transcendent does not preclude the 
possibility of God's "otherness;" as Altizer specifies in 
The Self-Embodiment of God: 
The only God who can be named is the God who is 
finally other, for God is other in being named, 
and God is finally other in being named as God. 
To speak of God is to speak of the God who 
is finally other, finally and wholly other, and 
finally other than Himself (sic). Only by being 
other than Himself can God be finally other, 
for only by being other than Himself can God 
lose, and finally lose, an identity which is 
eternally the same. (33) 
2 Vico, Byatt tells us, "had looked for historical 
fact in the poetic metaphors of myth and legend; this 
piecing together was his 'new science' " (E. 3). Kuntz 
describes vico's efforts as a marriage of linearity and 
cyclici ty in which the consistency of cycles points to 
the reassurance of Divine design in a dynamic of harmaony 
and equilibrium (520-530). It is from this grand system 
(specifically Ash's copy, his personal property, the 
contents of which had not been catalogued by the 
library), the margins of which Roland studies, that the 
fragment falls, and the decentering begins. 
3 For example, Rosemary Reuther cites the Biblical 
prophetic tradition as providing a basis for biblical 
critique. The "prophetic principle" allows for the 
critical establishment of historically evolving norms by 
which texts may be regarded as authoritative, even as the 
early church "set aside as no longer normative" much of 
Hebrew ritual law (Sexism and God-Talk 23). Biblical 
fai th, says Reuther, informed by a prophetic tradition, 
"constantly criticizes and renews itself and its own 
vision" (24). 
4 In 1966 Derrida had pre~ented "Structure, Sign and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" at a 
conference at Johns Hopkins, which, according to 
Christopher Norris, "marked the first impact of 
deconstruction among North American literary critics 
(242). It was also in 1966 that Time magazine ran a cover 
story on death of God theology, supported by a cover on 
which big red letters upon a solid black background read 
"Is God Dead?" ("Toward a Hidden God," April 8, 1966) 
5 It was as a result of its recommendation by A.S. 
Byatt that I came to read The Time of the Angels. In a 
recent phone conversation, Byatt suggested that The Time 
of the Angels had been an attempt to deal literarily with 
the theme of the death of God, and according to Murdoch 
herself, had left more to be done. Byatt's forthcoming 
Babel Tower would attempt to accomplish at least some of 
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what Murdoch had left undone. Further, Byatt is, in the 
process of researching for the writing of Babel Tower, 
reading Altizer--specifically The Genesis of God. 
6 The sound of apocalypse is of course the death 
knell, Derrida's Glas, Klang, le son of the the death of 
God (Taylor, A 267-303). The excess of Heidegger's 
theoretical words speak only silence to Pattie, a 
deafening silence which foreshadows the approaching death 
of her God. 
7 Despite his use of death of God language, Carel 
reveals his fundamental motivation to be what Altizer 
refers to as an "ultimate nihilism," a "sacrifice of God 
for 'the nothing'" (GOG 150). That "nothing" which is a 
Freudian image of the primordial womb, a nothing which 
"disguises an eternal death," is the pathological desire 
of the Oedipal drive toward oneness with the "ultimate 
womb which is the womb of all and everything" (GOG 151). 
Such a desire overlooks the inherent separation wi thin 
the maternal relationship, a separation highlighted by 
Kristeva and Irigaray (Irigaray, Je. Tu. Nous 39; 
Kristeva, "Stabat Mater" 178). 
8 Derrida notes the connection between this act of 
forbidden V1Sl0n and the Apocalypse, and also the 
deferral of apocalypse in "Of An Apocalyptic Tone 
Recently Adopted in Philosophy." 
Apokalupto, I disclose I uncover, I 
unveil, I reveal the thing that can be a part 
of the body, the head or the eyes, a secret 
part, the genitals or whatever might be hidden, 
a secret, the thing to be dissembled, a thing 
that does not show itself or say itself, that 
perhaps signifies itself but cannot or must not 
be handed over to its self-evidence. (64) 
9 In a recent letter Byatt explained, 
The whole of The Virgin in the Garden 
turns on cyclical history (renaissance" and 
Christian linear history (resurrection) and 
therefore on grass on the one hand and 
Marvell's innocent garden with its grass and 
innocent red and white, and the red of blood 
and the stone of death. I also think that the 
figure I "found" while writing that novel, 
Spenser's Dame Nature, hermaphrodite (Hermes, 
Aphrodite and as you say Hermes is trismegistus 
and the Psychopomp ••• ) is in fact the Nature 
who haunts and opposes God (Christ) in In 
Memoriam and is red in tooth and claw (and also 
hermaphrodite "behind the veil" see Ricks' note 
on the figure of the Sais-temple). And these 
figures are there in Angels and Insects (30 
July, 1994). 
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10 Byatt has pointed out that the phrase is a 
printer's error for what should be "A Tree, of Many, 
One," from Wordsworth's "Immortality Ode. II Despite her 
objections, the mistake continues to be repeated (letter 
to the author, 5 May 1994). 
11 Eliade elucidates the connection between the 
origin of Christianity as an "official" religion and the 
solar Sol Invictus cult, with which Constantine was 
associated, noting the heavenly vision of Constantine and 
the discrepancies regarding the interpretation and origin 
of the cipher, IHS, the abbreviated form of the name of 
Christ, the Son. Constantine considered the sun, and 
possibly then, the Son, as "the most perfect symbol of 
God" (Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas 2:411). 
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